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Abstract 
 
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm 
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across 
firms, even within the same industry.  This research assumes that the same compensation 
model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory variables, and coefficients on those 
variables) can be applied to all CEOs.  If you will, extant research assumes a one-size-
fits-all CEO compensation model approach to empirical analysis.  Furthermore, much of 
this research also examines firm performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all 
firm performance model.  I develop a proxy for CEO managerial power that I use to rank 
and classify CEOs into two groups: Elite CEOs (above a cut-off by the ranking) and Non-
Elite CEOs (the remaining CEOs).  As a note, I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by 
my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply ranking the CEOs by their 
total direct compensation.  My empirical results show that a one-size-fits-all model can 
be rejected. That is, the estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm 
performance models are different for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs.  Also, 
firms with Elite CEOs do not have higher performance.  This suggests that Elite CEOs 
extract excessive compensation due to undue influence over their respective boards rather 
than to superior performance.  These findings have both academic and corporate policy 
implications. 
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1 Overview 
The tremendous increase in CEO total compensation and the increased use of and 
payouts from stock options since the early 1990s has generated considerable debate and 
concern in boardrooms, in the financial press, and among academics.  The following 
quote from the New York Times nicely portrays the prevailing sentiment regarding this 
issue.  “Corporations have been wrestling for decades with ways to link pay to 
performance, with little success.  In the 1980’s, they tried tying cash bonuses to rising 
sales or earnings, only to find that the payouts encouraged executives to make decisions 
that yielded short-term results—and often longer-term disasters.  In the 1990’s, 
companies tried stock options, figuring that they would be the best way to tie the 
executives’ fortunes to those of shareholders.  Instead, they prompted some managers to 
time decisions to pump up the stock price just when the options vested.  Bonuses and 
options at Tyco and Enron, for example, did little to prevent widespread accounting 
frauds at either company.  The secret to linking pay to performance remains elusive.” 
Deutsch (2005)  
A particular body of research examines this issue of linking executive pay to firm 
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across 
firms, even within the same industry.  This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as 
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role 
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm 
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain 
‘why’ CEO compensation varies widely in cross-section.  However, this research 
assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory 
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variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this 
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are 
tested).  If you will, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model 
approach to empirical analysis.  Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm 
performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting 
that only a few CEOs have sufficient managerial power or influence to extract excessive 
compensation.  These authors argue that “U.S. executive pay may not be quite the 
runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.”  However, I find no research that 
thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a class of ‘only a few’ powerful 
CEOs has on the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation and firm performance models.  In 
other words, does this class of powerful CEOs affect only the residual term in the models, 
or does it also affect the estimated coefficients of the model?  If so, including these CEOs 
in a sample without making any special adjustments might lead to a spurious 
interpretation of the resulting estimated model. In addition, the literature has not 
examined whether the firms that are managed by such CEOs experience superior 
performance.  This void in the literature motivates my research. 
To empirically test the Holmstrom and Kaplan hypothesis that only a few 
powerful CEOs can extract excessive compensation, a proxy for CEO managerial power 
is required.  I develop two separate proxies for CEO managerial power that I use to rank 
and classify the CEOs.1  First, I use the ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the 
                                                 
1 I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply 
ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation. 
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total direct compensation of the highest paid executive, other than the CEO, as a proxy 
for CEO managerial power.  This ratio has been used in previous literature for a slightly 
different purpose, as I describe in Section 3.  Second, for robustness and sensitivity tests I 
develop a concentration measure of CEOs compensation, based on the top five 
executive’s compensation at each firm, which is analogous to the concentration ratio used 
to measure industry competitiveness (the Herfindahl Index). 
I hypothesize that the most powerful (or “Elite”) class of CEOs, as defined by my 
proxies, receives excessive compensation relative to the class of other (or “Non-Elite”) 
CEOs.  For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs receive higher and 
different compensation, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs; and if 
so, how are Elite CEOs compensated differently?  Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite 
CEOs’ firms do not experience superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’ 
firms.  For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; and if so, 
how do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently?   
If Elite CEOs receive higher compensation but their firms do not provide superior 
performance, then this suggests that Elite CEOs’ compensation is due to their influence 
over their board rather than to their ability.  Also, if the firms of Elite CEOs do not have 
superior performance, then the inclusion of Elite CEOs in the samples of previous studies 
of the links between firm performance and CEO compensation might have biased the 
results.  In other words, it is possible that the link between firm performance and CEO 
compensation is much stronger for most CEOs than previously thought. 
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My empirical results show that one-size-fits-all models can be rejected. The 
estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm performance models are different 
for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs.  Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not 
have higher performance.  In fact, I find evidence suggesting that the presence of an Elite 
CEO hurts firm performance and value.  This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive 
compensation due to influence over their respective boards rather than to superior 
performance.  These findings have two important implications.  First, it is possible that 
previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO 
compensation and firm performance might be distorted because previous studies have 
failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of highly-paid influential 
CEOs.  Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and policy makers to understand 
the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and firm performance.    
This dissertation has two distinct components. The first is a broad survey of the 
literature addressing the structure of CEO compensation, the relationships between CEO 
compensation and firm performance, and the relationship between corporate governance 
and CEO compensation. The second component is an empirical test of several very 
specific hypotheses related to CEO managerial power, compensation, and firm 
performance.  Note that the survey is intentionally broad so that it could be used as a 
primer on CEO compensation and firm performance.  As such, the survey does not 
specifically inform this research.  Instead, the specific literature review that motivates the 
empirical research is provided in Section 3. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Section 2 is the broad 
literature survey of previous research that investigates the structure of CEO 
 4
compensation, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, and 
the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation.  Section 3 
reviews the specific literature that motivates this research.  Section 4 describes the 
methodology for this research.  Section 5 describes the data set used for this research.  
Section 6 presents and reviews the results.  Section 7 offers closing comments. 
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2 Literature Survey 
The focus of this literature survey is on the body of previous research that 
investigates the structure of CEO compensation, the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance, or the relationship between corporate governance 
and CEO compensation.  This survey is intentionally broad so that it could be used as a 
primer on CEO compensation. As such, the survey does not specifically inform this 
research.  Instead, the specific literature review that motivates this research is provided in 
Section 3. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide a brief description of agency theory and corporate 
governance, respectively, as a lead in to a more thorough discussion of internal 
governance and external governance in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.  Sections 2.3 
and 2.4 are laid out in a similar format as a review of corporate governance presented in 
Gillan (2006). 
   
2.1 Agency Theory 
The separation of ownership (stockholders) and control (management) of the 
modern corporation is the classic agency problem suggested by Berle and Means (1932) 
and formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that gives rise to potential conflicts 
between stockholders and management.  In a large corporation, the ownership may be so 
diffuse that the stockholders cannot even make known their objectives let alone control or 
influence management.  This creates a situation where management may act in its own 
best interest rather than the interests of the stockholders.  However, stockholders do 
delegate decision-making and operational authority to management expecting that 
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management will act in the best interest of the stockholders.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
showed that stockholders could assure themselves that management will make optimal 
decisions (1) only if management is monitored and (2) only if appropriate incentives are 
given to management.  This issue of potential conflict between stockholders and 
management gives rise to the topic and purpose of corporate governance. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is generally considered to be the set of complementary 
mechanisms intended to align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of 
stockholders.  Corporate governance entails the relationships among a firm’s 
stockholders, board of directors, and executive management.  These relationships provide 
the framework within which objectives are set and performance is monitored.  Corporate 
governance is also the framework by which management is monitored by the board of 
directors and incentives are set by the board of directors in an attempt to align 
management with the objectives of the stockholders.  These last two functions of 
corporate governance relate directly to the two points made by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) noted previously.  Within the corporate governance literature there is research 
related to both monitoring and incentives (executive compensation).  The focus of this 
paper is to extend the literature related to executive compensation, particularly the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. 
There are several definitions of corporate governance found in the literature.  
Zingales (1998a) views corporate governance systems as the complex set of constraints 
that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm.  Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of financing 
to corporations assure themselves of getting an acceptable return on their investment. 
Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as the system of laws, rules, and 
factors that control operations at a company. Regardless of the particular definition used, 
researchers often view corporate governance mechanisms as falling into one of two 
categories: those internal to the firm and those external to the firm.  I review the 
literature on these two categories in turn.  While there is a tremendous volume of 
literature available on corporate governance my focus is on the research that relates to 
CEO compensation, executive compensation, or firm performance. 
 
2.3 Internal Governance 
This sub-section reviews the following elements of the corporate governance 
system that are internal to the firm: board of directors, managerial incentives, capital 
structure, bylaw and charter provisions, and managerial power.    
 
2.3.1 Board of Directors 
The board of directors (‘board’) has a fiduciary obligation to stockholders and the 
responsibility to monitor the executives’ and firm’s performance, hire and fire the CEO, 
set executive compensation, and provide strategic direction; obviously the board’s role in 
corporate governance is important. Traditionally, research on corporate boards has 
focused on links between board characteristics and CEO compensation, firm value and 
performance, governance choices, and investment and financing decisions (including the 
sale of the firm).  Unfortunately, the impact of board structure on executive compensation 
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and firm performance is unclear given the mixed results of empirical research. 
Furthermore, there is no clear evidence in the literature for the optimal board structure 
(number of directors, number of outside versus inside directors, ownership, etc.) as it 
relates to firm performance or executive compensation. 
The literature examines corporate governance issues that limit the effectiveness of 
the board of directors.  Jensen (1993) argues that typical boards of directors often fail to 
effectively monitor the firm’s management for several reasons: boards have a collegial 
culture that does not encourage constructive criticism, boards are too large and 
cumbersome, there is insufficient equity ownership represented on the board, and because 
of the informational asymmetry that exists between management and the board.  Crystal 
(1991) argues that directors are ineffective at setting CEO compensation because outside 
directors are hired and can be fired by the CEO (some describe this as managerial power 
or cronyism).  Goyal and Park (2002) find that CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm 
performance when the CEO is also the chairman of the board suggesting that this duality 
limits the board’s effectiveness. 
Some argue that the board composition of outside directors (directors that are not 
employees of the firm) and inside directors (employees of the firm) is an indication of the 
board’s ability to act independently of the CEO.  The relationship between board 
composition and executive compensation has been examined in many empirical papers.  
Hallock (1997) finds CEO compensation is higher at firms with interlocked directors 
(interlocked is defined as firm A’s chairman or CEO sits on the board of another firm 
whose chairman or CEO sits on the board of firm A) which suggests mutual back 
scratching or cronyism.  Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) find CEOs receive higher 
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pay with a higher percent of board members appointed by CEO (mutual back scratching 
or cronyism) and find a positive relation between CEO compensation and the percent of 
outside directors.   
However, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) do not find that CEO compensation is 
related to the percent of outside directors.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that 
a weak board composition, including interlocked, gray, and busy directors, is associated 
with higher CEO compensation and lower firm performance.  This research does not 
explicitly identify the optimal board composition but it implies that board composition 
does matter.  The research implies, at least to me, that a higher percent of outside 
directors is better provided that the outside directors are not hired by the CEO, 
interlocked, gray, and too busy – which in practice is probably a pretty tall order.       
The relationship between board composition and firm value and performance has 
also been investigated and again the results are mixed.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find 
a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of an additional outside director 
suggesting the market perceives this action as an improvement to the firm’s governance.  
However to the contrary, Yermack (1996) finds no association between percent of 
outside directors and firm performance.  Yermack (1996) finds that firm value and 
performance is decreasing function of board size which implies having too many 
directors can make the board ineffective but it does not speak to the optimal composition 
of outside versus inside directors.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no meaningful 
relation between various characteristics of board composition and firm performance. 
Recent empirical work by Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) examines the 
relationship between board characteristics (particularly director compensation) and CEO 
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compensation. The authors suggest that CEO and director compensation levels may be 
related for one of several possible reasons.  For instance, a negative relation between 
CEO compensation and directors’ compensation could exist if directors’ increased effort 
substitutes for a lack of CEO effort.  Alternatively, a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and directors’ compensation could exist for two reasons: (1) if the firm is 
large and complex, this affects the skill and effort required of both the CEO and the 
directors or (2) a positive relation could reflect cronyism, where the CEO and the 
directors put their joint interests ahead of the interests of the stockholders. 
In order to distinguish between these alternative explanations, Brick, Palmon and 
Wald (2006) model CEO and director compensation and find a significant positive 
relation between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation.  The 
authors regress the future firm performance on excess CEO compensation and excess 
director compensation.  If cronyism were the primary reason for the positive relationship 
between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation, they would expect 
a negative relationship between future firm performance and excess CEO and director 
compensations.  This negative association between excess compensation and future firm 
performance would reflect the suboptimal performance of a CEO and directors that put 
self-interest ahead of stockholder interests.   
In contrast, if firm risk and complexity were the primary reasons for a positive 
relationship between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation, they 
would expect a weakly positive impact on firm performance.  They find that the excess 
compensations are associated with poor firm performance in the future (based on return 
on assets) which they interpret as suggesting cronyism or mutual back-scratching.  That 
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is, excess directors’ compensation compromises the directors’ independence and leads to 
overpayment of CEOs and poor firm performance in the future.      
The matter of contradictory results aside, I will follow the pattern of the recent 
research and include a firm governance index in my models (this is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4).     
 
2.3.2 Managerial Incentives 
Compensation policies, in particular the incentive component of compensation, 
set by boards can play an important aspect of internal governance in addressing the 
potential agency problems between stockholders and CEOs.  During the 1980s and 
1990s, academics and practitioners alike argued in favor of equity-based compensation to 
better align the interests of stockholders and CEOs.  Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and 
Yermack (1995) each provide empirical evidence that CEO compensation is not as 
sensitive to stockholder returns as is, in their opinions, necessary to control for the 
potential agency problems.  The research paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990a) led to an 
article by Jensen and Murphy (1990b) that was published in the Harvard Business 
Review.  These research papers and the article, coupled with the support of compensation 
consultants, may have contributed to some degree at least to the increased use of equity-
based compensation for executives throughout the 1990s.   
The increased use of equity-based compensation is clearly evidenced by the 
following information.  Murphy (1999) presents equity-based compensation data, in 1996 
constant dollars, for CEOs of S&P 500 firms for the period of 1970 to 1996.  The equity-
based compensation as a percent of total compensation increased from 0% (1970) to 5% 
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(1976) to 20% (1980) to 28% (1990) to 45% (1996).  It is interesting and curious that 
CEOs received very little of their total compensation in the form of equity-based 
compensation prior to Jensen and Meckling (1976) .  Research by Hall (2003)  tells a 
similar story as the author reports that, in 1984, less than one-half of the CEOs of 
publicly traded U.S. corporations were granted stock or stock options in a given year and 
equity-based compensation comprised less than 1% of total CEO pay for the median firm.  
By 2001, equity-based compensation accounted for approximately two-thirds of total 
CEO pay for the median firm. 
Whether or not it is coincidental to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen and 
Murphy (1990a), and Jensen and Murphy (1990b), it is clearly evident that the equity-
based portion of CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the early 1970s.  
Another possible explanation for the proliferation of stock option grants relates to the 
technology boom of the 1990s.  So-called "new economy" firms (high-tech and dot-com 
firms) used large stock option grants in lieu of cash to recruit top managers from "old 
economy” firms.  Consequently, old economy firms were forced to use more stock option 
based compensation in order to retain top management.  During the boom, these stock 
option grants for both the old and new economy firms were extremely valuable.  
As stated by Murphy (2002) the compensation practices of new economy firms 
had a strong influence on all other firms in the 1990s, as stock options became an 
increasingly large component of compensation packages.  Many agree that because of the 
favorable accounting treatment, that stock option were not expensed in the year of grant, 
the stock options seemed a cheap way of enhancing compensation and the competitive 
recruitment pressures pushed the size of stock option grants.  The influence of new 
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economy firms on executive compensation practices in the 1990s also fits the collapse of 
the technology bubble (new economy firms) in 2000 leading to a subsequent decline in 
executive compensation.  Jensen and Murphy (2004) report that the average 
compensation of CEOs of the S&P 500 firms fell after the market crash in 2000 and by 
2002, the percentage of stock-related compensation fell as well. 
This growth in the use of stock options as a component of executive 
compensation has become extremely controversial and openly debated.  Proponents make 
the argument that the use of stock options better aligns CEO’s wealth with stockholders’ 
wealth, which reduces the potential agency problems.  Detractors make the following 
counter arguments: (1) there is a disconnection between CEO compensation and firm 
performance, (2) CEOs have no downside risk if the stock options expire out of the 
money, (3) the open ended upside potential of the stock options (with no downside risk) 
give the CEO incentive to take excess business risk and to fraudulently manipulate the 
firm’s stock price.  There has been much research on each of these counterarguments but 
the following review focuses only on the landmark and recent research on the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.   
 Mehran (1995) finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
CEOs’ equity-based compensation and firm performance (using both Tobin’s Q and 
return on assets).  Jensen and Murphy (1990a) find a statistically significant relationship 
but weak economic relationship, in their opinion, between changes in stockholder wealth 
and changes in CEO’s wealth.  Hall and Liebman (1998) find a strong relationship 
between percentage change in firm value and CEO compensation, particularly the equity-
based compensation component.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that excess 
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compensation has a negative relationship with subsequent firm operating performance 
and stock returns.   
 Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation (both equity and non-equity based compensation) and lagged firm 
performance (both return on assets and stockholder return).  Brick, Palmon and Wald 
(2006) find a negative relationship between subsequent year excess returns and both CEO 
and director total compensation.  A quote from Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) provides a 
nice summary description of the results of the research on the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation, “There is presently no theoretical or empirical 
consensus on how stock options and managerial equity ownership affect firm 
performance.”  
One of the issues with the aforementioned research is that the papers published 
prior to 2000 had limitations in the data sets.  Mehran (1995) performs cross-sectional 
analysis of the relationship between executive compensation, ownership structure, and 
firms’ performance based on the average of 1979 and 1980 data for 153 randomly 
selected manufacturing firms.  Mehran (1995) had several interesting findings but 
obviously we gain no insights on the temporal relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance.   
The Jensen and Murphy (1990a)  use several data sets of which one is based on all 
2,213 CEOs listed in the Executive Compensation Surveys published in Forbes from 
1974 to 1986.  An obvious limitation to this data set is that the Forbes definition of total 
compensation does not include any value for newly awarded stock options or the value 
recognized from the exercise of stock options.  While stock options were not as 
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commonplace then it was still a significant portion of the CEOs compensation.  The 
authors recognized this limitation of the data set and hand collected stock option 
information on a sample of 73 manufacturing firms for the period 1969 to 1983.  The 
obvious trade off here is a more thorough measure of changes in CEO wealth but for 
fewer firms.    
The Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) data set was for 205 publicly traded 
firms for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984.  The data was provided by a major 
compensation consultant and was rich in the specifics of the executives’ compensation.  
The authors actually cite three advantages to this data set: (1) the data set predates the 
controversy over corporate governance and thus potentially provides more powerful tests 
of the importance of corporate governance, (2) the availability of a long time series of 
subsequent firm performance, and (3) the detail of the compensation components.  This 
would be a great data set if the compensation were extended for much longer than just 
three years.   
The Hall and Liebman (1998) data set contained executive compensation and firm 
performance information on 478 firms for the period of 1980 through 1994.  This is 
another rich data set but even it has shortcomings as it overlays a particularly robust 
period in the stock market.  The ideal data set would cover about 50 years of history 
comprising several bull and bear cycles in the stock market and provide extensive history 
of executive compensation and firm performance prior to and throughout the period of 
the abundant use of stock options.  Unfortunately, that data set is unobtainable!  
Mr. Biggs, former Chairman and CEO of TIAA-CREF, and Mr. Bogle, founder of 
The Vanguard Group, are not academic researchers.  However, both are well revered in 
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the investment community and both have been very vocal with their opinions regarding 
managerial incentives, particularly equity-based compensation.  Biggs (2005) quotes a 
report from The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 
that described the 1990s as a “perfect storm – a confluence of events in the compensation 
area which created an environment ripe for abuse”.  Biggs (2005) notes two important 
elements of the report were the sometimes extraordinary payments made to leaders of 
failing companies and the dramatic windfalls given to almost all executives during the 
1990s.  The following quote from Bogle (2005) summarizes his opinion regarding equity-
based compensation, “It is said that stock option plans align the interests of managers 
with the interests of the owners. Seldom has a more untoward lie been foisted on the 
American public.  Options do no such thing.  They have a lottery-like benefit because 
executives do not hold their stock.  Academic studies have shown that as soon as their 
options vest, executives exercise the options and proceed to sell the shares almost 
immediately.  Executives are not stockholders; they're gamblers in the stock market 
lottery.” 
2.3.2.1 Arm’s Length Contracting 
Corporate governance theory states that boards set CEO compensation as guided 
by stockholders interests and therefore operate at arm’s length from the CEOs whose 
compensation they set.  This notion that boards contract CEO compensation at arm’s 
length is a fundamental premise in the corporate world and in most academic research.  In 
the corporate world, this premise serves as the basis for laws, public policy, and 
justification of the boards’ compensation decision to stockholders, policymakers, and 
courts.  However, some researchers have considered the disconnection between CEO 
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compensation and firm performance to be an arm’s length contracting (or ‘optimal 
contracting’) problem.  A review of this line of research follows but unfortunately the 
findings are inconsistent.   
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found an inconsistent relationship between the 
level of top managements’ and the boards’ percentage ownership of the firm with firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q).  This and any other research that does not find a consistent 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance implies either 
implicitly or maybe even explicitly that the process for contracting CEO compensation is 
largely inefficient and therefore does not minimize agency costs.  However, this point of 
view that most boards are contracting CEO compensation inefficiently is difficult to 
accept because the labor market, the stock market, and the market for control should 
work to correct such inefficiencies.  Others such as Fama (1980) argue the opposing point 
of view that transactions costs in the aforementioned markets are so small that all agency 
costs are eliminated.  However, this point of view overlooks the information and 
contracting costs, and the frictions in the markets.   
Later research by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Murphy (2002) develop 
theories that incorporate the attractive features of these opposing views.  They argue that 
firms in general contract optimally, but that transaction costs prohibit continuous re-
contracting for the frequent changes in the relationship between the parties involved in 
the contracts.  Since contracting is not continuous, the terms of firms’ contracts gradually 
deviate from the optimal arrangement.  Contracting theory models such as from John and 
John (1993) predict that in situations with an increase in the agency costs of equity and a 
decrease in the agency costs of debt should lead to an increased use of stock option based 
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compensation.  This theory is supported by the research by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) 
which provides evidence of an increase in the agency costs of equity and a decrease in the 
agency costs of debt from the beginning to the end of the 1990s which in turn supports 
the increased use of stock option based compensation throughout the 1990s.    
A strain of research investigates the agency problems that could lead managers to 
over-invest (empire-building to gain private benefits) or under-invest (shirking duties to 
avoid personal costs) in projects.  Certainly stockholders and boards want to eliminate or 
at least minimize these agency problems, since both managers’ private benefits and 
private costs can ultimately reduce firm value. An obvious method for addressing these 
agency problems is through the optimal contracting of managements’ incentives.  Some 
research finds that managers are empire-builders to gain private benefits such as 
additional compensation and more prestige.  Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1993) argue that 
managers invest in negative net present value projects because the managers derive 
private benefits from controlling more assets.  Along the same lines, Hennessy and Levy 
(2003) find that managers continue to invest in projects even after investing in all 
available positive net present value projects.   
Other research finds that managers shirk duties associated with investing in 
projects to avoid the incremental work associated with managing additional assets.  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that when new laws are implemented that protect 
a firm from the threat of takeover that both the destruction of old plants and the 
construction of new plants falls.  This suggest that managers under-invest to shirk the 
incremental duties associated with tearing down old plans and building new plants.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) use an optimal contracting model to show that the 
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relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is 
insufficient to determine whether or not managers have private benefits associated with 
empire-building.  This leads the authors to estimate the joint relationships between 
incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment.  This approach 
provides results showing that investment is increasing in incentives and that firm 
performance is increasing in incentives. Taken together, these results are consistent with 
managers having private costs of investment and that the agency problem of 
underinvestment is mitigated through the use of optimal incentive contracts.    
2.3.2.2 Tournament Theory 
This paragraph on tournament theory paraphrases comments made in Gordon 
(2005).  The author notes that a body of labor research views CEO compensation as part 
of the prize for winning a "tournament" against other managers and that the prize 
includes rewards for the prior effort of all competing managers.  These tournaments for 
promotion occur in situations where it is difficult to accurately measure individual 
performance among competitors for the promotion.  Therefore, firms implicitly promise 
to promote and reward the winner of the tournament.  In keeping with this theory, the 
competitors contribute a portion of their current implicit wage in order to have the 
opportunity to compete in the tournament for a better position with greater compensation.  
All of this suggests that the optimal CEO compensation package might very well consist 
of rewards for not only current and future performance but also for the firm’s past 
performance as part of the prize for winning the tournament. 
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2.3.3 Capital Structure 
The following reviews the literature on capital structure from two perspectives: 
agency problems of debt and agency problems of equity. 
2.3.3.1 Agency Problems of Debt 
Theory suggests that increasing levels of debt can act as a self-enforcing 
governance mechanism as increasing levels of debt forces managers to use discretionary 
cash flow to satisfy interest and principle payments rather than on selfish pursuits such as 
empire-building or perquisites.  Research by Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen 
(1993) confirms that debt mitigates the potential agency costs of free cash flow.  Allen 
and Gale (2000) make the counter-argument that most firms can easily meet interest and 
principle payments and also note that firms often rely on internal financing. 
 Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) use the firm’s leverage 
(debt to equity ratio) as a proxy for evaluating the agency problems of debt.  Bryan, Nash 
and Patel (2006) argue that proxies that pinpoint specific conflicts between stockholders 
and bondholders should provide greater insights than the leverage variable.  Therefore, 
Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) develop separate proxies for three specific agency 
problems of debt: underinvestment, asset substitution, and firm financial distress.  I 
discuss these three specific agency problems of debt in order. 
2.3.3.1.1 Underinvestment 
Myers (1977) identifies a potential underinvestment problem for highly leveraged 
firms with relatively more growth opportunities.  These highly leveraged firms will need 
an equity infusion in order to have the capital to invest in the growth opportunities: while 
an equity infusion is certainly acceptable to the bondholders it may not be attractive to 
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the stockholders.  If the stockholders decide against an equity infusion then the firm has 
an underinvestment problem.  However, Myers (1977) suggests that firms with relatively 
more growth opportunities that use shorter term debt, which is lower risk to the 
bondholders, should be able mitigate this underinvestment problem more effectively than 
similar firms that use more long term debt, which has higher risk to the bondholders.  
That is, firms with a lower risk capital structure should have better opportunities to raise 
new capital.   
 Begley and Feltham (1999a) contend that while increasing levels of equity-based 
compensation can better align stockholder and manager interests it can exacerbate the 
underinvestment problem because management will become more protective of the 
stockholders, including managements, capital.    This suggests that firms with relatively 
more growth opportunities and that also use shorter term debt can use greater amounts of 
equity-based compensation than similar firms with longer term debt.  This is possible 
since the firms with shorter term debt have less of an underinvestment problem from their 
capital structure and can issue more equity-based compensation and still have less overall 
of an underinvestment problem than similar firms with longer term debt.  This is 
confirmed by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) that find a statistically significant positive 
relationship between their proxy for short term debt and the use of stock option based 
compensation for the sub-sample period of 1992 to 1995.  However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant for their full sample period of 1992 to 1999 or the sub-sample 
period of 1996 to 1999. 
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2.3.3.1.2 Asset Substitution 
Asset substitution is when stockholders in a leveraged firm expropriate wealth 
from bondholders by switching investments from safer to riskier projects.  The theory is 
that the riskier projects have more upside potential than the safer projects and the 
shareholders stand to gain more from any realized upside potential than do the 
bondholders.  John and John (1993) contend that the issuance of convertible bonds 
mitigates the asset substitution problem because it reduces the opportunity to transfer 
wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders.  The reason is because the convertible 
bondholders have the option to become stockholders and participate in any increase in the 
stock price.  The asset substitution problem is potentially greater for firms with relatively 
more growth opportunities because there are more opportunities for the stockholders to 
expropriate wealth from the bondholders.  Combining the two strains of logic suggests 
that firms with relatively more growth opportunities can mitigate the agency costs of 
asset substitution by using more convertible debt.   
On another front, John and John (1993), Yermack (1995) and Begley and Feltham 
(1999a) argue that asset substitution is increasingly more likely as management receives 
increasing levels of equity-based compensation.  Management has the inside information 
on the risk level of the projects and can invest in the riskier projects to expropriate wealth 
for themselves.   Incorporating this logic suggests that for firms with relatively more 
growth opportunities, using relatively more convertible debt mitigates the asset 
substitution problem and can therefore issue more equity-based compensation and still 
have less overall of an asset substitution problem than similar firms with relatively less 
convertible debt.  The reason a firm wants to even issue the equity-based compensation at 
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all is to; in theory at least, better align the stockholders and the managers’ interests, even 
though as noted above increased levels of equity-based compensation can lead to an asset 
substitution problem.  Since convertible debt mitigates the asset substitution problem for 
firms with relatively more growth opportunities, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) expect and 
find a statistically significant positive relationship between their convertible debt and 
growth opportunity interaction term and the use of stock option based compensation for 
the their full sample period of 1992 to 1999. 
2.3.3.1.3 Financial Distress 
Circumstances where it is uncertain that bondholders will receive contracted 
payments from the firm lead to conflicts between bondholders and stockholders.  Since 
financial distress restricts a firm’s ability to make the contracted payments to the 
bondholders infers that financial distress exacerbates the agency problems of debt.  
Therefore, firms prone to financial distress should design CEO compensation such that 
the CEO’s interests are aligned with the interests of the bondholders.  That is, firms with 
a greater propensity for financial distress should use more non-equity based 
compensation and firms less prone to financial distress can use more equity-based 
compensation.  Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) measure the likelihood of financial distress 
by calculating the Z-score for each firm; see Altman (1993) for an explanation of the Z-
score.  Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find the expected negative relationship between the 
likelihood of financial distress and the use of stock option based compensation for some 
but not all of their cases.  
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2.3.3.2 Agency Problems of Outside Equity 
Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) develop separate proxies for five specific agency 
problems of equity: namely, managerial shirking, monitoring issues associated with 
growth options, monitoring issues associated with firm size, poor firm performance, and 
excess free cash flow.  I discuss these five specific agency problems of equity in order. 
2.3.3.2.1 Managerial Shirking 
The separation of ownership and control provides opportunities for CEOs to exert 
less than maximum effort, which is known as shirking.  An aspect of a CEO’s utility is 
the exertion of effort and even if the CEO is a workaholic presumably less exertion is 
better than more.  Contracting theory suggests that equity-based compensation may 
mitigate agency problems of outside equity, including shirking, between CEOs and 
stockholder wealth. 
John and John (1993) note that the capital market (external governance) mitigates 
the agency problems of outside equity by directly monitoring and disciplining managers 
for expropriation of stockholder wealth.  That is, management knows that if they are 
subject to scrutiny by external monitors then they need to avoid the appearance of 
shirking duties.  Comment and Jarrell (1995) argue that a firm’s ratio of short term debt 
(less than one year to maturity) to total debt is an indication of a firm’s reliance on 
external capital markets and its frequency of accessing the capital market to refinance the 
short term debt.  The firms with higher ratios of short term debt to total debt should be 
more frequently monitored in the external capital markets and therefore should have 
lower agency problems of outside equity.  Furthermore, a firm that is more frequently 
monitored by external oversight should require less equity-based compensation to align 
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the interest of the CEO with the stockholders.  Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find the 
expected negative relationship between the ratio of short term debt to total debt and stock 
option based compensation for the sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.  
2.3.3.2.2 Growth Options 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the level of a firm’s agency costs is 
influenced by the amount of managerial discretion in decision making and the cost of 
measuring managerial performance.  Along the same lines, Bryan, Hwang and Lilien 
(2000) contend that firms with relatively more growth options have broader informational 
asymmetries, insiders know more than the outsiders, that create more opportunities for 
managers to expropriate wealth.  The inference of these papers is that firms with 
relatively more growth options are likely to be more difficult to monitor and therefore 
may have greater potential for agency problems of equity.  Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) 
argue that firms with relatively more growth opportunities (larger market-to-book ratio) 
and presumably more difficult to monitor, should use more stock option based 
compensation to better align the interests of management with the stockholders.   Bryan, 
Nash and Patel (2006) find a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
their proxy for growth options and stock option based compensation for all of their cases.    
2.3.3.2.3 Firm Size 
 Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) find a positive relationship 
between firm size and the level of managements’ stock option based compensation.  
These authors attribute this relationship to the idea that the difficulty for external markets 
to monitor management is increasing with firm size.  Therefore, since presumably larger 
firms are more difficult to monitor, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) predict and find a 
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positive relationship between firm size and stock option based compensation for all of 
their cases. 
2.3.3.2.4 Firm Performance 
Stockholders of a firm stand to profit when the firm’s performance meets or 
exceeds the market’s expectations, which implies that the stockholders should link 
managements’ compensation to firm performance.  This suggests that stockholders might 
increase managements’ level of equity-based compensation when firm performance falls 
short of the market’s expectations.  Consistent with this notion, Bryan, Nash and Patel 
(2006) argue that firms with lower abnormal firm performance should use more stock 
option based compensation.   Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between their proxy for firm performance (return on assets) and 
stock option based compensation for their full sample period of 1992 to 1999 and the 
sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.  
2.3.3.2.5 Free Cash Flow 
Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are increasing with free cash flow 
since discretionary free cash flow may be invested in negative NPV projects (empire-
building) or on management perquisites.  Consistent with contracting theory, providing 
management with equity-based compensation should motivate managers to optimally 
utilize excess free cash flow and maximize stockholder wealth.  Along these lines, Bryan, 
Nash and Patel (2006) expect and find a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between their proxy for free cash flow and stock option based compensation for their full 
sample period of 1992 to 1999 and the sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.    
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2.3.3.2.6 Summary of Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) 
In summary of the research by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006), the authors consider 
the link between compensation and the agency costs of debt and the link between 
compensation and the agency costs of equity. The authors note that, even though 
contracting theory predicts that greater levels of equity-based compensation decreases the 
agency problems of outside equity, it may aggravate the agency problems of debt.  The 
authors argue that while the agency costs of debt declined during the 1990s (with the 
tremendous increase in equity, the debt to equity ratio fell throughout the 1990s), the 
attendant decline in external oversight increased the agency costs of equity.  The authors 
conclude that the net effect of these changes explains why more firms used equity-based 
compensation in the latter portion of the 1990s and why the proportion of equity-based 
compensation increased throughout the 1990s. 
 
2.3.4 Bylaw and Charter Provisions  
According to Gillan (2006) certain corporate governance features such as poison 
pills and staggered boards operate as deterrents to the market for corporate control.  The 
argument in favor of these features is that they force potential acquirers to negotiate with 
the incumbent board and executives to ensure the current stockholders receive an 
acceptable price for their shares.  The undesirable tradeoff is that such features may 
undermine the external oversight provided by the market for corporate control.  Malatesta 
and Walkling (1988) and Reingaert (1988) find negative abnormal returns surrounding 
the adoption of anti-takeover measures, which implies that the stock market is indeed 
concerned about the loss of external oversight provided by the market for control. 
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Drilling deeper than prior research, Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find that 
stock market reactions to the adoption of anti-takeover measures depends on board 
structure as they find a positive market reaction associated with independent boards and a 
negative market reaction associated with less independent boards.  This suggests that the 
stock market views the oversight of an independent board as a substitute for the loss of 
external oversight by the market for control.  However, the stock market is concerned 
about the loss of external oversight provided by the market for control when the board 
lacks independence. 
 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use 24 distinct corporate governance 
provisions to build a governance index as a proxy for shareholder rights.  They find the 
expected correlation between the governance index and stock returns during the 1990s, 
specifically finding that an investment strategy that bought firms with the strongest 
shareholder rights and sold firms with the weakest shareholder rights earned an abnormal 
8.5% return.  However, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) note that while their findings 
are indicative of associations between corporate governance and firm performance, they 
can not draw any conclusions regarding causality.   
 Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) also find that firms with weak shareholder rights 
underperform the market but their results do not support the theory that weak corporate 
governance causes poor stock performance.  Danielson and Karpoff (2006) focus on 
companies that adopt poison pills prior to widespread implementation of state laws 
affording firms anti-takeover protection. Contrary to the opinion that the adoption of 
poison pills leads management to shirk duties and entrenchment, they find that firms 
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experience modest operating performance improvements during the 5-year period after 
the adoption of the poison pill provision. 
 
2.3.5 Managerial Power   
Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002), Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2005), and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) provide a 
description of how managerial power or influence has shaped the structure of executive 
compensation in publicly traded U.S. firms.  They argue that the presence of managerial 
power can explain much of the current structure of executive compensation, including 
features that have long perplexed financial economists.  The authors also show that 
managerial influence over the structure of executive compensation which has produced a 
considerable transfer of wealth from stockholders and the economy to management.  
Furthermore, they argue this managerial power has led to components of compensation 
that weaken managers' incentives to increase stockholder wealth and may even provide 
perverse incentives to reduce stockholder wealth.   
As an author’s note, many of the comments in this section on managerial power 
stem from the work by Drs. Bebchuk, Fried, Grinstein, and Walker.  
2.3.5.1 Limits of the View on Arm’s Length Contracting 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that similar to the agency conflict between 
stockholders and management, there is potential for agency conflict between stockholders 
and directors of the board.  The authors contend that directors have had and continue to 
have various incentives to support arrangements that favor management over the 
stockholders.  The authors discuss a variety of social and psychological factors such as 
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collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board, friendship and 
loyalty, and cognitive dissonance that support their position.  I review the ten reasons that 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) present for limits to arm’s length contracting of executive 
compensation in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.5.1.1 Incentives to be Re-elected 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that directors’ desire to be re-elected to the board 
creates an incentive to support the CEO's compensation package, a matter that is 
extremely important to the CEO, as long as the compensation can be reasonably justified.  
Furthermore, a director does not want to develop a reputation for blocking compensation 
arrangements sought by executives for concern of not being invited to join other boards.  
The authors’ argue that besides attractive compensation, a directorship also provides 
prestige and valuable business and social connections.  They further argue that both the 
financial and non-financial benefits of holding a board seat provide directors incentive to 
act in such a fashion to have the best opportunity of retaining their position.  In a world 
where stockholders select individual directors, the directors would have incentive to 
develop a reputation of serving the stockholders.  However in practice, the director slate 
proposed by management is typically the only slate voted on my stockholders.  Since the 
CEO has significant influence (power) over the nomination process of the slate of 
directors, displeasing the CEO over compensation or any other matter can potentially hurt 
a director's chances of being put on the firm’s slate and re-elected.  
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2.3.5.1.2 CEO Power to Benefit Directors 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that if the CEO is generous with compensation 
and treatment of the directors then the board is more likely to support generous 
compensation and treatment for the CEO, and vice versa.  This is known as back 
scratching or cronyism.  Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) find that excess director 
compensation leads to excess compensation for the CEO and poor future firm 
performance, which is evidence of cronyism at the expense of the stockholders.  
2.3.5.1.3 Friendship and Loyalty 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) note that a director may have a professional, personal 
or social connection to the firm’s CEO or other executives; which may cause the director 
to have a strong sense of loyalty to the executives.  The authors point out that even those 
directors who do not know any of the firm’s executives prior to taking the position may 
have a stronger sense of loyalty to the executive team that they will be working with on a 
routine basis than to the stockholders. 
2.3.5.1.4 Collegiality and Authority 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that in addition to friendship and loyalty, there 
are other social and psychological factors that make it difficult for directors to resist 
generous executive compensation packages.  Directors are generally expected to treat 
their fellow directors, including the firm’s CEO and other firm executives that sit on the 
board, collegially.  The CEO is also the firm's leader, the person whose decisions and 
visions should have the most influence on and authority over the firm's future direction.  
For these reasons the directors often treat the CEO with respect and deference which can 
make it awkward for the directors to negotiate the CEO’s compensation contract at arm’s 
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length.  In fact, Holmstrom (2005) provides anecdotal evidence that firms may even want 
to avoid arm’s length bargaining so as not to damage relations with the firm’s CEO.  
Holmstrom (2005) argues that compensation is a sensitive matter and that the board may 
prefer to benchmark rather than risking potentially contentious negotiations with the 
CEO. 
2.3.5.1.5 Cognitive Dissonance and Solidarity 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) note that many members of compensation committees 
are logically current or former executives themselves and may have developed views 
about executive compensation consistent with their own self interest.  That is to say, they 
are likely to support a compensation package for the CEO that is in line with how they 
themselves have been or would like to be compensated. 
2.3.5.1.6 The Small (to the directors) Cost of Favoring Executives 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) point out that the independent directors of public firms 
may own only a small fraction of the firm’s stock and consequently there is little direct 
cost to the directors to support a generous compensation package for the CEO. 
2.3.5.1.7 Ratcheting 
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2005) the practice of many boards to 
compensate their CEO more than the industry average is a broadly recognized 
contributing factor to the rise in executive compensation.  Murphy (1999) suggests this 
widespread practice has led to an ever-increasing average and a continuous escalation of 
executive pay. 
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2.3.5.1.8 Limits of Market Forces 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) find fault with the argument that even if directors are 
influenced by the CEO, market forces will cause boards and executives to adopt 
compensation arrangements equivalent to what would have been contracted under arm’s 
length negotiations.  The authors’ argue that market forces are neither sufficiently fine-
tuned nor sufficiently powerful to compel such outcomes.  They acknowledge that 
markets for capital, corporate control, and managerial labor do impose some constraints 
on executive compensation.  However, they go on to argue that these constraints are 
limited and allow significant deviations from the equivalent compensation package 
produced from arm's length contracting. 
2.3.5.1.9 New CEOs    
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that all of the foregoing limitations still 
potentially apply to CEOs hired from outside of the firm even though the negotiations 
with new CEOs hired from outside of the firm may be closer to arm’s length negotiations 
than with incumbent CEOs. 
2.3.5.1.10 Firing of Executives 
Jenkins (2002) concludes that the increased willingness of directors to fire CEOs 
over the past decade provides evidence that boards do indeed deal with CEOs at arm’s 
length.  However, according to Bebchuk and Fried (2005) instances of firing a CEO are 
still limited to circumstances in which the CEO is accused of legal or ethical violations or 
is viewed by stockholders and directors as having dismal performance.  Without such 
extenuating circumstances, mere mediocrity is far from enough ammunition for a board 
to fire a CEO.  Bebchuk and Fried (2005) point out that in cases in which boards do fire 
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the CEO, boards often provide the departing CEO with compensation well beyond what 
is required by the contract to soften the blow and alleviate the directors' guilt and 
discomfort.  They go on to argue that boards' track record of dealing with 
underperforming CEOs does not support the view that boards treat CEOs at arm’s length. 
2.3.5.2 Managerial Power and Pay Relationships 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) acknowledge that although CEOs generally have some 
degree of influence over their boards, the extent of each CEO’s influence is a function of 
their respective firm's governance structure.  Their managerial power theory predicts that 
executives who have more power should receive higher compensation, or at least 
compensation that is less sensitive to firm performance, than their less powerful 
counterparts.  The authors indicate that there is a substantial body of evidence that 
supports their theory. 
First, there is evidence that CEO compensation is higher when the board is 
relatively weak.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that CEO compensation is 
higher (1) when the board is large, which makes it more difficult for directors to organize 
in opposition to the CEO; (2) when more of the outside directors have been appointed by 
the CEO, which could cause them to feel gratitude, obligation, or loyalty to the CEO; and 
(3) when outside directors serve on three or more boards, and thus are more likely to be 
busy (distracted).  Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) find CEO pay is 20% to 40% higher if 
the CEO is the chairman of the board, and it is negatively correlated with the stock 
ownership of the compensation committee members. 
Second, studies find a negative correlation between the presence of a large outside 
stockholder and compensation arrangements that favor CEOs.  A large outside 
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stockholder might engage in closer monitoring and thereby reduce CEOs’ managerial 
power (influence) regarding their compensation.  Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) find a 
negative correlation between the equity ownership of the largest stockholder and the 
amount of CEO compensation.  More specifically, they find that doubling the percentage 
ownership of a large outside stockholder is associated with a 12% to 14% reduction in a 
CEO's non-salary compensation.  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) find that CEOs in 
companies without a 5% (or larger) outside stockholder tend to receive more "luck-
based" pay; that is, compensation associated with increases in profits that are generated 
entirely by external factors (for example, changes in oil prices and exchange rates) rather 
than by CEOs’ own efforts.  This study also finds that companies lacking large outside 
stockholders, the boards make smaller offsetting reductions in cash compensation when 
they increase CEOs' stock option based compensation. 
Third, there is evidence linking CEO compensation to the concentration of 
institutional stockholders, which are more likely to monitor the CEO and the board.  
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that more concentrated institutional ownership leads to 
lower and more performance sensitive compensation.  Parthiban, Kochar and Levitas 
(1998) find that the effect of institutional stockholders on CEO pay depends on the nature 
of their relationships with the firm.   The authors report that CEO compensation is 
negatively correlated with the presence of "pressure resistant" institutions, institutions 
that have no other business relationship with the firm and thus presumably are concerned 
only with the firm's share value.  But they find that CEO compensation is positively 
correlated with the presence of "pressure sensitive" institutions, institutions that have 
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business relationships with the firm (for example, managing its pension funds) and are 
thus more susceptible to managerial power. 
Finally, studies find a connection between pay and anti-takeover provisions, 
arrangements that make CEOs and their boards less vulnerable to a hostile takeover.  
Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) find that CEOs of companies adopting anti-
takeover provisions enjoy above market compensation before adoption of the provisions 
and that adoption is followed by further significant increases in compensation.  This 
pattern is not readily explainable by arm's length contracting.  Indeed, if risk-averse 
managers' jobs are more secure, stockholders should be able to pay the managers less.  
Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2005) find that CEOs of companies that became protected by 
state anti-takeover legislation enacted during the period from 1984 to 1991 reduced their 
holdings of shares, which became less important for the purpose of maintaining control, 
by an average of 15%.  Arm’s length contracting, by contrast, might predict that CEOs 
protected by anti-takeover legislation would be required by their boards to increase their 
stockholdings to restore their incentive to generate stockholder value. 
In closing this section on internal governance I quote from Hubbard (2005): “there 
is very little evidence in the data that suggest that simply changing a governance 
mechanism, like share ownership or independent directors, has much effect on firm 
value.  This pattern simply indicates that markets try to get it right across an entire range 
of mechanisms.”  I do not take this statement to mean that internal governance does not 
matter.  To me it means that the tremendous increase in CEO compensation was a change 
in a governance mechanism intended to mitigate the agency problem between the CEO 
and the stockholders.  The question is did we get it right or is it wrong? 
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2.4 External Governance 
This sub-section reviews the following aspects of the corporate governance 
system that are external to the firm: laws and regulations, capital markets (ownership 
structure), market for corporate control, labor markets, and external oversight (private 
sources). 
 
2.4.1 Laws and Regulations 
Laws and regulations are integrally related to corporate governance, and a large 
body of research studies the link between corporate governance, the law, and finance.  La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) focus on corporate governance and 
how it relates to the legal protections afforded to stockholders and creditors.  The authors 
find that differences in countries’ laws account for differences in the breadth and depth of 
countries’ financial markets and in the ability of firms to access external capital.  Daouk, 
Lee and Ng (2006) examine the link between capital market governance (CMG) and 
several key measures of market performance.  Using detailed data from individual stock 
exchanges, the authors develop a composite index that captures three dimensions of 
security laws: the degree of earnings opacity, the enforcement of insider trading laws, and 
the effect of removing short selling restrictions.  The authors find that improvements in 
the CMG index are associated with decreases in the cost-of-equity, increases in market 
liquidity, and increases in market pricing efficiency. 
 Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) ask if there is a dark side to incentive 
compensation.  Put simply, their answer is yes.  After controlling for other elements of 
compensation and possible determinants of fraud, the authors find a positive association 
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between the use of stock options and allegations of fraud.  Using a matched sample 
procedure, the authors report a positive association between measures of stock option 
intensity and class action lawsuits for securities fraud.  Expanding the analysis to include 
ownership structure, they find the link between stock option use and alleged fraud is 
stronger in firms with higher outside block and institutional ownership.  The authors’ 
interpretation of this finding is that the incentive to engage in fraudulent activity is 
heightened by the presence of block and institutional owners who may also benefit from 
the fraud.  The authors argue that in firms with higher stock option compensation, the 
CEO benefits in two ways from fraudulent activities that increase stock price: (1) CEOs 
benefit directly from an increase in their compensation and (2) CEOs benefit indirectly 
by lowering the probability of dismissal. 
   
2.4.2 Capital Markets (Ownership Structure) 
The relation between ownership structure and CEO compensation has been 
studied with conflicting results.  Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that managers who 
are majority owners receive marginally higher salaries than other managers.  Allen 
(1981) finds level of CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the equity held by the 
CEO (and family) as well as the level of equity holdings by board members not related to 
the CEO.  Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) find CEO compensation is lower when 
the CEO’s ownership is higher and when a director other than CEO has ownership 
greater than 5%.  Core (1997) finds that CEO compensation is increasing in insider 
control of share votes and decreasing in insider ownership of the firm. 
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Others have studied the relationship between ownership structure and firm value 
and performance.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) demonstrate that firm value first 
rises with increases in inside ownership as the desired alignment effect of share price 
dominates, then falls as the managerial entrenchment effect of insider voting control 
becomes stronger.  Shivdasani (1993) finds that hostile takeovers are more likely when 
target outside directors own less equity and serve on fewer boards and when there are 
unaffiliated outside block-holders of stock.  Holthausen and Larcker (1996) indicate that 
performance subsequent to the initial public offering of a previously leveraged buy-out is 
positively associated with the change in the equity stake of both the significant non-
management investors and the operating management of the firm.  Yermack (1996) finds 
that firm value is significantly higher when officers and directors have greater ownership, 
although this ownership variable has an ambiguous relation with contemporaneous 
measures of accounting operating performance. 
Other research focuses on the influence of institutional and block-holder 
ownership.  Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) report 
evidence consistent with the view that block-holders and institutions play an important 
role in limiting agency problems between managers and other investors.   However, 
Colvin (1998) contends that institutional investors overreact to negative earnings news 
and consequently force managers to be overly concerned about short-term earnings.  
Consistent with this view, Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) report that the market reaction 
to negative earnings announcements is stronger in firms with greater institutional 
ownership. 
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 Berry, Paige Fields and Wilkins (2006) find that as CEO ownership declines, 
board independence, board seats held by venture capitalists, and unaffiliated block 
ownership increase. Their findings suggest that as inside ownership decreases alternative 
governance mechanisms evolve to help mitigate the resulting increase in agency costs. 
 
2.4.3 Market for Corporate Control 
According to Gillan (2006), the market for corporate control is the ultimate 
corporate governance mechanism.  As managers compete in the market for control, assets 
(companies) go to the highest creator of value and the inefficient managers are thusly 
disciplined.  However, the market for corporate control may have two sides to the coin in 
that it also provides inefficient managers the opportunity to indulge in empire building 
through acquisitions.  According to Bebchuk and Fried (2005), many believed that 
significant stock option grants would align stockholder and managerial interests and 
would thereby provide a substitute for the market for corporate control.  Additionally, 
stock options were included into severance arrangements (known as golden parachutes) 
so that a change in control triggered the immediate vesting of stock options otherwise 
scheduled to vest over a multi-year period.  While the golden parachutes were seen as 
aligning managerial and stockholder interests at the crucial moment of an uninvited 
takeover bid, the other side of this coin is that the inefficient manager of the target firm is 
simply rewarded for poor performance.    
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2.4.4 Labor Markets 
Hubbard (2005) states that executive compensation is often talked about as a 
stand alone corporate finance topic but he argues that we are really talking about a market 
for labor in a specific area.  The finance literature on labor markets focuses on CEOs, 
members of senior executive teams, and directors. Classic papers, such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that labor market forces and 
reputation concerns have a disciplining effect on both managers and directors.  On one 
hand, solid performance by CEOs and directors has the potential to lead to better 
opportunities in the future.  For example, CEOs may be offered a position at a larger or 
more prestigious firm or more board seats in the future.  On the other hand, poor 
performance may lead to termination and subsequent difficulties obtaining new positions, 
either as an executive officer or director.  Early empirical work by Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) and Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) provide a broad perspective on the 
association between firm performance and the labor market for CEOs.  These studies find 
that good performance is positively associated with CEO compensation, whereas poor 
performance increases the likelihood of termination or CEO turnover. 
 Holmstrom (2005) suggests that a reason it may be difficult to explain why 
executive compensation is so high is because of the dynamic nature of the labor market.  
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) find empirical 
evidence suggesting that the rapid rise in executive compensation can be explained as a 
shift in the demand for top executive talent.  They argue that in the second half of the 
1990s, executives had lucrative opportunities outside their traditional jobs, as either 
investors or partners in the red-hot venture and buy-out markets or as entrepreneurs.  
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Holmstrom (2005) argues that the view that there are many CEO substitutes, which 
should keep the compensation level under control, is misguided.  The author supposes 
there are many potential CEO substitutes, but the board of directors does not know who 
they are and where to find them.  In this event, a CEO that is performing well and is 
trusted can be worth much more than the second best alternative. 
 
2.4.5 External Oversight (Private Sources) 
One of the primary private sources of external oversight is the media.  The media 
clearly plays an important function in reporting on corporations’ performance, activities 
and matters of governance.  For example, Bethany Mclean of Fortune Magazine is 
credited with being the first to publicly reveal the problems at Enron.  Finance 
researchers have also examined the corporate governance role of the media.  Notably, 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) investigate how the media pushes corporate managers and 
directors to behave in a socially acceptable manner.  The authors conclude that the media 
affects corporations’ environmental policies and policies for diverting firm resources to 
controlling stockholders. 
In closing this section, this dissertation follows a literature survey and empirical test 
format.  This survey is intentionally broad as it establishes my foundation and 
understanding of research that investigates the structure of CEO compensation, the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, and the relationship 
between corporate governance and CEO compensation.  However, the survey does not 
specifically inform this research.  The specific literature review that motivates this 
research is provided in the next section. 
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3 Development of Empirical Research Hypotheses 
The tremendous increase in CEO total compensation and the increased use of and 
payouts from stock options in recent years has generated considerable debate and concern 
in boardrooms, in the financial press, and among academics.  The following quote from 
the New York Times nicely portrays the prevailing sentiment regarding this issue.  
“Corporations have been wrestling for decades with ways to link pay to performance, 
with little success.  In the 1980’s, they tried tying cash bonuses to rising sales or earnings, 
only to find that the payouts encouraged executives to make decisions that yielded short-
term results—and often longer-term disasters.  In the 1990’s, companies tried stock 
options, figuring that they would be the best way to tie the executives’ fortunes to those 
of shareholders.  Instead, they prompted some managers to time decisions to pump up the 
stock price just when the options vested.  Bonuses and options at Tyco and Enron, for 
example, did little to prevent widespread accounting frauds at either company.  The 
secret to linking pay to performance remains elusive.” Deutsch (2005) 
My research extends the literature that investigates the link or connection between 
CEO (executive) compensation and firm performance.  In sub-section 3.1, I describe the 
components of CEO compensation, provide a brief description of the CEO compensation 
data used in my dissertation (I more fully describe the complete sample in Section 5), and 
report changes in the level and composition of CEO compensation during the sample 
period.  As I discuss in sub-section 3.1, CEO compensation has increased dramatically, 
which raises the question as to whether CEOs’ performance has improved or whether 
CEOs have become better at extracting personal wealth from their firms.  In sub-section 
3.2, I point out which components of CEO compensation are potentially disconnected 
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from firm performance by comparing the components of CEO compensation to the S&P 
500 (market) performance during the sample period.  Although I do not perform any 
explicit tests in sub-section 3.2 as to whether there is a disconnection between CEO 
compensation and performance, a cursory view of the data does pique interest in several 
possible research questions.  In sub-section 3.2 I also review literature that describes 
potential sources of disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance.  In 
sub-section 3.3, I review a very specific branch of the literature that suggests a small 
group of CEOs has an inordinate impact on the overall levels of CEO compensation and 
the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance.  The gaps and 
unanswered questions in this literature review motivate my empirical research questions 
as described in sub-section 3.3. 
 
3.1 CEO Compensation 
This sub-section describes the components of CEO compensation.  It also presents 
summary information and graphs of CEO compensation to illustrate the significant 
changes in the level and composition of CEO compensation that have occurred during the 
1993-2005 period. 
 
3.1.1 Description of the Components of CEO Compensation 
The Board of Directors of a firm has a Compensation Committee that is responsible 
for setting the compensation package for the CEO and possibly other executives.  The 
principle objective, consistent with agency theory, is for the Compensation Committee to 
set the CEO compensation such that the CEO has incentives to act in the best interest of 
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the stockholders.  The Compensation Committee may engage a compensation consultant 
to provide a third party opinion on the appropriate levels of executive compensation.  
Although there is significant heterogeneity across firms and industries, most CEO 
compensation packages contain four basic components: (1) a base salary, (2) an annual 
bonus tied to accounting performance, (3) equity-based compensation (restricted stock 
grants and stock options), and (4) other compensation (hereafter “Other compensation”), 
such as perquisites, retirement benefits, loans, and severance packages.   
CEOs’ and other executives’ base salaries are typically based on industry and market 
peer salary surveys.  The annual bonus is usually based on achieving certain accounting-
based performance measures (for example, level of revenues, earnings, or return on 
assets) for the immediately preceding fiscal year (or several preceding fiscal years for 
multi-year plans).  Restricted stock is stock granted by a company to an employee with 
certain restrictions.  Typically, the restrictions include a vesting period, a holding period, 
and possibly performance conditions, such as the company reaching certain earnings per 
share goals or financial targets.  Stock options are contracts, which after vesting (options 
usually take one to three years to vest) give the holder the right to buy a share of stock at 
a set exercise price for a certain period of time (typically five to ten years).  Also, CEOs 
and other top executives will often sign employment contracts with the firm which 
includes a description of the base salary, target bonus payments, severance arrangements 
in the event of separation or change in corporate control, and other terms.   
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3.1.2 Summary Information and Graphs of CEO Compensation 
The discussion and figures in this sub-section report changes in the level and 
composition of the components of CEO compensation during the 1993-2005 sample 
period for the firms in the ExecuComp database (which includes the S&P 1500, firms 
that were formerly in the S&P 1500, and a small set of other firms chosen by the data 
provider, Compustat).  My base sample (which I describe in detail in Section 5) includes 
data for 5,210 CEOs and 2,746 firms collected from the ExecuComp database from 1993 
through 2005.  Roughly speaking, the average firm replaces its CEO once during the 
sample period (5,210 CEOs/2,764 firms = 1.9 CEOs per firm). However, there is little 
movement of CEOs from one firm in the sample to another firm in the sample.  In fact, 
only 150 of the 5,210 CEOs ever serve at more than one firm in the sample.  This 
suggests that newly hired CEOs either come from non-CEO positions from firms in the 
ExecuComp sample or come from firms outside the ExecuComp sample. 
Approximately 64% of the CEOs serve longer than three years as the CEO, with a 
mean CEO tenure of 6.4 years.  The firm count per year ranges from 1,622 to 1,996; on 
average, 95% of the firms survive from one year to the next.  The firm life during the 
sample period has a mean of 8.6 years.  These summary statistics suggest that the sample 
of firms and CEOs are relatively stable and time invariant, which makes it possible to 
meaningfully compare yearly compensation data from the sample.  (I more fully describe 
the complete sample and its stability in Section 5.)   
Before developing specific hypotheses, it will be helpful to begin with an 
overview of compensation patterns during the sample period.  Table 1, Panel A (all tables 
and figures are in the Appendix), presents annual summary statistics for mean CEO 
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compensation; all values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars.  Because a picture is 
worth a thousand words, it is more insightful to view this data graphically, beginning 
with Figure 1. 
Figure 1 presents the percent contribution of each of the four major components 
of CEO total direct compensation: salary, bonus, equity-based compensation (restricted 
stock grants plus stock options), and Other compensation for all CEOs in my sample.  It 
is interesting to note that the equity-based compensation, as a percent of CEOs’ total 
direct compensation, increased dramatically from 42% in 1993 to 73% in 2000 but 
curiously dropped in subsequent years to a level of 53% in 2005.   This increase and then 
subsequent decline in the percentage contribution of equity-based compensation could be 
coincidental to the technology bubble and bust in the stock market.  Alternatively, it 
could reflect stock and labor market forces at work attempting to discover the optimal 
level of equity-based compensation to minimize agency conflict.   
Another curiosity, as shown in Figure 2, is that even the make up of equity-based 
compensation has changed dramatically since 2001.  Stock options contributed 90% of 
the equity-based compensation in 2001, but their contribution is down to only 64% in 
2005 (with of course an exact offsetting increase in the contribution of restricted stock 
grants).  A cynic might say this is because stock options are out of favor and it is now 
easier to ‘hide’ compensation in the form of restricted stock grants.  Alternatively, it 
could reflect stock and market forces at work attempting to find the optimal mix of 
equity-based compensation.      
Figure 3 is a stacked bar graph that presents the mean dollar value of each of the 
four major components of CEO total direct compensation: salary, bonus, equity-based 
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compensation (the value of restricted stock grants plus stock options), and Other 
compensation for all CEOs in my sample, all adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars.  Note 
the large increase in CEO compensation.  Even with the decline in mean CEO 
compensation following the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000, the mean level of 
compensation in 2005 is still much greater than in 1993.  Also, it appears from this graph 
that the increase in the CEOs’ total direct compensation is primarily due to the increase in 
equity-based compensation. 
These data clearly indicate a significant increase in CEO mean compensation.   
The next sub-section explores potential sources of disconnection between CEO 
compensation and firm performance.                   
     
3.2 Is CEO Compensation Linked to Firm Performance?  
This sub-section begins to explore the link between CEO compensation and firm 
performance and as such is foundation for the questions underlying my empirical 
research.  Although I do not perform any empirical tests in this sub-section, the data I 
report do point out which components of CEO compensation are potential sources of 
disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance, which piques the 
interest in my research questions.  In addition, in this sub-section I review literature that 
describes potential sources of disconnection between CEO compensation and firm 
performance.   
Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance?  A simple comparison of the 
growth rate in CEO total direct compensation to the annualized return of the S&P 500 
index (which is a proxy for the market) for various periods of time suggests the answer is 
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no.  For the period of 1993 though 2000, mean CEO total direct compensation increased 
at an annualized nominal growth rate of 20.9% per year compared to an annualized 
nominal growth rate of 16.0% per year for the S&P 500 index (before dividends).  The 
substantially higher growth rate in CEO compensation relative to the S&P 500 index 
growth rate seems ‘excessive’ and probably unnecessary for addressing any potential 
agency conflicts.  Furthermore, it suggests that CEO compensation may not be properly 
linked to firm performance from the shareholders’ perspective.  This evidence is 
consistent with the point argued by Bebchuk and Fried (2005) that “executives' large 
compensation packages are much less sensitive to their own performance than has been 
commonly recognized.”  For the period of 1993 though 2005 the CEO total direct 
compensation increased at an annualized nominal growth rate of 10.0% per year 
compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5% per year for the S&P 500 index 
(before dividends).  While growth in CEO compensation during the 1993-2005 period 
was not as high as in the 1993-2000 period, it still may have been more than was 
necessary to address any potential agency conflicts.  
This simple comparison technique certainly is not sufficient to conclude that CEO 
total direct compensation is not linked to firm performance, but it does raise questions.  A 
similar comparison for each of the four major components of CEO compensation, as 
described in sub-section 3.1, with firm performance raises even more questions.  Figure 4 
presents the cumulative nominal increase in each of the four major components of CEO 
compensation for the period of 1993 through 2005, with each component indexed to 100 
in 1993.   
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First, I focus on the cash components of compensation, salary and bonus, and their 
relationship to firm performance.  Murphy (1999) found the sum of salary and annual 
bonus increased from $700,000 in 1970 to $1,300,000 in 1996, only a 2.3% annual 
increase above inflation.  Referring to Figure 4, the annual plot of mean salary indicates a 
fairly steady increase for 1993 through 2005 at a nominal rate of 3.7% per year.  Also, the 
annual plot of mean bonus has some fluctuation but generally it depicts a steady upward 
trend at a nominal rate of 10.0% per year through 2005.  Combined, mean salary plus 
bonus increased from 1993 at a nominal rate of 7.0% per year through 2005.  This rate of 
increase for the combined mean salary plus bonus is comparable to the 8.5% annualized 
increase (before dividends) in the S&P 500 index from year end 1993 through year end 
2005 and the average inflation rate of 2.5% for the same period.  These comparisons 
imply that the cash components of CEO compensation are not likely to be responsible for 
any disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance.   
Next, I explore the equity-based compensation component of CEO compensation.  
As stated previously, in the agency theory framework, the intention behind increasing 
equity-based compensation is to create an efficient compensation contract with the CEO 
such that the CEO acts to maximize stockholders’ wealth.  Hall and Liebman (1998) 
established that much of the increase in CEO total compensation is due to increased use 
of stock options.  According to these authors, the percentage of CEOs receiving stock 
options awards increased from 30 percent in 1980 to nearly 70 percent in 1994.  Also, the 
percentage of CEOs holding stock options increased from 57 percent to 87 percent for the 
same period.  Hall and Murphy (2003) find the average real pay for S&P 500 CEOs 
skyrocketed during the 1990s, growing from $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million in 
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2000.  According to these authors, most of this increase reflects the escalation in stock 
option values at time of grant, which grew nine-fold from an average of about $800,000 
in 1992 to nearly $7.2 million in 2000. 
Looking at Figure 4, the mean equity-based compensation component (restricted 
stock plus value of stock options) of CEO compensation increased almost seven-fold 
from 1993 through 2000.  This is an annualized nominal growth rate of 31.1% per year 
compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 16.0% per year for the S&P 500 index 
(before dividends).  The substantially higher growth rate in CEO equity-based 
compensation relative to the S&P 500 index growth rate seems ‘excessive’ and probably 
unnecessary for addressing any potential agency conflict.  For the period of 1993 though 
2005 the CEO equity-based compensation increased at an annualized nominal growth 
rate of 12.3% per year compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5% per year 
for the S&P 500 index (before dividends).  While not apparently as excessive it still may 
have been more than was necessary to address any potential agency conflict.  These 
comparisons suggest that equity-based compensation is a likely contributor to any 
disconnection between CEO total direct compensation and firm performance.      
Arguably, a substantial fraction of stock price increases is due to market and 
industry movements, rather than to firm-specific factors that might reflect the CEO's own 
performance.  Therefore, CEOs can profit substantially from their stock options even 
when their companies' performance lags that of their peers, as long as market and 
industry movements provide sufficient boost for the firm’s stock price.  Also, stock 
options enable CEOs to legally profit from temporary spikes in the firm's stock price, 
even when long-term stock performance is poor (however, it is illegal for CEOs to take 
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advantage of inside information that is not available to the public when exercising their 
options).  As designed, a CEO’s profit from stock options is not necessarily linked to firm 
performance.  The question is whether or not firm performance, measured either by 
accounting metrics or changes in the stock price, justifies this increase in CEO equity-
based compensation.  Alternatively, since causal direction is unknown, would market 
returns have been as high if CEOs had not been as well compensated? 
Lastly, I explore the Other compensation component of CEO compensation.  
Looking at Figure 4, the mean Other compensation component of CEO compensation 
increased almost three-fold from 1993 through 2005.  This is an annualized nominal 
growth rate of 11.7% per year compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5% 
per year for the S&P 500 index (before dividends).  This comparison suggests that Other 
compensation may be excessive relative to market (firm) performance and that it is a 
likely contributor to any disconnection between CEO total direct compensation and firm 
performance. 
For the reasons noted above, much of the attention in the media and in academic 
research has been on the tremendous increase in the contribution of equity-based 
compensation to executives' compensation during the 1990s.  However, non-equity based 
compensation continues to be substantial and should not be overlooked.  According to 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), non-equity compensation represented on average about 
half of the total compensation of both the CEO and the top five executives of S&P 1500 
companies not classified as new economy firms in 2003.  Murphy (1999) points out that 
many firms use subjective criteria for at least some of their cash (non-equity) bonus 
payments.  Such subjectivity can be a useful tool in the hands of boards that are looking 
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out for stockholder interests.  However, boards that favor their top executives over 
stockholders can use their discretion to pay executives handsome bonuses for substandard 
performance or any other reason.  For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find in about 
40% of large acquisitions during the period from 1993 to 1999, the acquiring firm’s CEO 
received a multi-million dollar cash bonus for closing the transaction.  The authors argue 
that an acquisition is not an action for which CEOs should receive additional 
compensation above and beyond whatever rewards they stand to receive from the 
resulting effect of the acquisition on the value of the CEO's options, shares, firm size 
based incentives, and prestige.  Even when firms use objective criteria, cash bonuses are 
typically based on the firm's own operating or accounting performance, which ignores 
and may be substandard to peers’ performance.     
Another area that demonstrates the disconnection between CEO compensation 
and firm performance is the severance payments provided to departing CEOs.  CEOs 
pushed out by their boards can be paid a handsome severance amounting to two or three 
years' worth of annual compensation, regardless of the firm’s performance.  These 
payments are often not reduced even when the CEO's performance has been clearly 
substandard.  For example, Carly Fiorina, former CEO of Hewlett Packard, was awarded 
a $21 million severance package when she was dismissed of her duties even though the 
board and the stockholders were disappointed with the performance of Hewlett Packard 
and its acquisition of Compaq.  Another example is Robert Nardelli, former CEO of 
Home Depot, who was paid $210 million when he resigned under pressure even though 
Home Depot had underperformed the market and its primary competitor Lowe’s 
throughout his reign.   
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Research by Bebchuk and Fried (2005) finds that pension payments can 
demonstrate a disconnection of pay from performance.  The authors perform a case study 
on Franklin Raines, who was forced to retire as Fannie Mae's CEO in late 2004.  Terms 
of the pension obligated Fannie Mae to pay him (or his surviving spouse after his death) 
an annual pension of approximately $1.4 million, an amount specified without any 
connection to the firm's stock performance under Raines.  Bebchuk and Fried (2005) 
estimate the value of this non-performance element of his pension at about $25 million.     
In summary, there is substantial evidence to suggest that CEO compensation 
(particularly the equity-based and Other components of compensation) may not be 
sufficiently linked to firm performance, an issue I will discuss in more detail later when I 
develop my specific research hypotheses. 
A related question is whether or not a disconnection between CEO compensation 
and firm performance exists for all CEOs or for just a sub-set of CEOs.  For example, it 
could be that a relatively small number of highly-paid CEOs have an inordinate impact 
on the mean values of the components of compensation that are shown in Figures 3 and 
4.  To explore this question, Figure 5 presents mean CEO total direct compensation each 
year for three groups of CEOs based simply on a ranking of total direct compensation 
each year: all CEOs, those CEOs in the top 10% of total direct compensation, and those 
in the bottom 90% of total direct compensation.  (Note that in the next sub-section I 
develop a more rigorous method for ranking and classifying the CEOs; I rank by total 
direct compensation in this section just to illustrate that a relatively small number of the 
highly paid CEOs skew the sample.)   
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Figure 5 shows that the baseline group of all CEOs has a ‘hump’ in the total direct 
compensation from about 1998 through 2002.  For the group of all CEOs, the total direct 
compensation increased by a nominal rate of 20.9% per year from 1993 through 2000 
then declined thereafter by a nominal rate of 3.6% per year through 2005.  In contrast, the 
bottom 90% group of CEOs by total direct compensation had an annualized nominal 
growth rate of 14.5% (substantially less than the group of all CEOs) from 1993 through 
2000 and it continued to increase by a nominal rate 3.4% per year through 2005.  Even 
though the bottom 90% group of CEOs has a hump for the year 2000 in the plot, it is not 
nearly as pronounced a hump as for the group of all CEOs. 
In contrast, as shown in Figure 5, the plot for the CEOs in the top 10% by total 
direct compensation has a huge hump in the 1997-2002 period.  The top 10% group of 
CEOs by total direct compensation had an annualized nominal growth rate in total direct 
compensation of 27.9% from 1993 through 2000 then declined thereafter at the nominal 
rate of 10.2% per year through 2005.  In comparison, the S&P 500 index increased 16.0% 
per year from 1993 through 2000 then declined modestly thereafter at the rate of 1.1% 
per year through 2005.  These comparisons certainly suggest that a sub-set of CEOs may 
be the primary culprit for any disconnection between CEO compensation and firm 
performance.      
In summary, I make three observations based on the information presented in 
Table 1 and Figures 1-5.  First, the level and composition of the components of CEO 
compensation change substantially during the sample period; the level of compensation 
increases significantly during the period and equity-based compensation becomes the 
largest component of compensation.  Second, the data do not reveal any obvious link 
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between CEO compensation and firm performance; in fact, mean compensation has 
grown more rapidly than shareholder wealth.  Third, a relatively small number of highly 
paid CEOs appear to be skewing the mean compensation upward. 
These observations motivate the idea that it is possible that previous empirical 
research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO compensation and firm 
performance might be distorted because previous studies have failed to explicitly address 
the impact caused by a small number of highly paid and influential CEOs.  In the next 
sub-section, I build on this thought and develop my specific research questions. 
 
3.3 Motivation of Research Questions 
Sub-section 3.3.1 is a review of the specific literature that motivates my empirical 
research.  Sub-section 3.3.2 describes the proxy for CEO managerial power that I use in 
my empirical tests to rank and classify CEOs.  Sub-section 3.3.3 presents the specific 
research questions. 
 
3.3.1  Literature Review 
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm 
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across 
firms, even within the same industry.  This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as 
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role 
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm 
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain 
‘why’ CEOs’ compensation varies widely in cross-section.  However, this research 
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assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory 
variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this 
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are 
estimated).  In other words, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO 
compensation model.  Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm 
performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model.  I review 
some of that literature next and for convenient referral I summarize the models and the 
findings of the literature I consider key to my research in Table 2.       
A possible explanation for extraordinarily high CEO compensation is the belief 
that a “superstar” CEO could deliver outsized performance.  If the board has the mindset 
that a particular CEO candidate can lead a firm to superior success then higher 
compensation levels for those individuals is appropriate and should be acceptable to the 
stockholders.  Sherwin Rosen is often given credit for coining the term “superstar” as 
used in the context of researching CEO or executive compensation.  The following quote 
from Rosen (1981) provides a clear description of the term: “The phenomenon of 
Superstars, wherein relatively small numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money 
and dominate the activities in which they engage, seems to be increasingly important in 
the modern world.”  Ironically, that was published in 1981 yet it is still “increasingly” 
important in the modern world in 2008.   
Malmendier and Tate (2005) build on Rosen’s concept and define “superstar” 
CEOs as those who receive prestigious awards from the business press.  The authors find 
that the firms of such CEOs subsequently under perform after the CEO receives the 
award, compared to both the overall market and a sample of hypothetical award winners 
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(CEOs that did not win awards but have matching firm and CEO characteristics to actual 
award winners).  They also find that CEOs who win awards are compensated more after 
receiving the awards, in absolute dollars and relative to the number 2 executive in the 
firm. Furthermore, CEOs spend more time on external activities (including outside 
directorships and writing books) after receiving the awards.  These effects are strongest in 
poorly governed firms implying a correlation between the personal benefits of a CEO’s 
superstar status and the weakness of a firm’s corporate governance. 
 Hayward, Rindova and Pollock (2004) develop a theoretical model in which CEO 
“celebrity” status is in part a product of the tendency of journalists to over-attribute a 
firm’s actions and results, good or bad, to the ability of the CEO rather than to broader 
contributing factors.  The authors argue that CEOs can internalize this over-attribution, 
become overconfident, and make decisions unfavorable to the firm.  Wade, Porac, 
Pollock and Graffin (2006) discuss the burden of celebrity and argue that the Financial 
World’s CEO of the Year Award is a “certification” contest that effectively ranks the 
CEOs for the benefit of the firms’ stakeholders.  They find a positive correlation between 
CEO total compensation and certification when return on equity is relatively high and 
find a negative correlation between CEO total compensation and certification when 
return on equity is relatively low, which implies certified CEOs are rewarded when return 
on equity is high and punished when return on equity is low.  They find an undesirable, 
from the stockholders perspective, negative correlation between CEO awards and current 
year stock performance.   
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 Wade, Porac, Pollock and Graffin (2006) define “certification” in a similar 
manner to how Malmendier and Tate (2005) define “superstar” and both papers find a 
negative correlation between CEO awards and firm performance.            
 Milbourn (2003) develops the idea that a CEO’s “reputation” or perceived ability 
should affect the CEO’s compensation package, particularly the pay-for-performance 
components. Milbourn also hypothesizes that reputation should help explain the 
enormous variation in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities across firms.  As proxies 
for reputation, Milbourn uses: (1) CEO tenure, (2) the number of business articles in 
which the CEO’s name appears, (2) whether or not the CEO was hired from outside of 
the firm, and (4) industry adjusted firm performance. Milbourn finds a statistically and 
economically significant positive relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity 
and reputation. 
Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005) argue that CEO “skill” helps explain the 
variation in CEO compensation across firms.  Their definition of a highly skilled CEO is 
one who leads a firm to continued good performance (they use return on assets and 
abnormal stock returns) from one year to the next, relative to industry peers.  They also 
define a highly skilled CEO as one who turns around prior poor firm performance from 
one year to the next, relative to industry peers.  They find that highly compensated CEOs 
appear more skilled than their industry peers when firms are small (particularly when 
there is a large stockholder to monitor activities) and that the CEO has high incentive 
compensation (alignment with the shareholder).  Also, highly compensated CEOs appear 
more skilled than their industry peers when the firm faces fewer environmental 
constraints on management discretion (that is, more skill is required with more 
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discretionary decisions).  By contrast, compensation is negatively related to skill in firms 
constrained by environmental conditions (less skill is required with fewer discretionary 
managerial decisions); especially when there is no large stockholder to monitor 
management or the firm is large. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting 
that only a few CEOs have sufficient power or influence to extract excessive 
compensation.  They note that in 2001 the top ten CEOs of U.S. firms received average 
option grants of $170 million, while the median value of total compensation for CEOs of 
the S&P 500 companies was only about $7 million.  The authors argue that “U.S. 
executive pay may not be quite the runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.”  
However, I find no research that thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a 
class of ‘only a few’ powerful CEOs (i.e., those with sufficient levels of managerial 
power or influence to extract excessive compensation) has on the one-size-fits-all CEO 
compensation and firm performance models. In addition, the literature has not examined 
whether the firms that are led by such CEOs experience superior performance. This void 
in the literature motivates my research. 
   
3.3.2 A Proxy for Managerial Power 
A key aspect of this research is how best to measure a CEOs managerial power to 
extract higher and different compensation, after controlling for other variables, and to 
determine whether CEOs with managerial power receive higher compensation because 
they are superior CEOs based on firm performance measures or because they have undue 
influence over their own compensation.  The classifications of CEOs used in prior 
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research, such as “superstar”, “celebrity”, “certification”, “reputation”, and “skill”, each 
measure to some extent CEO managerial power.  However, I propose an alternative 
measure of CEO managerial power.  I define the CEO/Number_2 Ratio as the ratio of 
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid non-
CEO executive in the firm.  I believe this ratio is a meaningful proxy for CEO managerial 
power, as described below. 
First, the CEO/Number_2 Ratio directly measures the CEOs influence or 
authority over the firm’s board, which is responsible for setting the CEO’s compensation, 
to extract excess compensation relative to another executive in the same firm.  This 
implies the CEOs with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios have the most managerial 
power.  An appealing attribute of this proxy for CEO managerial power is that it is based 
on data internal to the firm (no external measures such as press certifications, media or 
industry awards, or market opinion are required) and therefore more directly measures a 
CEOs influence within the firm. 
Second, this CEO/Number_2 Ratio has precedent in prior research.  Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) examine the role of CEO hubris in explaining large acquisition 
premiums.  They argue that “the greater the CEO’s relative compensation to the number 
two executive, the greater the CEO’s self-importance and the more likely the CEO is to 
be infected with hubris.”  The authors find a positive correlation between this 
CEO/Number_2 Ratio and acquisition premiums, which implies higher CEO managerial 
power.  Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that for CEOs receiving awards (i.e., “superstar 
CEOs”), the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is greater after receiving the reward relative to prior 
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to receiving the award.  This result implies an increase in CEO managerial power after 
receiving an award.              
Third, many of the same variables that are included to explain CEO compensation 
should also be included in a model to explain the compensation of a company’s other 
highly paid executives.  This implies that the CEO/Number_2 Ratio should be relatively 
constant across firms and that any significant deviation in this ratio is due to excessive 
managerial power wielded by the CEO.  
For theses reasons, I use the CEO/Number_2 Ratio as a metric for ranking and 
classifying the CEOs for the purposes described in the next sub-section.    
                     
3.3.3 Research Questions 
My dissertation examines four research questions. The first two questions focus 
on (1) the impact that the inclusion of Elite CEOs in a sample has on standard 
compensation models and (2) the factors that affect Elite CEO compensation differently 
from Non-Elite CEO compensation.  
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO 
compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?  Asked 
another way, does the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model apply for Elite CEOs?  
The methodology for answering this question is more fully developed in Section 4. 
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and 
Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is 
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently?  That is, should the CEO 
compensation model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) contain the 
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same structure and the same variables?  Or if the same variables are contained in the 
models, are there different coefficients on these variables?  For example, is the equity-
based compensation for Elite CEOs more sensitive to past firm performance than Non-
Elite CEOs?  The methodology for answering this question is more fully developed in 
Section 4. 
The empirical research for Questions 1 and 2 specifically investigates whether 
Elite CEOs are compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs.  If the same one-size-fits-
all model does not apply to all CEOs, then existing models distort the significance of the 
variables that are in the CEO compensation regression with respect to the impact they 
have on Elite CEOs.  This of course suggests that we do not fully understand 
compensation of Elite CEOs and have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO 
managerial power in determining CEO compensation. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite CEOs’ firms do not experience superior 
performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  For this hypothesis I perform 
empirical tests to answer the following Questions 3 and 4.  
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’ 
performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model?  Asked another 
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms?  The 
methodology for this question is more fully developed in Section 4. 
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite 
CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance 
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently?  That is, 
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite 
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CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables?  Or if the same variables are 
contained in the different models, are there different coefficients on these variables?  For 
example, is the firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms more sensitive to firm sales than 
Non-Elite CEOs?  The methodology for this question is more fully developed in Section 
4. 
The empirical research for Questions 3 and 4 specifically investigates whether or 
not Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  If the same one-
size-fits-all firm performance model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing 
models distort the significance of the variables that are in the firm performance 
regression with respect to the impact they have on the Elite CEOs’ firms.  This of course 
suggests that we do not fully understand the firm performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and 
have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO managerial power in determining 
firm performance. 
There are two important potential implications of the findings of this research.  
First, it is possible that previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the 
link between CEO compensation and firm performance might be distorted because 
previous studies have failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of 
highly paid and influential CEOs. Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and 
policy makers to understand the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and 
firm performance. 
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4 Methodology 
In this section I describe the steps involved in performing my research.  I describe 
the data in Section 5 and present the results in Section 6. 
 
4.1 Step 1: Develop the Classification of Elite CEO 
I rank the CEOs using the proxy for CEO managerial power, CEO/Number_2 
Ratio.  I then segregate the CEOs into two groups or classes: “Elite CEOs” (above some 
cut-off by ranking) and “Non-Elite CEOs” (the remaining CEOs).  I use these 
classifications for CEO compensation regressions and firm performance regressions.  I 
describe in detail my method for determining the cut-off level for classifying the CEOs 
(including an alternate proxy for CEO managerial power for robustness tests and 
alternative cut-off levels for sensitivity tests) in Section 6. 
     
4.2 Step 2: Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?   
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO 
compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?  Asked 
another way, does the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model apply for Elite CEOs?  I 
initiate this analysis by including an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with 
all of the explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the CEO 
compensation regressions.  I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite 
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  It is a modified Chow Test in the sense 
that I do not interact the Elite CEO dummy with the year and industry dummy variables. 
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This research specifically investigates whether or not the class of Elite CEOs is 
compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs.  If the same one-size-fits-all model does 
not apply to all CEOs, then existing models might distort the significance of the variables 
that are in the CEO compensation regression with respect to the impact they have on Elite 
CEOs.  This of course suggests that we do not fully understand the compensation of Elite 
CEOs and have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO managerial power in 
determining CEO compensation. 
I use five measures of CEO compensation (salary, bonus, equity-based 
compensation, Other compensation, and total direct compensation) as the dependent 
variable in my base case regressions.  I also run a sensitivity case with only the firms that 
are in the sample for the full thirteen years with CEO total direct compensation as the 
dependent variable (to explore potential survivorship issues).  I then run three 
sensitivities using different methods for ranking and classifying the CEOs on each of the 
six cases.  Furthermore, for each of the cases I run both random-effects and fixed-effects 
on the firm-effects (in Section 6, I show why firm-effects is a better specification than 
CEO-effects), and then perform the Hausman test to determine which is appropriate.          
I use the following empirical specification of CEO compensation, which is similar 
to models used in the literature: 
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(1) 
where subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, CEO and time, respectively.2  I include three 
measures of firm performance as explanatory variables in the CEO compensation 
regressions:  (1) the net income before extraordinary items over assets (return on assets or 
ROA), in the year prior to the year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help 
explain CEOs’ annual bonus, (2) 3-year growth rate in net income in the year prior to the 
year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help explain CEOs’ long term 
incentive plan bonus, and (3) 3-year shareholder return with dividends reinvested, in the 
year prior to the year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help explain CEOs’ 
equity-based compensation.  Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all 
components of CEO compensation and past firm performance.  I include predicted 
positive signs in the results tables.   
I include six measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables in the CEO 
compensation regressions: (1) the natural log of sales, in the year prior to the observation, 
explains firm scale and complexity, (2) the Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the 
                                                 
2 β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients 
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.  
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
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year prior to the observation, explains firm complexity, (3) the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, in the year prior to the observation, explains firm complexity, (4) the ratio of 
a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, in the year prior to the 
observation, explains firm complexity, (5) the ratio of the firm’s research and 
development expenditures (R&D) to total assets, in the year prior to the observation, 
explains firm complexity, and (6) the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of 
assets, in the year prior to the observation, explains firm growth opportunity and 
complexity.  Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all components of CEO 
compensation and firm characteristics based on the notion that a CEO that manages a 
larger or more complex firm deserves higher compensation.  I include predicted positive 
signs in the results tables. 
I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO 
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year prior to the observation, 
proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the 
year prior to the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3) 
CEO tenure at the firm in the year prior to the observation, proxy for CEO experience 
and standing at the firm.  The previous research has found mixed signs and significance 
for the coefficient on this variable.  Based on the idea that an older CEO or a CEO with 
more tenure is more highly skilled and experienced and therefore deserving of higher 
compensation, I include positive predicted signs in the results tables.     
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm 
governance characteristics.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) develop the governance 
index as a proxy for shareholder rights based on 24 governance rules.  The construction 
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of the governance index for each firm is as follows: the authors add 1 point for every 
provision that restricts shareholder rights (increases managerial power).  The governance 
index ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest shareholder rights).  
Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all components of CEO compensation 
and weakness in the governance index, i.e. the weaker corporate governance leads to 
higher CEO compensation.  I include predicted positive signs in the results tables as 
compensation is increasing with increasing weakness in corporate governance.  I also 
include industry and year dummy variables in the CEO compensation regressions.   
Table 3 presents a list and a description of the variables and the sources of the 
data for the CEO compensation regressions.  Table 4 presents summary results from 
previous research models, including the signs and significance of estimated coefficients 
on the control variables for a variety of different dependent variables that measure 
compensation.  
I perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEOs are compensated 
differently.  To perform the modified Chow Test I include an Elite CEO dummy variable 
(equal to 1 for Elite CEOs and 0 otherwise) and interact it with all explanatory variables 
(except for the year and industry dummies) then test the null that the coefficients on the 
Elite CEO dummy and all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  If the 
null is rejected, then Elite CEOs are compensated differently and something else is going 
on that is not captured in the CEO compensation models, such as excessive CEO 
managerial power or weak corporate governance. 
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4.3 Step 3: How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?   
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and 
Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is 
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently?  That is, should the CEO 
compensation model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) contain the 
same structure and the same variables?  The research in this step assumes the same 
variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs compensation 
models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are different.  For 
example, is total direct compensation for Elite CEOs more sensitive to past firm 
performance than Non-Elite CEOs?   
This step involves three additional cases (“All CEOs”, “Non-Elite CEOs” (the 
CEOs that are not Elite), and Elite CEOs) for each of the five measures of CEO 
compensation as the dependent variable.  Furthermore, for each case I run both random-
effects and fixed-effects on the firm-effects (I describe my support for using firm-effects 
instead of CEO-effects in Section 6), and then perform the Hausman test to determine 
which is appropriate.          
I use the following empirical specification of CEO compensation: 
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(2) 
where subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, CEO and time, respectively.3  For this set of CEO 
compensation regressions I use the same explanatory variables and expect the same signs 
on the coefficients as described in Step 2.  However, for this set of CEO compensation 
regressions I do not include the Elite CEO dummy or the Elite CEO interaction terms.   
The analysis of these regressions is a simple comparison of the statistical and 
economic significance of the coefficients on the variables from the three additional cases 
just described (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs) and the case from Step 2.  If 
the coefficients and their statistical significances are different, then something else is 
going on that is not captured in the CEO compensation models, such as excessive CEO 
managerial power or weak corporate governance.   
 
4.4 Step 4: Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?   
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’ 
performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model?  Asked another 
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms?  I 
                                                 
3 β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable and ε represents the error term.  
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients. 
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initiate this analysis by including an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with 
all of the explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the firm 
performance regressions.  I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite 
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. 
This research specifically investigates whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently from Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  If the same one-size-fits-all firm performance 
model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing models distort the significance of 
the variables that are in the firm performance regression with respect to the impact they 
have on the Elite CEOs’ firms.  This of course suggests that we do not fully understand 
the performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and have possibly been underestimating the role of 
CEO managerial power in determining firm performance.  
For this step, I use eight measures of firm performance (forward one-year return 
on assets, forward one-year return on equity, forward three-year growth rate in net 
income, forward five-year growth rate in net income, forward shareholder one-year return 
including reinvesting dividends, forward shareholder three-year return including 
reinvesting dividends, forward shareholder five-year return including reinvesting 
dividends, and market value to book value ratio) as dependent variables.  I also run a 
sensitivity case using only the firms that are in the sample for the full thirteen years for 
each of the eight dependent variables (to explore potential survivorship issues).  I then 
run one sensitivity test on each of the cases using a different method for ranking and 
classifying the CEOs.  Furthermore, for each case I run both random-effects and fixed-
effects on the firm-effects (I support using firm-effects instead of CEO-effects in Section 
6), and then perform the Hausman test to determine which is appropriate.     
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I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for seven of the 
eight dependent variables (all but the market value to book value ratio which has a 
different specification as described later): 
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where for equation 3 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time, respectively.4  I 
include six measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables in the firm 
performance regressions: (1) the natural log of sales, in the year of the observation, 
explains firm scale and complexity, (2) the Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the 
year of the observation, explains firm complexity, (3) the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm complexity, (4) the ratio of a firm’s 
net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, in the year of the observation, 
explains firm complexity, (5) the ratio of the firm’s research and development 
expenditures (R&D) to total assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm 
                                                 
4 β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients 
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.  
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients. 
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complexity, and (6) the ratio of market value to book value, in the year of the 
observation, explains firm growth potential.   
Based on the efficient market theory that all information is already priced in the 
market, I do not expect a statistically significant or consistent correlation between 
market-based measures of forward firm performance and firm characteristics.  Likewise 
and somewhat by extension, I do not expect a statistically significant or consistent 
correlation between accounting based measures of forward firm performance and firm 
characteristics.  However, consistent with the literature these firm characteristics will be 
included as control variables.  I include not significant (“NS”) for the predicted signs in 
my results tables.  
I include four measures of CEO compensation as explanatory variables in the firm 
performance regressions: (1) CEO annual salary in the year of the observation, proxy for 
CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) CEO annual bonus in the year of the 
observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, (3) CEO equity-based 
compensation in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably 
skill, and (4) CEO Other compensation in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO 
experience and presumably skill.  Based on the efficient market theory that all 
information is already priced in the market, I do not expect a statistically significant or 
consistent correlation between market-based measures of firm performance and measures 
of CEO compensation.  However, Mehran (1995) found a statistically significant positive 
relationship between CEO equity-based compensation and both Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets.  Therefore I expect a positive correlation between accounting based measures of 
firm performance and all measures of CEO compensation.  I include NS for the predicted 
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signs for the market-based measures of firm performance in my results tables and include 
a positive predicted sign for the accounting based measures of firm performance in my 
results tables.    
I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO 
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year of the observation, proxy 
for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the year of 
the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3) CEO tenure at 
the firm in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and standing at the 
firm.  Based on the premise that an older CEO or a CEO with more tenure is more highly 
skilled and experienced and based on Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005)’s finding of a 
positive correlation between CEO skill and forward firm performance I include positive 
predicted signs in my results tables.    
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm 
governance characteristics.  Generally, shareholders want a positive correlation between 
firm performance and a strengthening governance index, i.e. stronger corporate 
governance should lead to better firm performance.  Unfortunately, the previous research 
has found mixed signs and significance for the coefficients on various measures of 
corporate governance.  The construction of the governance index is described in sub-
section 4.2 but to review it ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest 
shareholder rights).  I include negative predicted signs in my results tables as firm 
performance is decreasing with increasing weakness in the governance index.  I also 
include industry and year dummy variables in the firm performance regressions.   
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The market to book ratio is different from the other performance metrics in that it 
does not measure a rate of return. The market value of a firm can be thought of as the 
capitalized value of different firm characteristics. Therefore, I use the following empirical 
specification for the market value to book value ratio: 
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where for equation 4 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time, respectively.5  I 
include four measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables: (1) the ratio of net 
income to the assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm profitability, (2) the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets, in the year of the observation, measures the 
leveraging effects of debt, (3) the ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E) to total assets, in the year of the observation, measures tangibility of assets, and 
(4) the ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures (R&D) to total assets, 
in the year of the observation, is a proxy for growth.   
                                                 
5 β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients 
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.  
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients. 
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I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO 
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year of the observation, proxy 
for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the year of 
the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3) CEO tenure at 
the firm in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and standing at the 
firm.  Based on the premise that an older CEO or a CEO with more tenure is more highly 
skilled and experienced and based on Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005)’s finding of a 
positive correlation between CEO skill and forward firm performance I include positive 
predicted signs in my results tables.    
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm 
governance characteristics.  Generally, shareholders want a positive correlation between 
firm performance and a strengthening governance index, i.e. stronger corporate 
governance should lead to better firm performance.  Unfortunately, the previous research 
has found mixed signs and significance for the coefficients on various measures of 
corporate governance.  The construction of the governance index is described in sub-
section 4.2 but to review it ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest 
shareholder rights).  I include negative predicted signs in my results tables as firm 
performance is decreasing with increasing weakness in the governance index.  I also 
include industry and year dummy variables in the firm performance regressions. 
As mentioned previously, a list and a description of the variables and the sources 
of the data are provided in Table 5.  I list the variables and present the sign and 
significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some measure 
of firm performance as the dependent variable in Table 6.     
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I perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently.  To perform the modified Chow Test I include a dummy variable equal to one 
for Elite CEOs and interact it with all explanatory variables (except for the year and 
industry dummies) then test the null that the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and all 
interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  If that is indeed the case, then something else 
is going on that is not captured in the firm performance models, such as excessive CEO 
managerial power or weak corporate governance. 
 
4.5 Step 5: How Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?    
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite 
CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance 
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently?  That is, 
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite 
CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables?  The research in this step 
assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs 
firm performance models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are 
different?  For example, is the firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms more sensitive to 
firm sales than Non-Elite CEOs?   
This step involves three additional cases (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite 
CEOs) for each of the eight measures of firm performance as the dependent variable.  I 
then run one sensitivity case on each of these twenty-four cases using a different method 
for ranking and classifying the CEOs.  Furthermore, for each of the forty-eight cases I run 
both random-effects and fixed-effects on the firm-effects (I support using firm-effects 
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instead of CEO-effects in Section 6 Results), and then perform the Hausman test to 
determine which is appropriate.     
I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for seven of the 
eight dependent variables (all but the market value to book value ratio which has a 
different specification): 
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I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for the market 
value to book value ratio: 
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where for both equations 5 and 6 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time, 
respectively.6  For this set of firm performance regressions I use the same explanatory 
variables and expect the same signs on the coefficients as described in Step 4 for 
equations 3 and 4, respectively; except, I now include the Average Ratio as an 
explanatory variable but do not include the Elite CEO dummy or Elite CEO interaction 
terms. 7   
The analysis of these regressions is a simple comparison of the statistical and 
economic significance of the coefficients on the variables from the three additional cases 
just described (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs) and the case from Step 4.  If 
the coefficients and their statistical significances are different, particularly on the 
Average Ratio, then something else is going on that is not captured in the CEO 
compensation models, such as excessive CEO managerial power or weak corporate 
governance.  The sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient on Average Ratio 
should help explain whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms outperform all other firms. 
 
                                                 
6 β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable and ε represents the error term.  
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.  
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients. 
7 The Average Ratio is the average of a CEO’s CEO/Number_2 Ratio over a CEO’s tenure as the CEO at a 
given firm.  The CEO/Number_2 Ratio was first described in Section 3 and the Average Ratio is more fully 
developed in Section 6. 
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5 Data 
In this section I describe in detail how I prepare the data set for this research in 
sub-section 5.1 and provide descriptive statistics and information on the data set in sub-
section 5.2. 
 
5.1 Data Set 
Table 3 lists and describes the variables I use in my CEO compensation 
regressions, as more fully described in Steps 2 and 3 of Section 4.  Table 5 lists and 
describes the variables I use in my firm performance regressions, as more fully described 
in Steps 4 and 5 of Section 4.  In these tables I also note the source of the data for each 
variable and the source’s name or code for the listed variables.  Table 7 presents the data 
and sources used in prior research that I consider key to my dissertation.  Following is a 
description of the process I followed to collect and prepare the data for this research.  
I utilized the Wharton Research Data Services to collect three ‘master’ data files 
for the period 1993 through 2005 from the Compustat North America dataset (one data 
file from the Executive Compensation area and one data file from the Financial 
Statements area) and from the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) dataset. 
Since my focus is on CEOs, I began building my dataset with the Executive 
Compensation (“ExecuComp”) master data file which has information for the top five 
executives at each firm.  I dropped observations that do not have any compensation data 
whatsoever.  For the observations that are missing data for total direct compensation 
(variable tdc1), restricted stock grants (variable rstkgrnt), and stock options (variable 
option_1) but have data for variables salary or bonus; I set tdc1 equal to salary plus 
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bonus.  I created a variable Equity that is equal to restricted stock grants (rstkgrnt) plus 
stock options (option_1).   
I created a new dummy variable CEO set equal to 1 if the ExecuComp variable 
ceoann was equal to the string ‘CEO’ and 0 otherwise.  Unfortunately, some of the firms 
do not recognize any of the executives for a given firm-year as the CEO by the variable 
ceoann.  For these firms I took two approaches to identifying the firm’s CEO.   First, I 
identify the firms that have a CEO for at least one other firm-year.  For these firms, if it is 
obvious that the person who is the CEO in the firm-years with a non-missing ceoann 
value is also the CEO in the firm-year with the missing ceoann variable, then I manually 
change the CEO dummy variable to 1 for firm-years missing ceoann.   Second, for the 
firms without a CEO for at least one firm-year, I ranked the executives by their respective 
total direct compensation by firm-year and deemed the highest ranking executive to be 
the CEO for the given firm-year.   
I rank the ‘non-CEO’ executives by total direct compensation by firm-year and 
deemed the highest ranking non-CEO to be the Number 2 executive.  I drop firm-years 
that do not have both a CEO and a Number 2 executive.  I create a new variable Ratio 
that for a given firm-year is simply the ratio of the CEO’s total direct compensation and 
the Number 2 executive’s total direct compensation (previously defined as CEO/Number 
2  Ratio).  The use of CEO/Number_2 Ratio was discussed in Sections 3 and 4.     
The CEO’s age is an explanatory variable in my regressions but the variable age 
is missing data for 1,187 firm-years.  However, for 407 of these observations the CEO’s 
age is available in at least one firm-year but is missing data in other firm-year(s).  For 
these 407 observations I added or subtracted, accordingly, from the CEO’s age to fill in 
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the missing data.  I created CEO tenure based on the number of years the CEO serves as 
CEO at a given firm in the sample.  For the executives who were CEOs in 1993, I add the 
number of years the served as CEO at that firm prior to 1993 using the becameceo 
variable from ExecuComp.   
I merge the ExecuComp data file, as it is at this point, with the Financial 
Statements data file (“Compustat”) by company identification number (variable gvkey) 
and year.  I drop observations that are missing data for company sales and drop 
observations with sales less than $25 million for a given firm-year (in 2005 dollars).   
I set missing data equal to zero for the following variables (this is a common 
approach in the literature): (1) research and development (variable data45) was missing 
data for 18,240 observations; and (2) deferred taxes (variable data74) was missing 3,421 
observations.  I winsorize the data at the 99th percentile for three variables to mitigate the 
influence of outliers: 1) shareholder one-year return (variable trs1yr), 2) shareholder 
three-year return (variable trs3yr) and 3) shareholder five-year return (variable trs5yr). 
The RiskMetrics (“IRRC”) master data file includes the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick governance index (variable gindex).  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) develop 
the governance index as a proxy for shareholder rights based on 24 governance rules.  
The construction of the governance index for each firm is as follows: the authors add 1 
point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights (increases managerial power).  
The governance index ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest 
shareholder rights).  Unfortunately, gindex is only available for years 1993, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  I fill in the missing years by averaging the values for gindex 
in the preceding year and subsequent year, in cases where both the preceding year and 
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subsequent year are available (for 1996 and 1997 it is the average of the gindex values for 
1995 and 1998 if both are available).  For the other years missing data for gindex I set the 
missing value equal to the preceding year’s value (if available) or the subsequent year’s 
value (if available).  I then use the “interpolate and extrapolate” features of Stata to fill in 
any remaining gaps. 
I merge the IRRC working data file with the combined ExecuComp and 
Compustat data file by cusip and year and drop 71 observations that I can not match.  I 
drop one of the two firm-years for CEOs that are serving as CEO at two firms in the same 
year and I drop the one firm with no industry identification.  The final dataset has 23,528 
firm-year observations for the period 1993-2005. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
There are 2,746 firms and 13 years in the final dataset, for a total of 23,528 firm-
years for most variables. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, 
median and mean) for each of the variables in the regressions.  Table 9 presents their 
pair-wise correlations.  The variables include five measures of CEO compensation 
(salary, bonus, equity-based, Other, and total compensation), eight measures of firm 
performance (return on assets, return on equity, net income 3-year growth rate, net 
income 5-year growth rate, shareholder 1-year, 3-year and 5-year growth rate, and market 
to book value ratio), six firm characteristics (sales, stock price volatility, total liabilities to 
assets ratio, PP&E to assets ratio, R&D to assets ratio, and Governance Index), and three 
CEO characteristics (age, age2, and tenure).   
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I now demonstrate that the firm-effects and CEO-effects are stable in the dataset. 
Table 10, panel A, indicates that on average 95% of the firms in the sample survive from 
one year to the next.  I define a firm’s life as the number of years it is in the sample. 
Table 10, panel B, shows that 88 percent of the firms have a life of 3 years or greater. The 
mean firm life is 8.6 years and the median is 9 years.   Firms tend not to float in and out 
of the sample; only 58 of the 2,746 firms have gaps in the years that they are in the 
sample.  Thus, the sample of firms is relatively stable from year to year. In other words, 
intertemporal variation in the data is not being driven by a changing composition of firms 
from year to year. This suggests that the entire sample of 23,528 firm-years can be used. 
However, I also run a sensitivity case including only the firms that are in the sample for 
the full 13 years for both the CEO compensation and firm performance regressions.   
In sub-section 3.3 I refer to Figure 5 and point out that the top 10% group of 
CEOs (based on a ranking of total direct compensation) has a huge hump in its total 
direct compensation in the years leading up to 2000.  A natural concern is that potentially 
some subset of firms represented within the top 10% group of CEOs is responsible for the 
anomaly.  For example, the technology firms that came and went during the internet 
bubble in the late 1990s potentially could be the source of the hump in total direct 
compensation.  Figure 6 addresses this concern by breaking the sample into three groups 
based on the number of years the firm is in the sample: (1) one to five year firm life, (2) 
six to nine year firm life, and (3) ten to thirteen year firm life.  From Figure 6 it is clear 
that all three groups have similarly shaped humps in the total direct compensation. Thus, 
the sample is not being distorted by a changing mixture of firms.          
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Next I focus on CEOs and find that fewer than 150 of the 5,210 CEOs in the sample 
serve at more than one firm during the sample years, indicating that few CEOs move 
from one firm in the sample to another firm in the sample. Table 11 shows that 
approximately 64 percent of the CEOs have tenure (including service prior to 1993) 
longer than three years, with mean CEO tenure of 6.4 years and median of 4 years.                        
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6 Results 
In this section I present the results of my research in the order of the five steps 
outlined in Section 4. 
 
6.1 Step 1: Develop the Classification of Elite CEOs   
The purpose of this step is to categorize the CEOs into two classes: “Elite CEOs” 
and “Non-Elite CEOs” (the remaining CEOs).  I began by calculating for each CEO in 
each year the CEO/Number_2 Ratio.  I then calculate the mean CEO/Number_2 Ratio for 
each CEO for the years that the CEO serves as the CEO at the firm. I call this the 
“Average Ratio.”  Note that each CEO has only one Average Ratio at a given firm, no 
matter how many years the individual is employed as the CEO.  I then rank the CEOs by 
year using the Average Ratio.  Figure 7 is a plot of the Average Ratio for all CEOs versus 
the fraction of the data and it indicates a slight bend in the curve starting at the 80th 
percentile and a distinct bend in the curve at the 90th percentile.8  In other words, the 
Average Ratio is pretty similar for about 90% of the CEOs, but it is much higher for the 
top 10%. Therefore, I classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the 
CEO has an Average Ratio that is in the top 10% for at least one year during the CEO’s 
tenure.  
The use of the Average Ratio leads to a definition of Elite CEO status that is 
relatively similar to the alternative of defining each year the Elite CEOs as those with a 
                                                 
8 The Average Ratio is about 2.0 at the 70th percentile and increases to 2.3 at the 80th percentile.  The slope 
increases (almost doubles) for the next decile as the Average Ratio climbs to 2.9 at the 90th percentile.  
Thereafter, the slope continues to increases as the Average Ratio jumps to 3.7 at the 95th percentile.  Figure 
7 plots only the first 98% (by Average Ratio) because the top 2% of the sample have such large values 
(greater than 6.0) that they distort the scale of the figure if they are included in the figure. Although the top 
2% are excluded from the figure, all observations are used in the subsequent empirical tests.  
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CEO/Number_2 Ratio in the top 10% for that year.  In other words, the annual ranking of 
CEO/Number_2 Ratio is fairly “sticky” over time.  For example, CEOs that have an 
CEO/Number_2 Ratio in the top 10% for at least one year also are in the top 10% for 
more than 80% of the years in which they are CEO.  In addition, Table 12 shows the 
stickiness of Elite CEO status by firm-tenure using the Average Ratio approach as 
defined with a top 10% cutoff (for robustness, Table 12 also shows similar data for a top 
15% cutoff).  Notice that if a long-tenured CEO is classified as Elite in at least one year, 
then the CEO is classified as Elite in most years. 
There are two reasons that I do not reclassify Elite CEOs each year, but instead 
classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the CEO is above the cut-off 
level for at least one year during the CEO’s tenure.  First, the Average Ratio approach 
mitigates the impact of golden hellos (sign on bonuses and other additional compensation 
in the first year on seat as the CEO) and golden goodbyes (severance or retirement 
packages in the last year of service) because it takes into account the CEO’s 
compensation in all years of the CEO’s firm-tenure.  Second, the Average Ratio approach 
makes Elite CEO status time invariant for an Elite CEO’s firm-tenure.  If I reclassified 
Elite CEOs each year then some CEOs would float in and out of Elite CEO status during 
their firm-tenure, creating anomalies in the firm-effect analysis. 
It is important to recognize that the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is not just another way 
of expressing total compensation but instead captures a distinct aspect of CEO 
managerial power.  Figure 8 presents a rank-order of the CEOs by their CEO/Number_2 
Ratio and total direct compensation, with the ranking done by thirds (I chose to rank by 
thirds because it provides sufficient insight without the clutter caused by more ranking 
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categories). Figure 8 clearly demonstrates ranking by CEO/Number_2 Ratio is 
substantially different from ranking by total direct compensation. For example, if the 
CEO/Number_2 Ratio and total compensation were perfectly correlated, then 100% of 
the CEOs in the top one-third when ranked by the CEO/Number_2 Ratio would also be in 
the top one-third when ranked by total compensation.  However, Figure 8 shows that only 
51% of the top one-third CEOs ranked by CEO/Number_2 Ratio are also in the top one-
third of CEOs ranked by total direct compensation.  Furthermore, Table 1 (panel B) 
shows the pair-wise correlation of CEO total direct compensation and CEO/Number_2 
Ratio is relatively low (in the range of 0.12 to 0.46 with an average of 0.24) for the period 
1993 through 2005.  The Spearman’s rank-order correlation is also shown in Table 1 
panel B, and it, too, is low.  
Because all executives at a particular firm may be highly compensated, the level 
of CEO total compensation does not necessarily speak to a CEO’s ability to extract 
excess compensation; in other words, there may be rational firm-specific reasons to have 
a highly compensated CEO and senior executives.  However, as I have noted previously, 
the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is a proxy for CEO managerial power or influence over the 
board, which is responsible for setting CEO compensation.  Therefore ranking and 
classifying the CEOs by their CEO/Number_2 Ratio provides insights on the different 
classes of CEOs’ relative level of compensation and relative level of firm performance.   
Some could argue that the CEOs’ with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios are 
simply managing more complex firms and therefore deserve the relatively higher 
compensation.  I argue that if a firm is more complex, then all executives’ roles in 
managing the firm are more demanding and deserving of relatively higher compensation.  
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Several of the firm characteristic explanatory variables that I previously described in 
Section 4 are proxies for firm complexity.  Therefore the CEO/Number_2 Ratios should 
stay relatively level within a firm after controlling for firm complexity.   
Others could argue that the CEOs with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios simply 
have a better relationship with their respective boards or there is an element of cronyism 
where the CEO and the directors set each others salaries.  I control for this “cronyism” 
issue by including the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index as an explanatory 
variable.   
For robustness tests, I develop a concentration index of each CEO’s compensation 
based on the top five executives’ compensation at each firm.  The logic and support for 
this approach is that the relationship of the CEO’s compensation to the top five 
executives’ compensation is a measure of the CEO’s managerial power and ability to 
extract compensation.  The technique I use for developing the concentration index of 
CEO compensation is analogous to the Herfindahl Index, also known as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index.  The Herfindahl Index is an indicator of the amount of competition 
among firms in an industry and is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares 
of each individual firm.  As such, it can range from close to 0 for an industry with many 
small firms to 1 for an industry with a single monopolistic producer. 
My concentration index is the sum of squares of the top five executive’s 
respective share (percent) of the total compensation for the top five executives.  In theory 
it can range from 0.2 if the top five executives are equally compensated to 1.0 if one of 
the executives receives all of the compensation paid to the top five executives. 
 91
Similar to Average Ratio, I rank and classify Elite CEOs based on the average 
compensation concentration index, denoted by “Average CCI.”  Figure 9 is a plot of the 
Average CCI for all CEOs versus the fraction of the data and it indicates a distinct bend 
in the curve at the 80th through the 90th percentile. 
In summary, I classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the 
CEO has an Average Ratio that is in the top 10% for at least one year during the CEO’s 
tenure.  I use this classification for my base cases for the CEO compensation regressions 
and the firm performance regressions.  For robustness tests, in the CEO compensation 
regressions I use the Average Ratio with a top 20% cutoff, the Average CCI with a top 
10% cutoff, and the Average CCI with a top 20% cut-off as sensitivity cases.  As I show 
later, the results from the CEO compensation regressions using the definition of an Elite 
CEO based on a top 10% cutoff with the Average Ratio are robust to the alternative 
cutoffs and the use of the Average CCI.  Therefore, I only use the Average CCI with a 
top 10% cut-off as a sensitivity case for the firm performance regressions.  
From my base-case classification of Elite CEO status, based on the Average Ratio 
and a cut-off at the 90th percentile, Table 13 shows the number of CEOs and Elite CEOs 
by year.  I note that the number and percent of Elite CEOs is increasing from year to year 
during the sample period.  Figure 10 demonstrates that this is simply because the Average 
Ratio is increasing for All CEOs throughout the sample period; which, naturally results in 
more CEOs being above the 90th percentile in the second half of the sample period.9  It is 
interesting that even though the Average Ratio is increasing during the sample period, the 
                                                 
9 As a sensitivity case, I use the CEO/Number_2 Ratio to rank and classify CEOs with a 10% cut-off by 
year for Elite CEO status and find similar results as for my base case.  However, this sensitivity case has 
the unfavorable characteristic that Elite CEO status is time variant (i.e., CEOs float in and out of Elite CEO 
status).   
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mean Average Ratios for All CEOs of 1.94 and Non-Elite CEOs of 1.66 are comparable 
to what the CEO/Number_2 Ratio was in the 1930s.  This comparison is based on 
information from Baker (1939) that enables me to determine that the CEO/Number_ 2 
Ratio for the top executive’s compensation to the number two executive’s compensation 
was about 1.7 in 1929 and 1.9 in 1936 for large firms.   
After classifying CEOs, I perform a univariate analysis of the means and medians 
of all variables I use later in my multivariate tests.  Table 14 presents these results.  It is 
interesting to note that the mean and median for every component of compensation and 
the total direct compensation for the Elite CEOs are two to four times higher and 
statistically different at the 1% level compared to the respective amounts for Non-Elite 
CEOs.  Yet, none of my eight measures of firm performance are statistically different at 
the 1% level, for both the mean and median, between the Elite CEOs and Non-Elite 
CEOs.  In fact, the mean and median for only two of the eight measures of firm 
performance (net income 5-year growth rate and shareholder 5-year return) are higher 
and statistically different at the 5% level for Elite CEOs compared to Non-Elite CEOs.  
This comparison suggests that Elite CEOs receive much higher compensation than Non-
Elite CEOs yet it is not clear at all that the Elite CEOs’ firms perform better. 
The comparison of the firm characteristic control variables between the two 
classes of CEOs is also quite interesting.  The mean and median for firm sales, stock 
volatility, and liabilities to assets ratio are higher and statistically different at the 1% level 
for Elite CEOs’ firms compared to the respective numbers for Non-Elite CEOs.  This 
suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms are larger, more complex, and riskier.  In addition, the 
mean and median for the ratio of PP&E to assets is lower and statistically different at the 
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1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms compared to the respective values for Non-Elite CEOs.  
This suggests that Elite CEOs firms are more difficult to monitor (firms are more difficult 
to monitor with decreasing levels of physical assets).  It is also important to notice the 
mean and median for the governance index is also higher (which means weaker corporate 
governance) and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms than for Non-
Elite CEOs’ firms.  These observations suggest that by virtue of the weaker corporate 
governance, higher difficulty of monitoring, and higher risk at their firms, Elite CEOs 
have relatively more opportunity than Non-Elite CEOs to extract excess compensation 
without necessarily providing higher firm performance. 
The foregoing comparison suggests that there are several statistically significant 
and interesting differences between the two classes of CEOs.  The next 3 sub-sections 
present the results of my multivariate tests of CEO compensation models.  
 
6.2 The Basic Unadjusted CEO Compensation Regression Model: A Comparison 
with Extant Literature  
Before performing multivariate tests that employ the classification of Elite CEOs, 
I first estimate my basic compensation model (without any adjustments for Elite status) 
and compare the results with the extant literature to verify that my basic unadjusted 
model produces results similar to results in the existing literature.  This sub-section 
demonstrates that my CEO compensation model and data are indeed comparable to 
similar CEO compensation models in extant literature.   
As mentioned in Section 4, I run both random-effects and fixed-effects for all of 
my regressions.  In most cases, Hausman tests indicated that the random-effects estimator 
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was not appropriate.  Consequently, I use and present the results from the fixed-effects 
estimator throughout this section.  However, before I ran the regressions I needed to 
determine whether it should be firm-effects or CEO-effects.  I calculated the mean and 
standard deviation of the CEO/Number_2 Ratio by CEO and by firm.  From that 
information I determined that the standard deviation of the CEO/Number_2 Ratio has a 
higher mean and varies more for firms than for CEOs.  Therefore I use firm-effects for all 
regressions. 
Table 15 lists the variables used in several comparable CEO compensation 
models in extant literature with total direct compensation as the dependent variable.10  
Table 15 also reports the results from my regression with CEO total direct compensation 
as the dependent variable in the last column. The R2 for extant CEO compensation 
models range from 0.08 to 0.80 with the majority in the range of 0.08 to 0.56.  The R2 for 
my CEO total direct compensation model is comparable at 0.39.  Table 15 also presents 
the sign and the significance on the coefficients for variables used in the respective CEO 
compensation models.  A comparison of the sign and the significance of the coefficients 
on the variables used in my CEO total direct compensation model are comparable to the 
results from extant literature.  Other than a larger sample (more firms and more years), 
Table 15 confirms that my unadjusted model and data are similar to models and data in 
previous empirical studies. Therefore, my new results in the next two sub-sections are 
due to my adjustments for Elite CEO status rather than to any difference in data or model 
structure. 
                                                 
10 Table 15 is essentially a reproduction of Table 4 but includes information from my CEO compensation 
model with total direct compensation as the dependent variable. 
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 6.3 Step 2:  Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?   
This sub-section presents the results of my research and shows that Elite CEOs 
are indeed compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs.  I begin with a review of my 
research question and methodology then present the results. 
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO 
compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?  As 
described in Section 4, I estimate regressions with compensation measures as the 
dependent variables and a set of control variables as the independent variables, including 
an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with all of the independent variables 
(except for the year and industry dummies).  I then perform a modified Chow Test to test 
the null that the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and all interaction terms are jointly 
equal to zero.  If the null is rejected, then the same model does not apply for Elite CEOs 
and Non-Elite CEOs. In other words, something is not captured in the typical CEO 
compensation models, such as excessive CEO managerial power of the Elite CEOs.  Note 
that the CEO’s managerial power may be due to superior performance or to weak 
corporate governance, an issue that I address later in this section. 
Table 16 presents results of the modified Chow Tests.  The rows of the table show 
results for regression models with different dependent variables, which are the four 
components of compensation (salary, bonus, equity, Other) and the total direct 
compensation.  In addition, for robustness testing I repeat the regression for total direct 
compensation using a sub-sample containing only the firms that are in the sample for all 
thirteen years.  Each column in Table 16 is for a different method of classifying Elite 
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CEOs.  These are based on the Average Ratio with cut-offs at the top 10% and top 20%.  
For robustness, I also classify Elite CEOs based on the Average CCI index with cut-offs 
at 10% and 20%.  In all cases, except for the bonus component of compensation, I reject 
the null at the 5% level (in fact most at the 1% level) that Elite CEO interaction terms are 
jointly equal to zero.  Also, rejecting the null for both the full sample and the sub-sample 
containing only the firms that are in the sample for the full 13 years is evidence that I 
probably do not have a severe selection problem.  Therefore, the answer to Question 1 is 
that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than implied by the one-size-fits-all CEO 
compensation model.11 
The modified Chow Test includes the Elite CEO dummy term in the test of the 
coefficients being jointly equal to zero.  A possibility for my finding that Elite CEOs are 
compensated differently is simply because they have a higher intercept (i.e., Elite CEOs 
might have higher compensation after controlling for other factors).  Therefore as a 
sensitivity case, I run an alternate modified Chow Test to test the null that the coefficients 
on all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero (the Elite CEO dummy term is 
excluded from this test).  Table 17 presents the results of the alternate modified Chow 
Test and they confirm that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite 
CEOs.12 
                                                 
11 As sensitivity cases for robustness, I determined two alternate Average Ratios based on salary and salary 
plus bonus for ranking and classifying CEOs.  I then ran regressions for all five measures of CEO 
compensation and also found that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs.    
12 As another sensitivity case for robustness, I ran a regression with total direct compensation as the 
dependent variable and interacted Elite CEO dummy with all explanatory variables and the variable year.  
Both the modified and alternate modified Chow Tests indicate Elite CEOs are compensated differently at 
the 1% level.  None of the Elite CEO interacted year terms are significant at the 1% level.    
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Now that I have established that Elite CEOs are compensated differently, the 
natural follow-on question is “How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?”  I 
address this question in the next sub-section. 
 
6.4 Step 3:  How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?  
This sub-section presents the results of my research that investigates how Elite 
CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs.  I begin with a review of my 
research question and methodology before presenting the results. 
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and 
Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is 
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently?  The answer to Question 1 is 
that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs.  That being the case, 
the research in this step assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite 
CEO and Non-Elite CEOs compensation models and investigates whether the coefficients 
on these variables are different. 
For this analysis I perform CEO compensation regressions both with and without 
the Elite CEO interaction terms.  Tables 18 through 22 present the results of these 
regressions; with each table presenting the results for a different measure of CEO 
compensation as the dependent variable.  For each table, Columns (1) and (2) are the 
results from a single regression including Elite CEO interaction terms; the coefficients on 
the independent variables are presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite 
CEO dummy and interaction terms are presented in column (2).  The results in column 
(2) show how Elites CEOs are compensated relative to the Non-Elite CEOs with respect 
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to the importance of particular control variables.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the 
results of three regressions (without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for 
All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, respectively; and are essentially a frame of 
reference or benchmark for determining how Elite CEOs are compensated differently.  
The regression in column (3) shows the results that a researcher would obtain if the 
impact of Elite CEOs is ignored.  As the following discussion will show, there are a 
couple of situations in which a researcher might draw an inappropriate conclusion with 
respect to either the significance or magnitude of a coefficient.  As a reminder, I use firm 
fixed-effects in my regressions for reasons previously explained in sub-section 6.2. 
Recall from Table 14 that the mean total direct compensation of $8.6 million for 
Elite CEOs is higher and statistically different from the mean total direct compensation of 
$3.6 million for Non-Elite CEOs. In general, the multivariate tests identify which 
independent variables explain the differences in compensation.  In addition, tests in the 
previous sub-section demonstrated that the coefficients on explanatory variables are not 
identical for Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs.  The objective in this sub-section is to 
examine the results from the multivariate tests and identify differences in the ways that 
Elite and Non-Elite CEOs are compensated.  
I discuss separately the regressions for each form of compensation presented in 
Tables 18-22, but I make a couple of general observations here.  First, the dummy term 
for Elite CEOs is not significant at even a 10% level for any form of compensation.  This 
indicates that the control variables in the regression models (rather than the intercept) 
explain the differences between Elite CEO compensation and Non-Elite CEO 
compensation.   Second, the separate regressions for Non-Elite CEOs tend to have higher 
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explanatory power than the regressions for Elite CEOs.  This suggests that the models 
used in extant literature might be better specified if they were adjusted for the influence 
of Elite CEOs. 
Table 18 presents the results of the four CEO compensation regressions with the 
natural log of CEO total direct compensation as the dependent variable.  An interesting 
observation is that the R-squared for the Non-Elite CEOs case, 0.45 in column (4), is 
higher than it is for either the All CEOs or Elite CEOs cases, 0.38 in column (3) and 0.27 
in column (5), respectively. As I mentioned earlier, this suggests that the models used in 
extant literature might be better specified if they were adjusted for the influence of Elite 
CEOs. 
Focusing on the results shown in Table 18, the coefficient on the market value to 
book value ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite 
CEO, as shown in columns (1) and (4).  Furthermore, the Elite CEO interaction term on 
the market to book value ratio is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
see column (2).  An interpretation of these results is that the compensation contracts for 
Elite CEOs have relatively more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts 
for Non-Elite CEOs) designed to mitigate CEOs shirking duties regarding the investment 
and growth opportunities reflected in the market to book value ratio.  This interpretation 
is consistent with findings by Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) that managers prefer the quiet life and therefore must have 
incentives to mitigate the underinvestment problem.  A slightly different interpretation is 
that Elite CEOs simply receive relatively more compensation than Non-Elite CEOs for 
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the increasing complexity of managing firms with greater investment and growth 
opportunities. 
Still reviewing Table 18, the coefficient on the PP&E to assets ratio is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in columns (1) 
and (4).  This suggest that for Non-Elite CEOs the total direct compensation is decreasing 
with increasing levels of PP&E to assets ratio, possibly because if a greater percent of a 
firm’s assets are in the form of physical assets then the firm is easier to monitor.  
However, the coefficient of the Elite CEO interaction term on the PP&E to assets ratio is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.  This suggests that Elite CEOs are 
compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs with respect to their firms’ asset intensity 
and either have incentives in their contracts to mitigate the shirking of duties regarding 
investment in PP&E or Elite CEOs are able to use their influence to extract more 
compensation based on increasing levels of the PP&E to asset ratio.      
The economic significance of these results are as follows: (1) the Elite CEO 
receives an additional $91 thousand in total direct compensation (relative to that of a 
Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the PP&E to asset ratio (at the mean for Elite 
CEOs this would be an increase of 2.7 percentage points from 27.0 percent to 29.7 
percent for the ratio) and (2) the Elite CEO receives an additional $128 thousand in total 
direct compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the 
market value to book value ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs this would be an increase of 
21.4 percentage points from 214.0 percent to 235.4 percent for the ratio).13 
                                                 
13 Refer to Table 14 for the summary statistics for these variables.  
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Finally from Table 18, the coefficient on the R&D to assets ratio is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in column (4).  
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant for All CEOs, see column (3).  
This indicates that the influence of the Elite CEOs masks the significance of the R&D to 
assets ratio in explaining Non-Elite CEOs’ compensation.  Furthermore, this suggests that 
a researcher might draw the inappropriate conclusion regarding the significance of the 
coefficient on the R&D to asset ratio in the one-size-fits-all CEO total compensation 
model.  
Table 19 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the 
natural log of CEO equity-based compensation as the dependent variable.  Focusing on 
the results shown in column (2) of Table 19, the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction 
term for Black-Scholes stock volatility is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  An interpretation of this finding is that Elite CEOs are more adept than Non-Elite 
CEOs at using their CEO managerial power to reduce the personal risk associated with 
equity-based compensation when their firms have higher levels of stock volatility.  
However, keep in mind that the mean equity-based compensation for Elite CEOs is 2.7 
times as great as the mean equity-based compensation for Non-Elite CEOs as shown in 
Table 14.  Also, the coefficient on CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in column (4).  However, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant for All CEOs, see column (3).  This indicates that the 
influence of the Elite CEOs masks the significance of CEO tenure in explaining Non-
Elite CEOs’ compensation.  Furthermore, this suggests that a researcher might draw the 
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inappropriate conclusion regarding the significance of the coefficient on CEO tenure in 
the one-size-fits-all CEO equity-based compensation model.  
Table 20 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the 
natural log of CEO Other compensation as the dependent variables.  Focusing on the 
results shown in column (2) of Table 20, the coefficients on the Elite CEO interaction 
terms for the total liabilities to assets ratio and the PP&E to assets ratio are positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.   
The coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term for the total liabilities to assets 
ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, see column (2) in Table 20.  
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant for Non-Elite CEOs, see columns 
(1) and (4).  An interpretation of this finding is that compensation contracts for Elite 
CEOs has more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts for Non-Elite 
CEOs) designed to compensate Elite CEOs for managing the additional risk associated 
with increasing levels of debt.  
The positive coefficient for Elite CEOs on the PP&E to asset ratio is particularly 
interesting because the coefficient on the PP&E to assets ratio is negative and statistically 
significant for Non-Elite CEOs at the 1% level (this makes sense for Non-Elite CEOs 
because firms are easier to monitor with increasing levels of physical assets).  The signs 
and the level of significance for these coefficients are the same as the previously 
discussed case with CEO total direct compensation as the dependent variable.  The 
interpretation of these results is that the compensation contracts for Elite CEOs has 
relatively more Other compensation (compared with the compensation contracts for Non-
Elite CEOs) when the firm has higher levels of tangible assets in the form of PP&E.  
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The economic significance of these results are as follows: (1) the Elite CEO 
receives an additional $30 thousand in Other compensation (relative to that of a Non-
Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the PP&E to asset ratio (at the mean for Elite 
CEOs this would be an increase of 2.7 percentage points from 27.0 percent to 29.7 
percent for the ratio) and (2) the Elite CEO receives an additional $97 thousand in Other 
compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the total 
liabilities to assets ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs this would be an increase of 5.9 
percentage points from 59.0 percent to 64.9 percent for the ratio).14   
Table 21 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the 
natural log of CEO salary as the dependent variables.  Focusing on the results shown in 
column (2) of Table 21, the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term for the total 
liabilities to assets ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  An 
interpretation of this result is that the compensation contracts for Elite CEOs has 
relatively more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts for Non-Elite 
CEOs) designed to compensate Elite CEOs for managing the additional risk associated 
with increasing levels of debt.   
The economic significance of this result is as follows: (1) the Elite CEO receives 
an additional $24 thousand in salary compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO) 
for a 10 percent increase in the total liabilities to assets ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs 
this would be an increase of 5.9 percentage points from 59.0 percent to 64.9 percent for 
the ratio).    
                                                 
14 Refer to Table 14 for the summary statistics. 
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Table 22 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the 
natural log of CEO bonus as the dependent variables.  As mentioned in the previous sub-
section, the bonus compensation is not statistically different for Elite CEOs compared to 
Non-Elite CEOs.   
In summary, Elite CEOs receive higher compensation and they are compensated 
differently from Non-Elite CEOs in the sense that a one-size-fits-all model is 
inappropriate.  Furthermore, Elite CEOs have higher compensation and their additional 
compensation is explained by their interacted control variables in the models rather than 
by the Elite CEO dummy variable.  Therefore future research should consider the 
influence of Elite CEOs on compensation models. In particular, it appears that the 
variables proxying firm risk, ease of monitoring the firm, and investments affect Elite 
CEO compensation and Non-Elite CEO compensation differently.  
I now examine firm performance regressions to determine whether or not Elite 
CEOs’ firms perform differently from Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  
 
6.5 The Basic Unadjusted Firm Performance Model: A Comparison with Extant 
Literature 
Before performing multivariate tests that employ the classification of Elite CEOs, 
I first estimate my basic firm performance model (without any adjustments for Elite 
status) and compare the results with the extant literature to verify that my basic 
unadjusted model produces results similar to results in the existing literature.  This sub-
section demonstrates that my firm performance model is indeed comparable to similar 
firm performance models in extant literature.   
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Table 23 lists the variables used in several comparable firm performance models 
in extant literature; my results are in the last column.15  The R2 for extant firm 
performance models range from 0.01 to 0.43 with the majority in the range of 0.01 to 
0.17.  The R2 for my firm performance model is comparable in the range of 0.01 to 0.10 
for my eight measures of firm performance.  Generally speaking, the firm performance 
models do not have as much explanatory power as the CEO compensation models.  Table 
23 also presents the sign and the significance on the coefficients for variables used in the 
respective firm performance models.  A comparison of the sign and the significance of 
the coefficients on the variables used in my firm performance model are qualitatively 
comparable to the results from extant literature. 
The Mehran (1995) firm performance model is essentially a single cross-section 
and therefore would be expected to have higher R2 than my pooled time-series cross-
section.  For comparison purposes, I ran single regressions each year for my data with the 
market to book value ratio used as a measure of firm performance (for comparability with 
Mehran (1995)). I found values of R2 by year in the range of 0.05 to 0.38 which is 
comparable to Mehran’s range of 0.03 to 0.43.  Also, the cases in Daines, Nair and 
Kornhauser (2005) that have R2 in the order of 0.3 had not only return on assets as the 
dependent variable but also the prior year return on assets as a control variable; because 
return on assets is fairly highly correlated from year to year,  Daines et al. have fairly 
high explanatory power when they include the prior years’ return on assets.  The other 
Daines et al. cases have R2 more in line with my firm performance model.   
                                                 
15 Table 23 is essentially a reproduction of Table 6 but includes information from my firm performance 
model. 
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Other than a larger sample (more firms and more years) and the differences noted 
above, Table 23 confirms that my unadjusted model and data are similar to models and 
data in previous empirical studies.  Therefore, my new results in the next two sub-
sections are due to my adjustments for Elite CEO status rather than to any difference in 
data or model structure. 
 
6.6 Step 4:  Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?   
This sub-section presents the results of my research that finds that Elite CEOs’ 
firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  I begin with a review of my 
research question and methodology then present the results. 
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’ 
performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model?  Asked another 
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms?  For 
this analysis I include an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with all of the 
explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the firm performance 
regressions.  I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEO 
interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. 
This research specifically investigates whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  If the same one-size-fits-all firm performance 
model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing models distort the significance of 
the variables that are in the firm performance regression with respect to the impact they 
have on the Elite CEOs’ firms.  This of course suggests that we do not fully understand 
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the performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and have possibly been underestimating the role of 
CEO managerial power in determining firm performance. 
Table 24 presents results of the modified Chow Tests.  The rows of the table show 
results from regressions with eight different measures of firm performance as the 
dependent variable.  Each column in Table 24 is for a different method of classifying 
Elite CEOs.  These are based on the Average Ratio with cut-off at the top 10% and for 
robustness I also classify Elite CEOs based on the Average CCI index with cut-off at 
10%.  In all cases, except for return on equity, I reject the null at the 1% level that Elite 
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  Therefore, the answer to Question 3 is 
that Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than implied by the one-size-fits-all firm 
performance model. 
The described modified Chow Test includes the Elite CEO dummy term in the 
test of the coefficients being jointly equal to zero.  A possibility for my finding that Elite 
CEOs’ firms perform differently is simply because they have a higher intercept (although 
the univariate tests in Table 14 do not indicate that Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently).  Therefore as a sensitivity case, I run an alternate modified Chow Test to test 
the null that the coefficients on all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero 
(the Elite CEO dummy is exclude from this test).  Table 25 presents the results of the 
alternate modified Chow Test and the results tell the same story that Elite CEOs’ firms 
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. 
I demonstrated in sub-sections 6.3 and 6.4 that Elite CEOs receive higher and 
different compensation than Non-Elite CEOs and have now established that Elite CEOs’ 
firms perform differently.  Do Elite CEOs receive this substantially higher compensation 
 108
because they lead their firms to superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’ 
firms? Or, is it because the Elite CEOs have undue influence over their respective boards 
for extracting excessive compensation even though their firms perform relatively worse 
than non-Elite CEOs’ firms?  The foregoing leads to the natural follow-on research 
question: “How do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently?”  I address this question in the 
next sub-section. 
 
6.7 How Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently? 
This sub-section presents the results of my research that investigates how Elite 
CEOs’ firms perform are differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  I begin with a review 
of my research question and methodology then present the results. 
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite 
CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance 
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently?  That is, 
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite 
CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables?  The research in this step 
assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs 
firm performance models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are 
different. 
For this analysis I perform firm performance regressions both with and without 
the Elite CEO interaction terms.  Tables 26 through 33 present the results of these 
regressions; with each table presenting the results for a different measure of firm 
performance as the dependent variable.  For each table, Columns (1) and (2) are the 
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results from one regression with coefficients on the independent variables presented in 
column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) show how Elites CEOs’ firms 
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the 
results of three regressions (without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for 
All CEOs’ firms, Non-Elite CEOs’ firms, and Elite CEOs’ firms, respectively.  I use firm 
fixed-effects in my regressions for reasons previously explained in sub-section 6.2. 
I discuss the results for each measure of performance separately, but it is 
worthwhile pointing out now that the coefficient on the Elite CEO dummy variable 
(column (2) of Tables 26-33) is never positive and statistically significant. This suggests 
that after controlling for other factors, Elite CEOs’ firms do not have higher performance. 
Table 26 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward shareholder 5-year return as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on market 
value to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for All 
CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the 
coefficient is incrementally more negative for Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (2) and 
(5)).  This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth 
opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward 
shareholder 5-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger reduction for 
Elite CEOs’ firms.  There are two possible interpretations for this result. First, because 
firms with higher levels of market to book value ratio are more difficult to monitor, CEOs 
of such firms are able to shirk duties which leads to poor future firm performance; if Elite 
CEOs have more power then this suggests that Elite CEOs are able to shirk more in firms 
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that are difficult to monitor.  Second, it may be evidence of long term reversals of firm 
performance (i.e., the current market to book value is high because recent shareholder 
returns have been high but the forward shareholder returns reverse). However, it is not 
clear why the reversal would be more pronounced for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs (see columns 
(1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level (see column (2)).  This suggests awarding 
additional equity-based compensation reduces forward shareholder 5-year return for Non-
Elite CEOs’ firms but improves forward shareholder 5-year return for Elite CEOs’ firms.  
However, no coefficient on any other component of CEO compensation is statistically 
different for Elite CEOs which implies that the additional compensation that Elite CEOs 
receive relative to Non-Elite CEOs does not translate to better forward 5-year shareholder 
return. 
The coefficients on Average Ratio in columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 26 tell an 
interesting story.  The coefficient on Average Ratio is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs but is not statistically significant for 
Elite CEOs; which suggests the result for All CEOs is being driven by Non-Elite CEOs.  
Considering that the mean Average Ratio is 4.18 for Elite CEOs and only 1.63 for Non-
Elite CEOs it appears the higher compensation paid to Elite CEOs does not translate to 
higher shareholder 5-year return for Elite CEOs’ firms.  This result indicates that firm 
performance initially improves with increasing levels of the Average Ratio up to a point, 
but then any further increase to the Average Ratio does not benefit firm performance.  An 
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interpretation of this finding is that the market (shareholders) responds favorably to 
increasing levels of this proxy for CEO managerial power, possibly as a signal of CEO 
ability and leadership, but the market does not reward excessive levels of the Average 
Ratio such as received by Elite CEOs.      
Table 27 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward shareholder 3-year return as the dependent variable.  As expected, the results and 
the interpretation of the results are very similar to the story told by using the forward 
shareholder 5-year return as the dependent variable.   
Similar to the results for the forward shareholder 5-year returns, Tables 27 shows 
the coefficient on market value to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level for All CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (1), (3) and 
(4)); but, notice the coefficient is incrementally more negative for Elite CEOs (see 
columns (2) and (5)).  This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a 
proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced 
forward shareholder 3-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger 
reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms.   
In contrast to the results for the forward shareholder 5-year returns, the coefficient 
on the natural log of bonus compensation is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs (see columns (1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the 
coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level (see column (2)).  This suggests awarding additional bonus compensation 
reduces forward shareholder 3-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but improves 
forward shareholder 3-year return of Elite CEOs’ firms.  However, no coefficient on any 
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other component of CEO compensation is statistically different for Elite CEOs which 
implies that the additional compensation that Elite CEOs receive relative to Non-Elite 
CEOs does not translate to better forward shareholder 3-year return. 
Still reviewing Table 27, the coefficient on the R&D to asset ratio is not 
statistically significant for All CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but the Elite CEO 
interaction term is positive and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms 
(see column (2)).  As the ratio of R&D to assets is a proxy for technical complexity, this 
suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms with increasing levels of technical complexity are more 
skilled at increasing forward 3-year shareholder return.  However, this is an odd finding 
for two reasons.  First, the Elite CEO interaction on the R&D to assets ratio is not 
statistically significant for any other of my seven measures of forward firm performance.  
Second, increasing levels of the market to book value ratio and the R&D to asset ratio 
individually indicate higher firm complexity and higher difficulty in monitoring; yet, the 
signs on the respective Elite CEO interaction terms are moving in opposite directions.16       
The coefficients on Average Ratio in columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 27 tell the 
exact same interesting story as learned from Table 26.  The coefficient on Average Ratio 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs 
but is not statistically significant for Elite CEOs.  Considering that the mean Average 
Ratio is 4.18 for Elite CEOs and only 1.63 for Non-Elite CEOs it appears the additional 
compensation paid to Elite CEOs does not translate to higher shareholder 3-year return 
for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
                                                 
16 The market to book value ratio and the R&D to asset ratio only have a 0.06 pair-wise correlation, see 
Table 9. 
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Table 28 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward shareholder 1-year return as the dependent variable.  The coefficients on the 
market value to book value ratio tell the exact same story as using the forward 
shareholder 3-year and 5-year returns.  Which is that an increasing market value to book 
value ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, 
leads to reduced forward shareholder 1-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an 
even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs (see column (3)) but is not 
statistically significant for Non-Elite CEOs (see column (4)).  However, notice the 
coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term (see column (2)) and the coefficient for 
Elite CEOs (see column (5)) are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation does not impact forward 
shareholder 1-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but reduces the forward shareholder 
1-year return of Elite CEOs’ firms.  However, the coefficient on the bonus component of 
CEO compensation is positive and statistically different for Elite CEOs which implies 
that the additional bonus compensation that Elite CEOs receive relative to Non-Elite 
CEOs does translate to better forward 1-year shareholder return. 
Still referring to Table 28, the coefficient on the measure of stock volatility is 
negative and statistically different for Elite CEOs’ firms but is not statistically significant 
for All CEOs’ firms or Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.  This suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms are 
less adept than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms at managing the underlying source of risk that 
causes stock volatility.  Also, the coefficients on Average Ratio are not statistically 
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significant for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs or Elite CEOs.  This suggests that increasing 
levels of this proxy for CEO managerial power does not impact forward shareholder 1-
year return.  Said another way, increasing CEO compensation relative to the Number 2 
executive does not improve the forward 1-year shareholder return. 
Table 29 presents the results of the firm performance regressions with the market 
value to book value ratio as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on the net income to 
asset ratio interaction term is negative and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite 
CEOs’ firms (see column (2)) but the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms (see column (5)).  Also, notice the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see 
columns (1) and (4).  These findings suggest the market rewards firms with a higher 
market to book value ratio for increasing levels of net income to assets but not as much 
so for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
As shown on Table 29, the coefficient on the Average Ratio is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs but is even more negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for Elite CEOs.  The interpretation is that higher 
levels of CEO managerial power, as measured by the Average Ratio, result in decreasing 
levels of the market value to book value ratio for their firms.  This finding implies that 
higher Average Ratio leads to reduced market to book value for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms 
and an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms.  Also, the Elite CEO dummy is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level; implying that after controlling for 
other factors, Elite CEOs’ firms have less value.  All of the foregoing suggests that the 
 115
market does not respond favorably to Elite CEOs’ firms or to increasing levels of the 
Average Ratio.     
Table 30 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward net income 5-year growth rate as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on 
stock volatility is positive at statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms 
(see column (2)).  This suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms convert increasing level of stock 
volatility into higher levels of forward net income 5-year growth rate.  However, the 
coefficient on PP&E to asset ratio is negative and statistically different at the 1% level for 
Elite CEOs’ firms (see column (2)).  This implies increasing levels of this ratio hurts the 
forward net income 5-year growth rate. 
The coefficients on the market value to book value ratio as seen on Table 30 tell 
the exact same story as several other measures of firm performance.  An increasing 
market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to 
monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward net income 5-year growth rate for Non-Elite 
CEOs’ firms and it is an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs (see column (3)) and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs (see column (4)).  However, notice the 
coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term (see column (2)) and the coefficient for 
Elite CEOs (see column (5)) are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation hurts forward net income 
5-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but hurts forward performance by this 
measure even more so for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
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The final lesson from Table 30 is that the coefficient on the Average Ratio is not 
statistically significant for any class of CEO.  This implies that increasing the level of 
CEO managerial power, as measured by the Average Ratio, does not impact forward net 
income 5-year growth rate. 
Table 31 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward net income 3-year growth rate as the dependent variable.  The coefficients on the 
market value to book value ratio tell the exact same story as several other measures of 
firm performance.  An increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth 
opportunities which is difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward net 
income 5-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and it is the same but even worse 
for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is not statistically 
significant for All CEOs or Non-Elite CEOs.  However, notice the coefficient on the Elite 
CEO interaction term is negative and statistically different at the 5% level (see column 
(2)).  This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation does not impact the 
forward net income 3-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but reduces the 
forward net income 3-year growth rate for Elite CEOs’ firms.  However, the coefficient 
on the Other component of CEO compensation is positive and statistically different for 
Elite CEOs which implies that the additional Other compensation that Elite CEOs receive 
relative to Non-Elite CEOs does translate to better forward net-income 3-year growth 
rate. 
The most interesting information from Table 31 is that the coefficient on the 
Average Ratio is not statistically significant for All CEOs or Non-Elite CEOs but is 
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negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for Elite CEOs.  The interpretation is 
that higher levels of CEO managerial power hurts forward net income 3-year growth rate 
for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
Table 32 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward return on assets as the dependent variable.  The most interesting information 
from this table is that the coefficient on the Average Ratio is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs but is negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level for Elite CEOs.  The interpretation is that higher levels of CEO 
managerial power helps forward return on assets for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but hurts 
forward return on assets for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficient on stock volatility is negative and significantly different for Elite 
CEOs’ firms (see column (2)), which suggests higher stock volatility diminishes forward 
return on assets.  However, the coefficients on total liabilities to asset ratio and the 
market value to book value ratio are both positive and statistically different (see column 
(2)), which increasing levels of these variables improves forward return on assets. 
Table 33 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the 
forward return on equity as the dependent variable.  I include this table for reference but 
do not review the results herein as the modified Chow Test indicates that Elite CEOs’ 
firms do not perform differently as measured by the forward return on equity. 
In summary, the two most consistent and therefore most interesting findings from 
this sub-section relate to the market to book value ratio and the Average Ratio. The 
coefficient on the market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant for 
five of the six relevant measures of forward firm performance (shareholder 5-year return, 
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shareholder 3-year return, shareholder 1-year return, net income 5-year growth rate, and 
net income 3-year growth rate) for the cases with All CEOs’ firms and Non-CEOs’ 
firms.17  Furthermore, for these five measures of forward firm performance, the Elite 
CEO interaction on the market to book value is negative and statistically significant.  
This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth 
opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced firm 
performance for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ 
firms.  There are two possible interpretations for this result. First, because firms with 
increasing levels of market to book value ratio are more difficult to monitor and Elite 
CEOs have more power, Elite CEOs are able to shirk even more at firms where 
monitoring is difficult.   Second, it may be evidence of long term reversal of firm 
performance (i.e., the current market to book value is high because recent shareholder 
returns have been high but then forward shareholder returns just reverses).  However, it is 
not clear why the reversal would be more pronounced for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
The coefficients on the Average Ratio, a proxy for CEO managerial power, tell 
the most interesting story.  Increasing levels of CEO managerial power do not benefit 
firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms for four measures of firm performance 
(shareholder 5-year return, shareholder 3-year return, shareholder 1-year return, and net 
income 5-year growth rate).  Increasing levels of CEO managerial power hurts firm 
performance for Elite CEOs’ firms for three measures of firm performance (market to 
book value ratio, net income 3-year growth rate, and return on assets).  That is fairly 
                                                 
17 The two of the eight measures of firm performance that are not relevant for this generalization regarding 
the coefficients on the market to book value ratio as a control variable are (1) the market to book value ratio 
as the dependent variable for obvious reason and (2) return on equity because it is not statistically different 
for Elite CEOs’ firms. 
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condemning evidence considering that the mean Average Ratio and the mean CEO total 
direct compensation are each roughly 2.5 times greater for Elite CEOs compared to Non-
Elite CEOs.18   This finding indicates that Elite CEOs receive higher compensation than 
Non-Elite CEOs not because Elite CEOs lead their firms to superior performance but 
because the Elite CEOs have undue influence over their boards.  
 
        
                                                 
18 See Table 14 for summary statistics. 
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7 Closing Comments  
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm 
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across 
firms, even within the same industry.  This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as 
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role 
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm 
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain 
‘why’ CEOs’ compensation varies widely in cross-section.  However, this research 
assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory 
variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this 
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are 
tested).  If you will, extant research utilizes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model 
for empirical analysis.  Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm 
performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting 
that only a few CEOs have sufficient power or influence to extract excessive 
compensation.  They note that in 2001 the top ten CEOs of U.S. firms received average 
option grants of $170 million, while the median value of total compensation for CEOs of 
the S&P 500 companies was only about $7 million.  The authors argue that “U.S. 
executive pay may not be quite the runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.”  
However, I find no research that thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a 
class of ‘only a few’ powerful CEOs (i.e., those with sufficient levels of managerial 
power or influence to extract excessive compensation) has on the one-size-fits-all CEO 
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compensation and firm performance models. In addition, the literature has not examined 
whether the firms that are led by such CEOs experience superior performance. This void 
in the literature motivates my research. 
To empirically test the Holmstrom and Kaplan hypothesis that only a few 
powerful CEOs can extract excessive compensation, a proxy for CEO managerial power 
is required.  I develop two separate proxies for CEO managerial power that I use to rank 
and classify the CEOs.19  First, I use the ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the 
total direct compensation of the highest paid executive, other than the CEO, as a proxy 
for CEO managerial power.  Second, for robustness and sensitivity tests I develop a 
concentration measure of CEOs compensation, based on the top five executive’s 
compensation at each firm, which is analogous to the concentration ratio used to measure 
industry competitiveness (the Herfindahl Index). 
I hypothesize that the most powerful (or “Elite”) class of CEOs, as defined by my 
proxies, receives excessive compensation relative to the class of other (or “Non-Elite”) 
CEOs.  For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs receive higher and 
different compensation, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs; and if 
so, how are Elite CEOs compensated differently?  Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite 
CEOs’ firms do not experience superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’ 
firms.  For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs’ firms perform 
differently, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; and if so, 
how do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently? 
                                                 
19 I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply 
ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation. 
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I perform regressions with CEO compensation as the dependent variable, the 
common independent variables in extant literature, an Elite CEO dummy variable, and 
Elite CEO interaction terms with the independent variables.  Furthermore, I perform 
regressions with eight measures of firm performance as the dependent variable, the 
common independent variable utilized in extant literature, an Elite CEO dummy term, 
Elite CEO interaction terms, and the Average Ratio as an explanatory variable. 
My empirical results show that one-size-fits-all models can be rejected. The 
estimated coefficients in compensation models and performance models are different for 
Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs.  Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not have 
higher performance.  In fact, I find evidence suggesting that the presence of an Elite CEO 
hurts firm performance and value.  This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive 
compensation due to influence over their respective boards rather than to superior 
performance.  These findings have two important implications.  First, it is possible that 
previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO 
compensation and firm performance might be distorted because previous studies have 
failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of highly paid and 
influential CEOs.  Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and policy makers to 
understand the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and firm performance. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find that the United States corporate governance 
system is better at resolving agency problems than other countries’ corporate governance 
systems based on comparing respective market returns.  Their findings suggest the United 
States corporate governance system is not broken.  On the other hand, their findings do 
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not tell us whether or not recent increases in CEO (executive) compensation have 
improved the system with respect to firm performance.   
Even though the United States corporate governance system was and may still be 
the number one system in the world that does not mean that the tremendous increase in 
CEO compensation from 1993 through 2005 was not a step backward in the evolution of 
the United States corporate governance system. 
In closing, I find that Elite CEOs receive higher compensation than Non-Elite 
CEOs not because Elite CEOs lead their firms to superior performance but because the 
Elite CEOs have undue influence over their boards for extracting excessive 
compensation. These findings suggest that we may have indeed taken a step backward 
with our corporate governance system.  
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Figure 1. Component's Percentage Contribution to CEOs’ Total Compensation. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  This bar graph presents the percent each component of compensation 
contributes to the mean CEO total direct compensation for all firms in the sample, by year. 
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Figure 2.  Components of CEOs Equity-Based Compensation. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  This bar graph presents the percent that stock options and restricted 
stock grants each contribute to the mean CEO equity-based compensation for all firms in the sample, by year. 
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Figure 3. Component's $ Contribution to CEOs’ Total Compensation. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars.  This stacked bar 
graph presents the mean CEO total direct compensation and its components for all firms in the sample by year. 
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Figure 4.  Increase in CEOs' Components of Mean Compensation. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  This figure presents the respective nominal increase in the index of 
each component of CEO mean compensation by year through 2005 from an index for each component of 100 in 1993. 
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Figure 5.  CEO Total Compensation by Groups Ranked by Total Compensation. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars.  This figure 
presents the mean CEO total direct compensation adjusted for inflation, by year for three groups of CEOs: top 10% by total direct compensation, all 
CEOs, and bottom 90% by total direct compensation.   
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 CEO Total Compensation for Top 10% by Ratio
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Figure 6.  CEO Total Compensation by Groups of Firm Life. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars.  This figure 
presents the mean CEO total direct compensation adjusted for inflation by year for five groups of CEOs: top 10% by total direct compensation for all 
firms, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample life within 1 to 5 years, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample 
life within 6 to 9 years, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample life within 10 to 13 years, and all CEOs for all Firms.   
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Figure 7.  Plot of Average Ratio. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  The Average Ratio is the average of the annually determined ratio of 
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO) during the CEO’s firm-tenure.  This 
figure plots only the first 98% as the top 2% by Average Ratio have such large value that the scale of the figure is distorted.   
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Figure 8.  Rank Order of CEO Compensation and CEO/Number_2 Ratio, by thirds. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  This figure is a rank-order of CEO total direct compensation versus 
the CEO/Number_2 Ratio.  The CEO/Number_2 Ratio is the annually determined ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the total direct 
compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO).   
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Figure 9.  Plot of Average CCI. 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  The Average Compensation Concentration Index (“Average CCI”) is 
the average of the annually determined firm compensation concentration index over the CEO’s firm-tenure.  This figure plots only the first 98% as the 
top 2% by Average CCI distorts the scale.  The compensation concentration index is the sum of squares of the top five executive’s respective share 
(percent) of the total compensation for the top five executives: this technique is analogous to the Herfindahl Index. 
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Figure 10.  CEOs' Average Ratio 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  The Average Ratio is the average of the annually determined ratio of 
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO) during the CEO’s tenure at a given 
firm.  Based on using the Average Ratio to rank and classify CEOs; Elite CEOs are based on a top 10% cut-off and the remaining CEOs are classified as 
Non-Elite CEOs.  
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for CEO Compensation. 
 
Panel A.  Mean CEO Compensation and S&P 500 Index. 
All Firms. 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Salary 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.74 
Bonus 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.79 0.82 0.72 0.76 0.92 1.07 1.16 
Equity 0.97 1.30 1.24 1.96 2.46 3.16 3.97 5.40 4.76 3.23 2.54 2.92 2.89 
Other 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.46 0.40 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.52 0.50 0.67 
Total 2.35 2.76 2.80 3.66 4.25 4.86 5.93 7.42 6.66 5.12 4.69 5.21 5.46 
S&P 500 Index 
Yr-End 
466 459 616 748 975 1,229 1,469 1,320 1,173 909 1,108 1,212 1,248 
Firm Count 1,622 1,688 1,778 1,902 1,962 1,996 1,897 1,807 1,764 1,801 1,847 1,789 1,675 
 
Firms in the sample each year for 1993-2005 (847 firms). 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Salary 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.84 
Bonus 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.84 0.84 0.94 1.08 0.95 0.99 1.24 1.43 1.49 
Equity 0.93 1.31 1.32 2.13 2.85 4.30 3.96 6.11 4.64 3.67 3.05 3.35 3.29 
Other 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.47 0.69 0.53 0.63 0.73 0.58 0.60 0.72 0.72 0.94 
Total 2.43 2.93 3.03 4.06 5.12 6.46 6.30 8.72 6.98 6.07 5.85 6.33 6.56 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars.  Year-end S&P 
500 Index levels are from Yahoo! Finance.   
 
Panel B.  Correlation Between CEO Total Direct Compensation and CEO/Number_2 Ratio. 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Overall 
Pair-wise 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.21 0.31 0.12 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.47 0.35 0.35 0.24 
Spearman's 0.34 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.42 
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005.  This table presents the pair-wise correlation and the Spearman 
correlation between CEO total direct compensation and the CEO/Number_2 Ratio.  The CEO/Number_2 Ratio is the annually determined ratio of CEO 
total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO).   
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Table 2.  Key Extant Research. 
 
Authors (Year 
Published) 
Main model(s) Main Findings 
Bebchuk & 
Grinstein 2005 
1) Executive comp. 
regressions 
 
2) Predicted 2003 
comp. based on 
1993 model 
1) Controlling for firm size, performance and industry 
classification they find that compensation increased far beyond 
what can be attributed to their control variables. 
2) Find that actual 2003 compensation levels were much higher 
than was predicted based on the relation of compensation to 
firm size, performance and industry classification in 1993. 
Brick, Palmon, 
Wald 2006 
1) Director 
compensation 
regressions 
2) CEO 
compensation 
regressions 
3) Summary 
statistics on 
extreme director 
comp. 
4) 1-year excess 
returns regressions 
1) Find director compensation is directly related to the need for 
firm monitoring. 
 
2) Find a significant positive relation between CEO 
compensation and excess director compensation after 
controlling for other variables. 
3) Conclude that excess CEO and director compensation is 
associated with poor firm governance. 
 
 
4) Results are consistent with their cronyism hypothesis. 
Daines, Nair, 
Kornhauser 2005 
1) Firm 
performance 
regressions (all 
firms) 
2) Segregate by 
small and large 
firms 
 
 
3) Segregate by 
high and low 
environmental 
constraints 
1) Find highly paid CEOs are significantly more likely to lead 
firms that have persistently good performance.  However, find 
no evidence that highly paid CEOs turnaround poor firm 
performance. 
2) Finds small firms with highly paid CEOs are significantly 
more likely to continue good performance and to reverse poor 
performance than poorly paid CEOs. However, in large firms 
there is no evidence that highly paid CEOs produce predictably 
better results than poorly paid CEOs. 
3) Finds firms with low constraints and highly paid CEOs are 
significantly more likely to continue good performance and to 
reverse poor performance than poorly paid CEOs. However, in 
firms with high constraints there is little evidence that highly 
paid CEOs produce predictably better results than poorly paid 
CEOs. 
Hayward & 
Hambrick 1997 
1) Acquisition 
premium regression 
 
2) Post-acquisition 
CAR regression 
1) The four indicators of CEO hubris are highly correlated with 
the size of the acquisition premium. 
 
2) Found losses in acquiring firms’ shareholder wealth 
following an acquisition. Also found that the greater the CEO 
hubris and acquisition premium, the greater the loss. 
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2 continued. 
 
Authors (Year 
Published) 
Main model(s) Main Findings 
Malmendier & 
Tate 2005 
1) Logit regression 
 
 
 
2) Event study 
around award date 
3) ROA regressions 
 
 
 
 
4) total and cash 
compensation 
regressions 
1) CEO award winners are more likely to have more company 
ownership, higher compensation, longer tenure and to be 
female. The firms are typically larger, have lower book-to-
market ratio, higher sales, and higher returns over the past year. 
2) Find negative cumulative abnormal performance, using stock 
return data, over a 1, 2, or 3 year interval following the award.  
3) Find over the three years following an award, the ROA is 
roughly two and a quarter percentage points lower than in the 
year preceding and year of the CEO award.  Also, a matched 
sample of ‘predicted winners’ did not experience the same 
decline in performance. 
4) Find award winners obtain significantly higher total 
compensation (tdc1) in the year following the award.  
Generally, this takes the form of increases in equity-based 
compensation and is greatest among powerful CEOs (also 
Chairman and President) and in weakly governed firms. 
Milbourn 2005 1) CEO pay 
sensitivity 
regressions 
1) Finds stock based pay sensitivities are strictly increasing in a 
CEO’s reputation.  
Wade, Porac, 
Pollock, and 
Graffin 2006 
1) Event Study 
 
 
 
2) Firm 
performance 
regressions 
 
 
 
3) CEO 
compensation 
regressions 
1) They performed an event study around the announcement 
date of the CEO of the year Award and found the immediate 
effect of winning a medal is positive, over time the effect is 
negative. 
2) Using a fixed-effects regression analysis they found that 
although the market had an initially positive reaction to CEO 
certification, over the long term there is a negative relationship 
between CEO certification and market performance, and no 
relationship between CEO certification and accounting 
performance in the following year. 
3) Found that certified CEOs received higher compensation 
than non-certified CEOs when performance was high but lower 
remuneration when performance was poor. 
 147
 
Table 3.  CEO Compensation Regressions, Variables and Descriptions. 
Variable name Variable description and comments20
Dependent Variables  
CEO Compensation 
variables 
 
Salary Ln of CEOs salary. ExecuComp. 
Bonus Ln of CEOs bonus.  ExecuComp. 
Equity-based compensation Ln of (CEOs restricted stock grants plus stock options).  RSTKGRNT + 
OPTION_1 from ExecuComp.  
Other compensation Ln of (Total direct compensation – salary – bonus – equity-based comp.). 
Total direct compensation Ln of CEOs total of salary, bonus, the total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted using Black-Scholes model, 
long term incentive payouts, and all other payments. TDC1 from 
ExecuComp.   
 Independent Variables  
Firm performance 
variables21
 
Return on assets Net income before extraordinary items over assets, in the year prior to the 
year of observation. Proxy for CEO skill and helps explain annual bonus.  
ROA from ExecuComp.   
Net Income 3 yr growth rate 3-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, in the 
year prior to the year of observation.  Proxy for CEO skill and helps 
explain long term incentive plan bonus.  NI3LS from ExecuComp. 
Shareholder 3-year return 3-year shareholder return with dividends reinvested, in the year prior to the 
year of observation. Proxy for CEO skill and helps explain equity-based 
compensation.  Winsorized at the 99th percentile to remove influential 
outliers.  TRS3YR from ExecuComp.   
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
20 The listed variable name is the same as the source’s name for the variable unless otherwise noted. 
21 I use past firm performance as a proxy for CEO skill.  Certainly some could make the argument that this 
over-attribution.  Regardless, these variables explain components of CEO compensation. 
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Table 3 continued 
 
Variable name Variable description and comments20 
Firm characteristics  
Firm size The ln of sales, in the year prior to the observation.  Explains firm scale and 
complexity.  SALES from ExecuComp. 
Stock volatility The Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the year prior to the 
observation. Explains firm complexity.  BS_VOLATILITY from 
ExecuComp. 
Total liabilities/assets The ratio of total liabilities to total assets, in the year prior to the observation. 
Explains firm complexity.  DATA181/DATA6 from Compustat. 
PP&E/assets The ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets, in the 
year prior to the observation. Explains firm complexity.  DATA8/DATA6 
from Compustat. 
R&D/assets The ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures to total assets, 
in the year prior to the observation.  Explains firm complexity.  Missing 
values are replaced by zeros.  DATA45/DATA6 from Compustat.  
Market to Book ratio The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets, in the year 
prior to the observation.  The market value of assets is the market value of 
equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding 
(DATA25)) plus book assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus 
deferred taxes (DATA74).  The book value of assets is DATA6.  Compustat.   
CEO characteristics  
CEO age The age of the CEO, in the year prior to the observation. AGE from 
ExecuComp. 
CEO age2 The age of the CEO squared, in the year prior to the observation.  
CEO tenure The years of service as the CEO at the firm, in the year prior to the 
observation.  Determined from data in ExecuComp.  
Governance 
characteristics 
 
Governance Index The Gompers, Ishii, Metrick governance index. Variable gindex from The 
Investor Responsibility Research Center. 
Control variables  
Industry dummies  Industry group codes.  SPINDEX from ExecuComp. 
Year dummies  Year of the observation. ExecuComp. 
Note: This table lists and describes the variables I use in the regressions with CEO compensation as the 
dependent variable.  I also note the source of the data for each variable and the source’s name or code for 
the listed variable.
Table 4.  CEO Compensation Regressions, Key Extant Research. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al22 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 
2003 
Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
CEO Sample CEO award 
winners23
Matched sample 
of CEOs24  
All CEOs All CEOs All CEOs All CEOs 
Dependent Variable       
 Log of CEO compensation Various time 
periods25
Various time 
periods23 
Yes23 Yes26    Yes27
 CEO pay sensitivity     Yes  
       
Independent Variables       
 Firm characteristics       
 Firm size (log of sales) Not Significant Mixed 
Significance 
    
 Firm size (log of salest-1)   Positive Positive   
 Firm size (market equity)     Negative  
 Firm size (log of net assets)      Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 Stock Return      Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
Return on Equity      Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 ROA Mixed 
Significance 
Positive     
 Qt-1   Positive    
 ROAt-1   Not Significant    
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
22 Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006 
23 Regressions with only CEO award winners. 
24 Regressions comparing ‘actual’ CEO award winners to ‘predicted’ CEO award winners (i.e., matched sample). 
25 Ran regressions with both total and cash compensation. 
26 Ran regressions with total, equity and non-equity compensation. 
27 Three regressions: base salary, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation. 
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Table 4 continued. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 
2003 
Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
 Mean ROAt-1, t-3   Not Significant    
 Stock returnt-1, t-3   Positive    
 Cash flow risk   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 Stock volatility   Mixed 
Significance 
  Positive 
 Log (employeest-1)   Positive    
 R&Dt-1/assetst-1   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 Advertisingt-1/assetst-1   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 Debtt-1/assetst-1   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 PP&Et-1/assetst-1   Negative    
 Investmentst-1/assetst-1   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 Log(1+Firm ROAt-1)    Positive   
 Log(1+Firm Returnt-1)    Positive   
 Log(1+Firm Returnt-2)    Positive28   
 Default Risk       Negative 
 Financial Leverage      Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 Growth opportunities      Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
28 Statistical Significance depends on level of compensation used in regression. 
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Table 4 continued. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 2003 Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
CEO characteristics       
 CEO age Not Significant Not Significant   Negative Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 CEO gender   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 CEO stock ownership [%]   Negative   Positive 
 CEO is chairman   Mixed 
Significance 
  Positive 
 Internal CEO   Negative    
 
 CEO reputation (Milbourn)       
 CEO tenure (experience) Not Significant Not Significant Mixed 
Significance 
 Positive Mixed Sign 
 Dow Jones Hits     Positive  
 Outsider     Positive  
 Industry adj. firm 
performance 
    Positive29   
 Board characteristics       
 Number of board meetings   Mixed 
Significance 
   
 Excess director total comp.   Positive    
 Proportion of outside 
directors 
     Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 Board Size      Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
29 Industry adjusted stock price performance for 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years prior with current CEO at the helm.  Used only one of these in a given model. 
 152
Table 4 continued. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 2003 Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
Ownership Characteristics       
Largest stock ownership, non-
CEO [%] 
     N  
Mixed 
Significance 
ega
egative,
tive,
tive
 
Data
Largest stock ownership, 
CEO [%] 
     N  
Mixed 
Significance 
NegaCompensation  committee 
ownership [%] 
      
Internal Blockholder > 5%      Not Significant 
External Blockholder > 5%      Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 Other independent variables       
 1 year after award Positive Not Significant     
 2 years after award Positive Not Significant     
 3 years after award Positive Not Significant     
 Firm fixed-effects Included Included  Included   
 Year fixed-effects Included Included Included Positive30 Included  
 SIC (industry) dummies   Included  Included  
 Regulated industry      Negative, 
Mixed 
Significance 
        
       
 Time period 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2001 1993-2003 1993-1998 1992-1993 
 Number of CEOs 594-76031 633-805 1,435 firms 1,500 firms 1,500 firms 1,648 firms 
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some 
component of CEO compensation as the dependent variable. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Positive and statistically Significant for each year 1994 through 2003. 
31 Without CEO age variable. 
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Table 5.  Firm Performance Regressions, Variables and Descriptions. 
 
Variable name Variable description and comments32
Dependent Variables  
Firm performance variables  
Return on assets Net income before extraordinary items over total assets, in the year after the observation. ROA from 
ExecuComp. 
Return on equity Return on equity, in the year after the observation. ROEPER from ExecuComp. 
Shareholder 1-year return 1-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 1-year after the year of the observation. Winsorized 
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers.  TRS3YR from ExecuComp. 
Shareholder 3-year return 3-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 3 years after the year of the observation. Winsorized 
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers.  TRS3YR from ExecuComp. 
Shareholder 5-year return 5-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 5 years after the year of the observation. Winsorized 
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers.  TRS5YR from ExecuComp. 
Net Income 3 yr growth rate 3-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, 3 years after the year of the 
observation.  NI3LS from ExecuComp. 
Net Income 5 yr growth rate 5-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, 5 years after the year of the 
observation.  NI3LS from ExecuComp. 
Market to Book ratio The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets.  The market value of assets is the market 
value of equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding (DATA25)) plus book 
assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus deferred taxes (DATA74).  The book value of assets 
is DATA6.  Compustat.    
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
32 The listed variable name is the same as the source’s name of the variable unless otherwise noted. 
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Table 5 continued. 
 
Variable name Variable description and comments 
 Independent Variables  
Firm characteristics  
Firm size The ln of sales.  Explains firm scale and complexity.  SALES from ExecuComp. 
Stock volatility The Black-Scholes stock volatility measure. Explains firm complexity.  BS_VOLATILITY from 
ExecuComp. 
Total liabilities/assets The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Explains firm complexity.  DATA181/DATA6 from Compustat. 
PP&E/assets The ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Explains firm complexity.  
DATA8/DATA6 from Compustat. 
R&D/assets The ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures to total assets.  Explains firm complexity.  
Missing values are replaced by zeros.  DATA45/DATA6 from Compustat.  
Market to Book ratio The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets.  The market value of assets is the market 
value of equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding (DATA25)) plus book 
assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus deferred taxes (DATA74).  The book value of assets 
is DATA6.  Compustat.    
Net income/assets The ratio of firm net income to total assets.  Net income (after extraordinary and discontinued operations) 
from ExecuComp/DATA6 from Compustat.  This independent variable replaces market to book ratio as an 
independent variable for the regression with market to book ratio as a dependent variable.   
Variable name Variable description and comments 
CEO Compensation variables  
Salary Ln of CEOs salary. ExecuComp. 
Bonus Ln of CEOs bonus.  ExecuComp. 
Equity-based compensation  Ln of CEOs restricted stock grants plus stock options.  RSTKGRNT + OPTION_1 from ExecuComp. 
Except use STOCK_AW + OPTION_A for some in 2006 (SEC reported values). 
Other compensation Ln of (Total direct compensation – salary – bonus – equity-based comp.). 
CEO characteristics  
CEO age The age of the CEO in the year of the observation. AGE from ExecuComp. 
CEO age2 The age of the CEO squared, in the year prior to the observation.  
CEO tenure The years of service as the CEO at the firm, in the year prior to the observation.  Determined from data in 
ExecuComp.  
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 5 continued. 
 
Variable name Variable description and comments 
Governance characteristics  
Governance Index The Gompers, Ishii, Metrick governance index. Variable gindex from The Investor Responsibility 
Research Center. 
Control variables  
Industry dummies  Industry group codes.  SPINDEX from ExecuComp. 
Year dummies  Year of the observation. ExecuComp. 
  
Note: This table lists and describes the variables I use in the regressions with firm performance as the dependent variable.  I also note the source of the 
data for each variable and the source’s name or code for the listed variable. 
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Table 6.  Firm Performance Regressions, Key Extant Research. 
 
 Mehran 1995 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al33 
2006 
Daines et al34 
2005 
CEO Sample  CEO award 
winners9 
Matched 
sample10 
All CEOs All CEOs 
Dependent Variable      
Tobin’s Q Included     
 Return on Assets Included Various time 
periods 
Various time 
periods 
 Included 
 1-year excess returns    Included35   Included36
      
Independent Variables      
 Firm characteristics      
 Firm size (log of tot assets) Negative     
 Firm size (log of sales)  Negative Mixed 
significance 
  
 Firm size (log of salest-1)    Not reported  
 R&D/Sales Positive     
 (Inv+PP&E)/total assets Not significant     
 LT debt/ total assets Not significant     
 Qt-1    Not reported  
 ROAt-1  Positive Positive Not reported  
 Mean ROAt-1, t-3    Not reported  
 Stock returnt-1, t-3    Not reported  
 Cash flow risk    Not reported  
 Stock volatility    Not reported  
 Log (employeest-1)    Not reported  
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
33 Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006 
34 Daines, Nair and Kornhauser 2005 
35 One-factor model and Fama-French three-factor model. 
36 Fama-French four-factor model. 
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Table 6 continued. 
 
 Mehran 1995 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 2006 Daines et al 
2005 
 Firm characteristics 
(continued) 
     
 R&Dt-1/assetst-1    Not reported  
 Advertisingt-1/assetst-1    Not reported  
 Debtt-1/assetst-1    Not reported  
 PP&Et-1/assetst-1    Not reported  
 Investmentst-1/assetst-1    Not reported  
 CEO characteristics      
 CEO tenure (experience)    Not reported  
 CEO gender    Not reported  
 CEO’s equity-based comp [% of 
total comp] 
Positive     
 % equity owned by CEO Positive   Mixed 
significance 
 
 CEO is chairman    Not significant  
 Internal CEO    Mixed 
significance 
 
 Log (CEO’s total comp.)    Negative37   
 Board characteristics      
 % shares held by outside 
directors 
Not significant     
 Outside directors [% of board] Not significant     
 Number of board meetings    Not significant  
 Excess director total comp.    Positive  
 Log (director’s total comp.)    Negative  
(Continued on next page)
                                                 
37 Mixed significance depending upon which model is used (pooled versus fixed-effects, one-factor versus Fama-French three-factor model). 
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Table 6 continued. 
 
 Mehran 1995 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 2006 Daines et al 
2005 
 Other independent 
variables 
     
 1 year after award  Negative Not significant   
 2 years after award  Negative Not significant   
 3 years after award  Negative Not significant   
 Firm fixed-effects  Included Included   
 Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  
 SIC (industry) dummies    Included  
 Prior good performance 
for 
 highly paid CEOs  
    Mixed
Mixed
 
significance38
 Prior bad performance for 
 highly paid CEOs 
     
significance 
 Highly paid CEO dummy     Mixed 
significance 
 Prior good performance     Mixed 
significance 
 Prior bad performance     Mixed 
significance 
 Data      
 Time period 1979-1980 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2001 1992-2001 
 Number of firms 153 608-775 641-814 1193-1336 2,284 
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some measure 
of firm performance as the dependent variable. 
                                                 
38 Mixed significance depending upon how they broke out the regressions: i.e., by firm size, by management constraints, by level of incentive pay, and 
by whether or not there is a 5% blockholder. 
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Table 7.  Data and Sources in Key Extant Research. 
 
Authors (Year 
Published) 
Data Sources Period Sample 
Bebchuk & Grinstein 
2005 
Executive compensation. 
Firm acctg and market 
characteristics. 
ExecuComp. 
Compustat. 
1993-2003. 1,500 firms (S&P500, 
Mid400, Small600) 
 
Brick, Palmon, & Wald 
2006 
Executive and director 
compensation. 
Firm acctg and market 
characteristics. 
Governance characteristics. 
 
Governance characteristics. 
ExecuComp. 
 
Compustat. 
 
Directory of Corporate 
Executives and Directors. 
Proxy statements. 
1992-2001. 
 
 
 
1997. 
 
1992-2001. 
1163 to 1441 firms (varies). 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample of 237 firms. 
Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker 1999 
Executive compensation. 
Firm variables. 
Board and ownership variables. 
Compensation consultant. 
Compustat. 
Proxy statements. 
1982-1984. 205 publicly traded firms. 
Daines, Nair, & 
Kornhauser 2005 
CEO compensation and 
characteristics. 
Firm characteristics and 
performance. 
ExecuComp. 
 
Compustat and CRSP. 
1992-2001. 2,284 firms and 2,880 CEOs. 
Hall & Liebman 1998 CEO compensation. 
 
Stock price and returns. 
Accounting information. 
Proxy statements and 10-K 
filings. 
CRSP. 
Compustat. 
1980-1994. 478 firms. 
Hayward & Hambrick 
1997 
Acquisitions > $100 million. 
 
 
Media praise for the CEO. 
Securities Data Corporation’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. 
Seven major newspapers. 
1989 and 
1992. 
106 transactions. 
Jensen & Murphy 
1990a 
CEO compensation. 
 
Firm characteristics and 
performance. 
Forbes’ Executive Comp 
Survey and proxies. 
Compustat and CRSP. 
1969-1983. 73 manufacturing firms. 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 7 continued. 
 
Authors (Year 
Published) 
Data Sources Period Sample 
Malmendier & Tate 
2005 
CEO Awards. 
 
CEO compensation and 
characteristics. 
Firm characteristics and 
performance. 
Hand-collected from various 
journals. 
ExecuComp. 
 
Compustat and CRSP. 
1975-2002. 
 
1992-2002. 
 
1975-2002. 
283 awards. 
 
1,500 firms (S&P500, 
Mid400, Small600) 
Mehran 1995 CEO compensation, firm and 
board characteristics. 
Compustat Annual Industrial 
File. 
1979-1980 153 manufacturing firms. 
Milbourn 2005 CEO compensation and 
characteristics. 
Stock data. 
Dow Jones News Retrieval 
Service. 
ExecuComp. 
 
CRSP. 
Number of articles with CEO’s 
name. 
1993-1998. 1,500 firms (S&P500, 
Mid400, Small600) 
Wade, Porac, Pollock, 
& Graffin 2006 
CEO of the Year Award 
CEO compensation and 
characteristics. 
Firm characteristics and 
performance. 
Financial World. 
ExecuComp. 
 
Compustat. 
1975-1996. 
1992-1996. 
 
 
 
278 firms from the S&P 500. 
Note: The data and sources used in prior research that I consider key to my dissertation. 
 
  
 
Table 8.  Summary Statistics. 
 
Variable N Min Max Median Mean s.d. 
CEO Compensation Variables      
Salary [$ Thousands] 23,528 0 8,320 526 591 345 
Bonus[$ Thousands] 23,528 0 43,512 320 672 1,327 
Equity [$ Thousands] 23,528 0 650,812 652 2,525 9,874 
Other [$ Thousands] 23,528 0 96,423 41 386 1,712 
Total Compensation [$Thousands] 23,528 0 655,448 1,900 4,173 10,606 
CEO Characteristics      
CEO Age [Years] 23,528 28 91 55 55 7.6 
CEO Age Squared 23,528 784 8,281 3,025 3,127 856.0 
CEO Firm-Tenure [Years] 23,528 1.0 55.0 4.0 6.4 6.4 
Average Ratio 23,528 0.0 60.3 1.72 1.94 1.42 
Average CCI 23,143 0.2 0.65 0.27 0.27 0.05 
Firm Performance Variables      
ROA [%] 23,527 -588 1,100 4.1 3.3 17.6 
ROE [%] 22,916 -33,719 5,277 12.7 6.9 248.5 
NI 3-Year Growth Rate [%] 15,667 -93 28,527 15.5 27.4 236.8 
NI 5-Year Growth Rate [%] 13,802 -68 1,843 14.2 21.1 43.4 
Shareholder 1-Year Return [%] 23,528 -99 567 12.5 21.0 60.6 
Shareholder 3-Year Return [%] 23,528 -94 169 12.0 14.1 28.6 
Shareholder 5-Year Return [%] 23,528 -84 97 11.7 12.2 19.9 
Market Value/Book Value 23,286 0.22 246.47 1.47 2.09 2.77 
Firm Characteristics      
Sales  [$Millions] 23,528 19 328,213 973 3,934 11,632 
BS Volatility  23,505 0.10 4.21 0.37 0.44 0.26 
Net Income/Assets 23,527 -5.88 11.0 0.04 0.03 0.18 
Liabilities/Assets 23,476 0.02 4.22 0.57 0.57 0.25 
PPE/Assets 23,133 0.00 0.97 0.23 0.29 0.24 
RD/Assets 23,527 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Governance Index 23,528 1.0 18.5 9.0 9.0 2.6 
Note: Summary statistics for the data set described in Section 5. 
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Table 9.  Pair-wise Correlations. 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5             
1 Salary [$   M] 01.   0                 
2 Bonus[$M] 0.42  1.00                 
3 Equity [$M] 0.16  0.19  1.00                
4 Other [$M] 0.21  0.23  0.07  1.00              
5 Total Comp. [$M] 0.26  0.36  0.97  0.26 1.00              
                   
  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
6 CEO Age [Ye   ars] 01.   0                 
7 CEO Age Squared 0.99  1.00                 
8 CEO Firm-Tenure 
[Years] 
0.   28 29 00.   1.   0               
9 ROA [%] 0.05  0.05  0.07  1.00              
10 ROE [%] 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.18 1.00              
11 NI 3-Year Growth 
Rate [%] 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 0.05 0.01  1.00            
12 NI 5-Year Growth 
Rate [%] 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.03) 0.19 0.07  0.75 1.00            
13 Shareholder 1-Year 
Return [%] 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) 0.00  (0.01) (0.02) 1.00          
14 Shareholder 3-Year 
Return [%] 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 0.04 (0.00) 0.01 0.01  0.68 1.00          
15 Shareholder 5-Year 
Return [%] 
(0.00) (0.00) 0.03  0.03 0.00  0.01 0.05  0.45 0.75  1.00         
16 Sales  [$MM] 0.06  0.05  (0.00) 0.02 0.01  (0.01) (0.04) 0.01 0.01  (0.00) 1.00        
17 BS Volatility  (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.06) 0.05 0.23  0.08 (0.02) (0.08) (0.13) 1.00      
18 Liabilities/Assets  0.07  0.06  (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.15  (0.15) 1.00      
19 PPE/Assets  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.02 (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) 0.01  0.02  (0.16) 0.02  1.00    
20 RD/Assets (0.04) (0.03) 0.01  0.01 0.01  (0.01) (0.01) 0.01 0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03 (0.04) (0.02) 1.00    
21 Market Value to 
Book Value  
(0.10) (0.09) (0.03) 0.09 0.01  0.04 0.22  0.08 0.08  0.07  (0.03) 0.14 (0.21) (0.10) 0.06  1.00  
22 Governance Index 0.04  0.03  (0.03) (0.00) 0.01  (0.02) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.16) 0.17  0.05 (0.02) (0.09) 1.00  
Note: Pair-wise correlations for the data set described in Section 5. 
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Table 10.  Firm Life. 
 
Panel A 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(1) Firm Count 1,622 1,688 1,778 1,902 1,962 1,996 1,897 1,807 1,764 1,801 1,847 1,789 1,675 
(2) Count survived from previous year   1,589 1,620 1,711 1,762 1,844 1,846 1,742 1,689 1,717 1,753 1,777 1,671 
(3) % survived from previous year   98.0% 96.0% 96.2% 92.6% 94.0% 92.5% 91.8% 93.5% 97.3% 97.3% 96.2% 93.4% 
(4) Count survived from 1993   1,589 1,522 1,464 1,340 1,246 1,145 1,053 989 970 949 920 867 
(5) % survived from 1993   98.0% 93.8% 90.3% 82.6% 76.8% 70.6% 64.9% 61.0% 59.8% 58.5% 56.7% 53.5% 
Note:  Rows (2) and (3) show the count and percent, respectively, of firms that survive from one year to the next.   Rows (4) and (5) show the count and 
percent, respectively, of firms that are in the sample in 1993 that survive throughout the sample period.  Note that slightly more than half of the firms 
that are in the sample in 1993 are still in the sample in 2005 (i.e., 867 out of 1,622 firms).  However, 20 of the 867 firms are not in the sample for all 13 
years. 
 
 
 
Panel B 
(1) Life - N years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(2) Firms w/ N yr life 42 83 215 252 201 185 162 197 160 151 131 120 847 
(3) % of Total 1.5% 3.0% 7.8% 9.2% 7.3% 6.7% 5.9% 7.2% 5.8% 5.5% 4.8% 4.4% 30.8% 
(4) Cumulative % 1.5% 4.6% 12.4% 21.6% 28.9% 35.6% 41.5% 48.7% 54.5% 60.0% 64.8% 69.2% 100.0% 
(5) % w/ Life > N yrs 98.5% 95.4% 87.6% 78.4% 71.1% 64.4% 58.5% 51.3% 45.5% 40.0% 35.2% 30.8% 0.0% 
Note:  Row (1) is the number of years that a firm can be in the 13 year sample.  Rows (2) and (3) present the count and percent of total firms, 
respectively, of firms by firm life in the sample.  Row (4) is the cumulative of row (3).  Row (5) is 100% minus row (4).  As a point of reference, row 
(5) shows that almost two-thirds of the firms (64.4%) are in the sample for at least five years.    
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Table 11.  CEO Tenure. 
 
(1) Life - N years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 >12 
(2) CEOs with N yr tenure 831 507 546 431 490 372 304 271 322 212 146 129 649 
(3) % of Total 16.0% 9.7% 10.5% 8.3% 9.4% 7.1% 5.8% 5.2% 6.2% 4.1% 2.8% 2.5% 12.4% 
(4) Cumulative % 16.0% 25.7% 36.2% 44.4% 53.8% 61.0% 66.8% 72.0% 78.2% 82.3% 85.1% 87.5% 100.0% 
(5) % with Life > N yrs 84.0% 74.3% 63.8% 55.6% 46.2% 39.0% 33.2% 28.0% 21.8% 17.7% 14.9% 12.5% 0.0% 
Note:  Row (1) is CEO tenure as the CEO at a given firm and rows (2) and  3 are the count and percent, respectively, of CEOs by CEO tenure; note that 
649 CEOs (12.4%) of the 5,210 CEOs in the sample were CEOs prior to 1993 (1993 is the beginning of the sample period).  Row (4) is the cumulative 
of row (3).  Row (5) is 100% minus row (4).   
 
Table 12.  Average Ratio Stickiness. 
 
Firm-Tenure Elite CEO Status 
As CEO By Top 10% By Top 15% 
N years % % 
1 100.00% 100.00% 
2 98.59% 98.07% 
3 92.40% 96.42% 
4 92.41% 94.38% 
5 92.17% 89.90% 
6 85.98% 83.57% 
7 80.67% 81.48% 
8 85.90% 86.83% 
9 79.63% 88.53% 
10 81.43% 73.64% 
11 69.09% 78.64% 
12 58.33% 72.62% 
13 62.72% 63.92% 
Note:  CEOs that are Elite CEOs for at least one year using the Average Ratio approach of ranking and 
classifying CEOs as Elite with the indicated cutoff.  The indicated % is the number of years classified as 
Elite using the Average Ratio approach with the indicated cut-off divided by the CEO’s firm-tenure. 
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Table 13.  Elite CEO Count by Year. 
 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Overall 
All CEO Count 1,622 1,688 1,778 1,902 1,962 1,996 1,897 1,807 1,764 1,801 1,847 1,789 1,675 5,210 
Elite CEO Count 116 128 145 167 193 201 197 190 209 217 231 234 226 522 
% Elite 7.2% 7.6% 8.2% 8.8% 9.8% 10.1% 10.4% 10.5% 11.8% 12.0% 12.5% 13.1% 13.5% 10.0% 
Note:  This table presents the count of all CEOs in the sample by year.  Also, this table presents the count and percent of total of Elite CEOs by year.   
CEOs are ranked and classified using the Average Ratio as a proxy for CEO managerial power as described in sub-section 6.2.  The cut-off for Elite 
CEO status for this table and my base case regressions is the top 10%. 
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Table 14.  Univariate Comparison of Variables' Means and Medians: Elite versus 
Non-Elite CEOs. 
 
 Non-
Elite 
CEOs 
Elite 
CEOs 
 Non-
Elite 
CEOs 
Elite 
CEOs 
 
Variable Mean Mean t-test Median Median Wilcoxon 
CEO Compensation Variables       
Salary [$ Thousands] 572 726 0.00*** 509 682 0.00*** 
Bonus[$ Thousands] 612 1,106 0.00*** 300 575 0.00*** 
Equity [$ Thousands] 2,086 5,731 0.00*** 572 1,940 0.00*** 
Other [$ Thousands] 335 756 0.00*** 38 85 0.00*** 
Total Compensation [$ Thousands] 3,606 8,319 0.00*** 1,722 4,044 0.00*** 
CEO Characteristics       
CEO Age [Years] 55.5 54.4 0.00*** 55.0 55.0 0.00*** 
CEO Age Squared 3,143 3,015 0.00*** 3,025 3,025 0.00*** 
CEO Firm-Tenure [Years] 6.4 6.2 0.17 4.0 4.0 0.02** 
Average Ratio 1.63 4.18 0.00*** 1.61 3.47 0.00*** 
Average CCI 0.27 0.34 0.00*** 0.26 0.32 0.00*** 
Firm Performance Variables       
ROA [%] 3.3 3.5 0.67 4.1 4.1 0.74 
ROE [%] 6.5 9.8 0.52 12.7 12.8 0.09* 
NI 3-Year Growth Rate [%] 27.2 29.2 0.73 15.4 16.8 0.02** 
NI 5-Year Growth Rate [%] 20.8 23.7 0.01** 14.0 15.5 0.00*** 
Shareholder 1-Year Return [%] 20.8 22.8 0.10* 12.4 13.2 0.20 
Shareholder 3-Year Return [%] 14.0 15.4 0.02** 11.9 12.8 0.07* 
Shareholder 5-Year Return [%] 12.1 13.2 0.01*** 11.5 12.5 0.03** 
Market Value/Book Value 2.08 2.14 0.31 1.47 1.55 0.00*** 
Firm Characteristics       
Sales  [$Millions] 3,866 4,431 0.02** 949 1,211 0.00*** 
Stock Volatility  0.43 0.47 0.00*** 0.37 0.40 0.00*** 
Liabilities/Assets 0.57 0.59 0.00*** 0.57 0.59 0.00*** 
PPE/Assets 0.29 0.27 0.00*** 0.23 0.21 0.00*** 
RD/Assets 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.06* 
Governance Index 9.0 9.2 0.00*** 9.0 9.2 0.00*** 
Note:  CEOs are ranked and classified using the Average Ratio as a proxy for CEO managerial power as 
described in sub-section 6.1.  The cut-off for Elite CEO status for this table and my base case regressions is 
the top 10%.  The t-test compares the respective mean of the two classes and the Wilcoxon test compares 
the medians of the two classes.    
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 15.  CEO Compensation Regression Model:  Comparison to Extant Models. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 
200539  
Brick et al40 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 
2003 
Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
Pate 2008 
Dependent Variable       
 Log of CEO compensation Various time 
periods41
Yes3 Yes42  Yes43   Yes44
 CEO pay sensitivity    Yes   
       
Independent Variables       
 Firm characteristics       
 Firm size (log of sales) Not Significant      
 Firm size (log of salest-1)  Positive Positive   Positive 
 Firm size (market equity)    Negative   
 Firm size (log of net assets)     Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 
 Stock Return     Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 
Return on Equity     Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 
 ROA Mixed 
Significance 
     
 Qt-1  Positive     
 ROAt-1  Not Significant    Not Significant 
(Continued next page)
                                                 
39 Regressions with only CEO award winners. 
40 Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006 
41 Ran regressions with both total and cash compensation. 
42 Ran regressions with total, equity and non-equity compensation. 
43 Three regressions: base salary, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation. 
44 For this table I am only comparing my regression with the natural log of CEO total direct compensation for all CEOs. 
 169
Table 15 continued. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 
2003 
Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
Pate 2008 
 Mean ROAt-1, t-3  Not Significant     
 Stock returnt-1, t-3  Positive    Positive 
 Cash flow risk  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 Stock volatility  Mixed 
Significance 
  Positive Not Significant 
 Log (employeest-1)  Positive     
 R&Dt-1/assetst-1  Mixed 
Significance 
   Not Significant 
 Advertisingt-1/assetst-1  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 Debtt-1/assetst-1  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 PP&Et-1/assetst-1  Negative    Negative 
 Investmentst-1/assetst-1  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 Log(1+Firm ROAt-1)   Positive    
 Log(1+Firm Returnt-1)   Positive    
 Log(1+Firm Returnt-2)   Positive45    
 Default Risk      Negative  
 Financial Leverage     Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
Not Significant 
 Growth opportunities     Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
Positive 
(Continued next page) 
                                                 
45 Statistical Significance depends on level of compensation used in regression. 
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Table 15 continued. 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 2003 Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
Pate 2008 
CEO characteristics       
 CEO age Not Significant   Negative Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
Not Significant 
 CEO gender  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 CEO stock ownership [%]  Negative   Positive  
 CEO is chairman  Mixed 
Significance 
  Positive  
 Internal CEO  Negative     
 
 CEO reputation (Milbourn)       
 CEO tenure (experience) Not Significant Mixed 
Significance 
 Positive Mixed Sign Positive 
 Dow Jones Hits    Positive   
 Outsider    Positive   
 Industry adj. firm 
performance 
   Positive46    
 Board characteristics       
 Number of board meetings  Mixed 
Significance 
    
 Excess director total comp.  Positive     
 Proportion of outside 
directors 
    Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 
 Board Size     Mixed Sign, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 
Governance Index      Not Significant 
(Continued next page)
                                                 
46 Industry adjusted stock price performance for 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years prior with current CEO at the helm.  Used only one of these in a given model. 
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Table 15 continued 
 
 Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005 
Milbourn 2003 Cyert, Kang, 
Kumar 2002 
Pate 2008 
Ownership Characteristics       
Largest stock ownership, non-
CEO [%] 
    N  
Mixed 
Significance 
ega
egative
tive
tive
 
Data
,  
Largest stock ownership, 
CEO [%] 
    N  
Mixed 
Significance 
Nega
,  
Compensation  committee 
ownership [%] 
      
Internal Blockholder > 5%     Not Significant  
External Blockholder > 5%     Positive, Mixed 
Significance 
 
 Other independent variables       
 1 year after award Positive      
 2 years after award Positive      
 3 years after award Positive      
 Firm fixed-effects Included  Included   Included 
 Year fixed-effects Included Included Positive47 Included  Included 
 SIC (industry) dummies  Included  Included  Included 
 Regulated industry     Negative, 
Mixed 
Significance 
 
 R2 0.14 to 0.35 0.46 to 0.80 0.56 0.08 0.34 to 0.52 0.39 
       
 Time period 1992-2002 1992-2001 1993-2003 1993-1998 1992-1993 1993-2005 
 Number of Firms 594-76048 1,435 1,500 1,500 1,648 2,746 
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some 
component of CEO compensation as the dependent variable compared to my regression with using the natural log of CEO total direct compensation for 
all CEOs in my sample. 
 
                                                 
47 Positive and statistically significant for each year 1994 through 2003. 
48 Without CEO age variable. 
Table 16.  CEO Compensation Regressions, Modified Chow Test. 
 
 Average Ratio Average CCI  
Dependent Variable Top 10% Top 20% Top 10% Top 20%     
ln of Salary 0.000*** 0.002** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
ln of Bonus    0.071*    0.109    0.243    0.346 
ln of Equity 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ln of Other 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.047** 
ln of Total Compensation 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.010*** 
(a) Firm Life = 13 years 0.031** 0.000*** 0.007***    0.338 
Note:  This table presents the results of modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is interacted with 
all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if Elite CEOs are 
compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs; see Equation (1) in section 4.2 for the complete regression 
model.  The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to rank 
and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6).  The results indicate that 
Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs for all components of compensation except 
for bonus compensation.  Row (a) is a sensitivity case for the natural log of total compensation with only 
the 847 firms that are in the sample all 13 years.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 17.  CEO Compensation Regressions, Alternate Modified Chow Test. 
 
 Average Ratio Average CCI  
Dependent Variable Top 10% Top 20% Top 10% Top 20%     
ln of Salary 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ln of Bonus 0.070* 0.109 0.262 0.222 
ln of Equity 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ln of Other 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.043** 
ln of Total Compensation 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.090* 0.050** 
(a) Firm Life = 13 years 0.040** 0.000*** 0.043** 0.520 
Note:  This table presents the results of an alternate modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is 
interacted with all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if 
Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs; see Equation (1) in section 4.2 for the 
complete regression model.  However, the alternate modified Chow Test excludes the Elite CEO intercept 
from the test.  The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to 
rank and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6).  The results 
indicate that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs for all components of 
compensation except for bonus compensation.  Row (a) is a sensitivity case and is for the natural log of 
total compensation with only the 847 firms that are in the sample all 13 years.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 18.  CEO Total Direct Compensation Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite Exp. 
Sign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO Dummy  0.769     
ROA 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.007 Pos 
Net Income 3-Year 
Growth Rate 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Pos 
Shareholder 3-Year 
Return 
0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003**  
Pos 
Ln Sales 0.303*** -0.045* 0.309*** 0.269*** 0.414*** Pos 
Stock Volatility -0.069 0.218 -0.063 -0.133 0.603 Pos 
TotalLiabilities/Assets -0.068 -0.044 -0.050 -0.042 -0.654** Pos 
PPE/Assets -0.537*** 0.405** -0.462*** -0.505*** -0.217 Pos 
RD/Assets -0.603 0.716 -0.545 -0.767** 1.599 Pos 
MarketToBook Ratio 0.022** 0.072*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.091*** Pos 
CEOAge 0.040*** -0.006 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.081 Pos 
CEOAge2  -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 Pos 
CEOTenure 0.007*** 0.012* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.024** Pos 
Governance Index 0.006 -0.022 0.002 0.004 0.034 Pos 
Constant 4.072***  4.000*** 4.254*** 2.455  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***     
R-squared  0.406 0.384 0.450 0.268  
Observations  12,557 12,557 11,353 1,204  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 175
Table 19.  CEO Equity-Based Compensation Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite Exp. 
Sign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO Dummy  -3.712     
ROA -0.011 0.031 -0.009 -0.013 0.064 Pos 
Net Income 3-Year 
Growth Rate 
-0.001 0.007** 0.000 -0.001 0.005    
Pos 
Shareholder 3-Year 
Return 
0.011*** 0.000 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.003    
Pos 
Ln Sales -0.603*** 0.000 -0.655*** -0.645*** -0.481 Pos 
Stock Volatility -1.887*** -3.411** -2.176*** -2.472*** -1.288 Pos 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 2.708*** -0.611 2.692*** 2.805*** 0.397 Pos 
PPE/Assets -0.180 1.853 0.017 -0.303 1.609 Pos 
RD/Assets -2.788 4.230 -2.658 -2.800 0.247 Pos 
MarketToBook Ratio 0.028 0.042 0.031 0.011 0.235 Pos 
CEOAge -0.048 0.195 -0.034 -0.074 0.472 Pos 
CEOAge2  0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 Pos 
CEOTenure 0.025** -0.070* 0.020 0.029** -0.024 Pos 
Governance Index -0.056 0.081 -0.044 -0.050 0.164 Pos 
Constant 9.552***  9.425*** 10.796*** -7.378  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***     
R-squared  0.095 0.094 0.100 0.008  
Observations  12,557 12,557 11,353 1,204  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 20.  CEO Other Compensation Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite Exp. 
Sign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO Dummy  -2.681     
ROA -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 Pos 
Net Income 3-Year 
Growth Rate 
-0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001    
Pos 
Shareholder 3-Year 
Return 
0.004*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.003** 0.012***    
Pos 
Ln Sales 0.535*** 0.000 0.537*** 0.521*** 0.918*** Pos 
Stock Volatility -0.922*** -0.324 -1.018*** -0.961*** -0.383 Pos 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 0.005 2.164*** 0.339 -0.005 2.236*** Pos 
PPE/Assets -1.777*** 1.488** -1.524*** -1.651*** -0.710 Pos 
RD/Assets 0.007 6.463 0.376 -0.421 4.481 Pos 
MarketToBook Ratio -0.031 -0.033 -0.035 -0.032 -0.109 Pos 
CEOAge 0.219*** 0.017 0.224*** 0.231*** 0.095 Pos 
CEOAge2  -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 Pos 
CEOTenure -0.001 0.016 0.000 -0.001 0.010 Pos 
Governance Index 0.013 -0.026 0.014 0.029 -0.128 Pos 
Constant -6.428***  -6.848*** -6.833*** -5.54  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***     
R-squared  0.146 0.153 0.146 0.141  
Observations  12,557 12,557 11,353 1,204  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions. 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 21.  CEO Salary Compensation Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite Exp. 
Sign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO Dummy  2.06     
ROA -0.005 0.017** -0.003 -0.006* 0.003 Pos 
Net Income 3-Year 
Growth Rate 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000* 0.001    
Pos 
Shareholder 3-Year 
Return 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002    
Pos 
Ln Sales 0.244*** -0.068** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.128 Pos 
Stock Volatility -0.587*** -0.514* -0.618*** -0.502*** -2.277*** Pos 
TotalLiabilities/Assets -0.101 0.565*** -0.006 -0.121 -0.207 Pos 
PPE/Assets 0.032 -0.172 0.035 0.042 -0.657 Pos 
RD/Assets -0.172 0.079 -0.204 -0.279 0.409 Pos 
MarketToBook Ratio -0.029*** 0.022 -0.027*** -0.025** -0.026 Pos 
CEOAge 0 -0.075 0.013 0.016 -0.039 Pos 
CEOAge2  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pos 
CEOTenure 0.011*** -0.019** 0.010*** 0.012*** -0.011 Pos 
Governance Index 0.003 0.031* 0.006 0.003 0.071 Pos 
Constant 4.343***  4.461*** 4.402*** 7.011***  
Modified Chow Test  0.004***     
R-squared  0.078 0.079 0.091 0.023  
Observations  12,557 12,557 11,353 1,204  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 22.  CEO Bonus Compensation Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite Exp. 
Sign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO Dummy  -3.712     
ROA -0.011 0.031 -0.009 -0.013 0.064 Pos 
Net Income 3-Year 
Growth Rate 
-0.001 0.007** 0.000 -0.001 0.005    
Pos 
Shareholder 3-Year 
Return 
0.011*** 0.000 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.003    
Pos 
Ln Sales -0.603*** 0.000 -0.655*** -0.645*** -0.481 Pos 
Stock Volatility -1.887*** -3.411** -2.176*** -2.472*** -1.288 Pos 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 2.708*** -0.611 2.692*** 2.805*** 0.397 Pos 
PPE/Assets -0.180 1.853 0.017 -0.303 1.609 Pos 
RD/Assets -2.788 4.230 -2.658 -2.800 0.247 Pos 
MarketToBook Ratio 0.028 0.042 0.031 0.011 0.235 Pos 
CEOAge -0.048 0.195 -0.034 -0.074 0.472 Pos 
CEOAge2  0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 Pos 
CEOTenure 0.025** -0.070* 0.020 0.029** -0.024 Pos 
Governance Index -0.056 0.081 -0.044 -0.050 0.164 Pos 
Constant 9.552***  9.425*** 10.796*** -7.378  
Modified Chow Test  0.109     
R-squared  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006  
Observations  12,557 12,557 11,353 1,204  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 23.  Firm Performance Regression Model: Comparison to Extant Models. 
 Mehran 
1995 
Malmendier 
and Tate 
2005 
Brick et al 
2006 
Daines et al 
2005 
Pate 2008 
Dependent Variable      
Tobin’s Q Included     
 Return on Assets Included Various 
periods 
 Included  
 1-year excess returns   Included49 Included50  
 
 
 
 
 Firm Performance     8 Measures 
Independent Variables      
 Firm characteristics      
 Firm size (log of tot 
assets) 
Negative     
 Firm size (log of sales)  Negative   Negative51
 Firm size (log of salest-
1) 
  Not reported   
 R&D/Sales Positive     
 (Inv+PP&E)/total 
assets 
Not 
significant 
    
 LT debt/ total assets Not 
significant 
   Positive52
 Qt-1   Not reported   
 ROAt-1  Positive Not reported   
 Mean ROAt-1, t-3   Not reported   
 Stock returnt-1, t-3   Not reported   
 Cash flow risk   Not reported   
 Stock volatility   Not reported  Positive53
 Log (employeest-1)   Not reported   
 R&Dt-1/assetst-1   Not reported  Not 
significant 
 Advertisingt-1/assetst-1   Not reported   
 Debtt-1/assetst-1   Not reported   
 PP&Et-1/assetst-1   Not reported  Not 
significant54
 Investmentst-1/assetst-1   Not reported   
 Market to Book Ratio     Negative55
(Continued next page)
                                                 
49 One-factor model and Fama-French three-factor model. 
50 Fama-French four-factor model. 
51 Statistically significant and negative for 6 of 7 cases that have log of sales as a control variable. 
52 Statistically significant and positive for 7 of 8 cases. 
53 Statistically significant and positive for 4 of 7 cases that have Black-Scholes stock volatility as a control 
variable. 
54 Not significant for 5 of 8 cases.  Statistically significant and positive for 3 of 8 cases. 
55 Statistically significant and negative for 5 of 7 cases that have market to book ratio as a control variable. 
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Table 23 continued. 
 
 Mehran 
1995 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al14 
2006 
Daines et 
al15 
2005 
Pate 2008 
 CEO characteristics      
 CEO age     Mixed56
CEO age2     Mixed 
 CEO tenure 
(experience) 
  Not reported  Not 
significant 
 CEO gender   Not reported   
 CEO’s equity-based 
comp [% of total comp] 
Positive     
 % equity owned by 
CEO 
Positive  Mixed 
significance 
  
 CEO is chairman   Not 
significant 
  
 Internal CEO   Mixed 
significance 
  
 Log (CEO’s total 
comp.) 
  Negative57    
 Log (CEO salary)     Mixed 
 Log (CEO bonus)     Mixed 
 Log (CEO equity)     Mixed 
 Log (CEO Other)     Not 
significant 
 Board characteristics      
 % shares held by 
outside directors 
Not 
significant 
    
 Outside directors [% of 
board] 
Not 
significant 
    
 Number of board 
meetings 
  Not 
significant 
  
 Excess director total 
comp. 
  Positive   
 Log (director’s total 
comp.) 
  Negative   
 Governance Index     Not 
significant 
(Continued next page)
                                                 
56 Mixed significance depending upon the dependent variable. 
57 Mixed significance depending upon which model is used (pooled versus fixed-effects, one-factor versus 
Fama-French three-factor model). 
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Table 23 continued. 
 
 Mehran 
1995 
Malmendier 
and Tate 2005 
Brick et al14 
2006 
Daines et al15 
2005 
Pate 2008 
 Other independent 
variables 
     
 1 year after award  Negative    
 2 years after award  Negative    
 3 years after award  Negative    
 Firm fixed-effects  Included    
 Year fixed-effects  Included Included   
 SIC (industry) 
dummies 
  Included   
 Prior good 
performance for 
 highly paid CEOs  
   Mixed 
significance58  
 
 Prior bad 
performance for 
 highly paid CEOs 
   Mixed 
significance 
 
 Highly paid CEO 
dummy 
   Mixed 
significance 
 
 Prior good 
performance 
   Mixed 
significance 
 
 Prior bad 
performance 
   Mixed 
significance 
 
 Data      
 R2 0.03-0.43 0.12-0.17 0.01-0.10 0.01-0.30 0.01-.12 
 Time period 1979-1980 1992-2002 1992-2001 1992-2001 1993-2005 
 Number of firms 153 608-775 1193-1336 2,284 2,710 
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that 
performed regressions with some measure of firm performance as the dependent variable. 
 
                                                 
58 Mixed significance depending upon how they broke out the regressions: i.e., by firm size, by 
management constraints, by level of incentive pay, and by whether or not there is a 5% blockholder. 
Table 24.  Firm Performance Regressions, Modified Chow Test. 
 
 Average Ratio Average CCI  
Dependent Variable Top 10% Top 10%   
Return on Assets 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Return on Equity      0.992      0.928 
Shareholder 1-Year Return 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Shareholder 3-Year Return 0.000*** 0.008*** 
Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Shareholder 5-Year Return 0.001*** 0.005*** 
Note:  This table presents the results of modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is interacted with 
all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if Elite CEOs’ firms 
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; see Equation (3) in section 4.4 for the complete regression 
model.  The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to rank 
and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6).  The results indicate that 
Elite CEOs’ firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms for all measures of firm performance 
except for return on equity. 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 25.  Firm Performance Regressions, Alternate Modified Chow Test. 
 
 Average Ratio Average CCI  
Dependent Variable Top 10% Top 10%   
Return on Assets 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Return on Equity      0.992      0.931 
Shareholder 1-Year Return 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Shareholder 3-Year Return 0.000*** 0.007*** 
Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Shareholder 5-Year Return 0.002*** 0.005*** 
Note:  This table presents the results of the alternate modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is 
interacted with all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if 
Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; see Equation (3) in section 4.4 for the 
complete regression model.  However, the alternate modified Chow Test excludes the Elite CEO intercept 
from the test.  The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to 
rank and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6).  The results 
indicate that Elite CEOs’ firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms for all measures of firm 
performance except for return on equity. 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 26.   Shareholder 5-Year Return Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  26.180     
lnSales -13.733*** 0.824 -13.623*** -14.154*** -12.662***  NS 
Stock Volatility 12.742*** -1.971 12.851*** 10.742*** 14.975*** NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 32.053*** -1.094 32.006*** 32.334*** 24.644*** NS 
PPE/Assets 12.537*** 1.680 12.908*** 11.824*** 22.211*** NS 
RD/Assets -1.776 -1.627 -1.719 -3.674 -3.865 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio -1.002*** -0.645*** -1.068*** -0.989*** -1.425*** NS 
lnSalary 0.433** 0.163 0.511*** 0.340* 0.886*** NS 
lnBonus -0.444*** 0.104 -0.434*** -0.446*** -0.213** NS 
lnEquity -0.142*** 0.167** -0.120*** -0.154*** 0.009 NS 
lnOther -0.041 -0.199 -0.049 -0.009 -0.563*** NS 
CEO Age 0.715** -1.418* 0.625** 0.598* 1.588 Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.006** 0.015* -0.005** -0.005* -0.013 Pos 
CEO Tenure 0.028 -0.016 0.029 0.038 0.086 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.598** 1.908*** -1.169 Pos 
Governance Index -0.703*** 0.052 -0.739*** -0.865*** -0.231 Neg 
Constant 69.063***  68.479*** 74.600*** 32.639   
Modified Chow Test  0.001***      
R-squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   
Observations  10,557 10,557 9,147 1,410   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 27.  Shareholder 3-Year Return Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  -48.876     
lnSales -18.839*** -1.057 -19.107*** -18.782*** -25.802***  NS 
Stock Volatility 18.735*** 8.162* 19.263*** 18.397*** 31.892*** NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 43.534*** 5.302 44.788*** 42.079*** 46.434*** NS 
PPE/Assets 23.666*** 1.768 24.555*** 24.250*** 18.804 NS 
RD/Assets 6.955 69.310** 11.403 5.584 33.729 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio -1.369*** -1.016*** -1.470*** -1.359*** -2.351*** NS 
lnSalary 0.632*** 0.013 0.645*** 0.486** 1.096** NS 
lnBonus -0.366*** 0.274** -0.329*** -0.370*** -0.209 NS 
lnEquity -0.203*** -0.081 -0.211*** -0.216*** -0.171 NS 
lnOther -0.092 -0.064 -0.093 -0.058 -0.451* NS 
CEO Age 0.409 1.573 0.561 0.399 3.764** Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.031** Pos 
CEO Tenure 0.055 -0.044 0.049 0.094 0.128 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.611** 2.420*** 0.431 Pos 
Governance Index -0.319 0.166 -0.305 -0.406 0.348 Neg 
Constant 91.529***  85.927*** 89.649*** 45.220  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***      
R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03   
Observations  14,900 14,900 13,008 1,892   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 28.  Shareholder 1-Year Return Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  -57.451     
lnSales -29.689*** -2.795* -30.269*** -29.597*** -39.807***  NS 
Stock Volatility 5.286 -16.905** 2.008 0.551 -37.996*** NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 57.802*** 12.423* 60.945*** 56.424*** 69.972*** NS 
PPE/Assets 45.134*** -2.451 45.362*** 51.404*** -3.459 NS 
RD/Assets 27.894 3.354 26.337 28.985 -233.006* NS 
MarketToBook Ratio -0.911*** -2.325*** -1.001*** -0.993*** -3.973*** NS 
lnSalary 0.690 -0.390 0.594 0.623 0.625 NS 
lnBonus -0.136 0.618** -0.061 -0.143 0.231 NS 
lnEquity -0.085 -0.793*** -0.180** -0.103 -0.754*** NS 
lnOther 0.008 0.252 0.035 0.029 -0.276 NS 
CEO Age 1.777** 2.969 2.013** 1.896** 4.277 Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.016** -0.023 -0.018** -0.017** -0.030 Pos 
CEO Tenure 0.031 -0.540 -0.009 0.035 -0.669 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.564 1.979 -1.996 Pos 
Governance Index 0.788 -0.041 0.889 0.711 2.594 Neg 
Constant 93.144***  88.215*** 87.765*** 142.629  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***      
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04   
Observations  19,990 19,990 17,547 2,443   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.  
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
 187
 
Table 29.  Market to Book Ratio Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  -5.352*     
TotalLiabilities/Assets 0.192 0.155 0.173 0.313** -0.276 NS 
PPE/Assets 0.784*** 0.304 0.788*** 1.142*** -1.036* NS 
RD/Assets 2.180** -0.193 2.080** 2.064** 1.578 NS 
NI/Assets 1.597*** -1.030*** 1.318*** 1.671*** 0.384***   NS 
CEO Age -0.158*** 0.168 -0.146*** -0.152*** -0.220** Pos 
CEO Age2 0.001*** -0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002* Pos 
CEO Tenure -0.004 0.006 -0.004 -0.005 0.029 Pos 
Average Ratio   -0.101*** -0.110** -0.352*** Pos 
Governance Index 0.005 0.052 0.008 0.011 0.05 Neg 
Constant 6.557***  6.400*** 6.281*** 10.805***  
Modified Chow Test  0.001***      
R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00   
Observations  22,856 22,856 20,506 2,350   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.  
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
 188
Table 30.  Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  -6.282     
lnSales -16.937*** -0.541 -17.188*** -18.264*** -12.748***  NS 
Stock Volatility 4.857 21.693*** 6.933** 4.319 32.611** NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 30.033*** -7.278 28.733*** 28.233*** 36.371*** NS 
PPE/Assets 6.807 -19.929*** 4.334 6.623 -23.299 NS 
RD/Assets -7.397 29.686 -6.883 -7.495 21.224 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio -0.495*** -1.856*** -0.646*** -0.478*** -2.328*** NS 
lnSalary 0.217 0.030 0.211 0.266 0.441 Pos 
lnBonus -0.712*** -0.069 -0.719*** -0.672*** -1.007*** Pos 
lnEquity -0.115** -0.280** -0.156*** -0.117** -0.399** Pos 
lnOther -0.086 -0.047 -0.095 -0.032 -0.379 Pos 
CEO Age 0.765 0.516 0.867* 0.790 1.219 Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008* -0.008* -0.011 Pos 
CEO Tenure 0.023 0.308* 0.058 0.051 0.318 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.374 1.083 -2.721 Pos 
Governance Index -0.764** -0.362 -0.797** -0.791** -1.650 Neg 
Constant 102.819***  101.756*** 109.683*** 81.361  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***      
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06   
Observations  6,239 6,239 5,458 781   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 31.  Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  130.293     
lnSales -24.722*** -0.373 -24.817*** -26.084*** -29.016***  NS 
Stock Volatility 12.094* 11.962 13.989** 8.804 42.649 NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 51.663*** 11.162 53.190*** 47.910*** 95.892*** NS 
PPE/Assets 13.623* -16.932 11.641 13.805 -17.597 NS 
RD/Assets -26.729 -1.745 -27.808 -27.568 -126.887 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio -0.967*** -2.703*** -1.201*** -0.906*** -4.295*** NS 
lnSalary 0.417 -1.469 0.099 0.518 -1.196 Pos 
lnBonus -1.500*** -0.194 -1.516*** -1.463*** -1.611*** Pos 
lnEquity -0.070 -0.636** -0.146* -0.071 -0.534* Pos 
lnOther -0.385** 1.051** -0.257 -0.344* 0.668 Pos 
CEO Age 2.573*** -4.054 2.344** 2.874*** -2.317 Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.024*** 0.035 -0.022*** -0.027*** 0.023 Pos 
CEO Tenure 0.040 0.575* 0.123 0.081 0.514 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.226 2.204 -17.803** Pos 
Governance Index -0.555 -0.747 -0.697 -0.771 -0.243 Neg 
Constant 114.013***  123.339*** 115.897*** 299.092**  
Modified Chow Test  0.002***      
R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01   
Observations  9,955 9,955 8,758 1,197   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.  
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
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Table 32.  Return on Assets Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  -15.879     
lnSales -1.471*** -0.385 -1.724*** -1.735*** -3.497**    NS 
Stock Volatility -3.949*** -8.961*** -6.618*** -3.846*** -26.646*** NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets 18.288*** 37.016*** 25.489*** 13.443*** 97.550*** NS 
PPE/Assets -0.580 0.206 -0.898 1.481 -34.024*** NS 
RD/Assets 10.283 -17.004 7.694 3.171 -22.901 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio 0.419*** 0.933*** 0.486*** 0.464*** 1.449*** NS 
lnSalary -0.295** -0.162 -0.266** -0.328** -0.207 Pos 
lnBonus 0.271*** 0.104 0.294*** 0.261*** 0.252** Pos 
lnEquity 0.024 -0.078 0.005 0.023 -0.150 Pos 
lnOther 0.090* -0.058 0.077* 0.045 0.040 Pos 
CEO Age 0.095 -0.023 0.078 0.210 -1.100 Pos 
CEO Age2 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.011 Pos 
CEO Tenure -0.005 -0.144 -0.006 0.014 -0.183 Pos 
Average Ratio   0.206 1.216*** -2.405** Pos 
Governance Index -0.199 -0.256 -0.162 -0.144 -0.093 Neg 
Constant 4.796  3.048 2.950 32.354  
Modified Chow Test  0.000***      
R-squared  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04   
Observations  20,124 20,124 17,669 2,455   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.  
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 33.  Return on Equity Regressions. 
 
Variable  Elite CEO 
Interaction 
Terms 
All Non-Elite Elite  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elite CEO dummy  31.499     
lnSales 3.082 0.735 2.807 4.971* -6.180*     NS 
Stock Volatility 0.516 -1.282 0.687 7.935 -9.723 NS 
TotalLiabilities/Assets -66.120*** 77.850** -55.510*** -75.130*** 34.546** NS 
PPE/Assets 5.058 6.049 6.971 13.970 -78.400** NS 
RD/Assets -52.355 6.163 -54.276 -54.836 -3.467 NS 
MarketToBook Ratio 0.854* 0.807 0.968* 0.983* 2.279** NS 
lnSalary -1.016 1.080 -0.534 -1.330 -0.857 Pos 
lnBonus 0.620* 0.802 0.716* 0.564* 1.207*** Pos 
lnEquity 1.197*** -0.672 1.097*** 1.178*** 0.419* Pos 
lnOther -0.261 -0.456 -0.346 -0.241 -0.678* Pos 
CEO Age 3.945* -2.626 3.650* 4.507* -1.450 Pos 
CEO Age2 -0.035* 0.025 -0.033* -0.040* 0.017 Pos 
CEO Tenure -0.021 -0.605 -0.030 0.126 -0.769* Pos 
Average Ratio   3.663* 13.720** 0.173 Pos 
Governance Index 1.943 -1.262 1.952 2.471* 0.272 Neg 
Constant -130.194*  -136.227* -149.226* 86.060  
Modified Chow Test  0.992      
R-squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Observations  19,707 19,707 17,310 2,397   
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent 
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are 
presented in column (2).  The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated 
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs.  Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions 
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, 
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference.  Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients 
for all columns except column (2).  I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all 
regressions.   
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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